Which Battle Had a Greater Impact?

They should have sunk that ocean liner in the panama canal to force a delay on transfer of war material to fight Japan.

They should have attacked in 3 waves and finished off these Battleships

They should have invaded Hawaii from the start, American power was not capable after the defeat to retake it too soon.

but really if they left french indo-china alone they could have easily established their empire and not had any war. If they invaded the dutch colonies in say 1938-39 while Germany was drawing attention away from the world stage, they would have their oil and FDR would not have any support to DOW on Japan.

They could have successfully raged war on China for as long as it took, and avoided war with USA. Nobody cared about China except a few British who were worried about their properties in Asia.

If they had to attack USA, they should have wiped out the Ceylon fleet AND the pacific fleet at the same time, followed up with all those invasions. But after 10 years in China they could not even finish the job, proving that attacking USA was stupid, because China was totally backward in this time proving Japan didn’t have the capabilities to fight normal armies.

@Corbeau:

Debatable.

USA had still options after the attack and it’s best units still at sea. There was still hope.

I’m not convinced the will of vengeance would have been enough to overcome the despair of having no means to fight. Rebuilding from scratch rather than from the backbone of their full carrier force would have been a really different story.

I would not have seen the Japaneses hold back in thoses conditions, the very US west coast would have been endangered. It took everything and lots of luck to win midway. I say luck causes it was sheer luck to take out 2 carriers minutes before their fully loaded planes launched, not morale like in Guadalcanal.

Debatable?

In Yamamoto words: “I can run wild for six months … after that, I have no expectation of success.”

(By the way Midway happened 6 months after Pearl Harbour…)

Japan only one possibility was to win breaking USA morale, defeating them and breaking the will of combat in order to obtain recognition of status quo of their conquests.

Attacking as they did at Pearl Harbour achieved the opposite. They could even managed to sink the entire Hawaiian island sending all to the bottom of the sea: USA had not given up.

Yamamoto, when once asked his opinion on the war, pessimistically said that the only way for Japan to win the war was to dictate terms in the White House, requiring them to eventually invade the United States and march across the country while fighting their way to Washington — i.e., Japan would have to conquer the whole of the United States. Yamamoto’s meaning was that military victory was completely impossible - a rebuff to those who thought that winning a major battle against the US Navy would end the war.

Midaway was a lucky battle for sure but USA worked to obtain those victory. The task force 16 and 17 were there to wait the enemy AC because Nimitz knew of the coming attack having decripted Japanese messages. Moreover Nagumo do not performed well in command of the Japanese Carrier Force in that battle. Too much indecision in the planning of the attacks. He did not expected any opposition because according to plan USA forces should arrive there only after Midway invasion. He was then caught by surprise in the worst situation his Carriers may be. Furthermore USA soldiers, seamen and pilots were moved by a terrible resolve to avenge Pearl Harbour.

Yes and also it was the way the Japanese started the war that sealed their fate. They could just left us alone, which would have made king FDR in a poor position to convince anybody that Japan was worth fighting over. Eventually of course FDR would have created some excuse to get in the war. To prove the point he said he was very much relieved when Germany blundered and declared war on USA, which FDR could not get in this war if he got dropped off in his wheelchair with a BAR shooting Germans in france. Hitlers mistake was saving grace for the Allies.

Funny that Japan was smart about leaving the Russians alone because they were too strong, but attacked USA instead.

I completely agree with you IL! It is the point that I had tried to made!

Well if you read the views of the Japanese (particually good is John Tolands The Rising sun in which he interviewed and documented the Japanese view of the Pacific War) they viewed Guadalcanal as the bigger disaster.

They understood the defeat at Midway, but many viewed this as a Navy disaster, which the Army did not support nor believed needed to be undertaken. The loss of the 4 carriers and the aircrews was not viewed as particually alarming by the leaders in Tokyo at the time (not counting the Navy men of course).

Guadalcanal, however became a struggle that the Japanese Army and Navy waged together (although they really didn’t always work together) and that consumed resources the Japanese could not afford to lose. The Japanese made supreme efforts to stop the US at Guadalcanal, and ultimately cost the IJN far more ship losses than Midway and finished off her naval aviator veterans. The Japanese Army also got a drubbing that was so severe that they abandoned GC…something they usually did not do.

Certainly both battles were disasters for the Japanese but their view was GC was the point when they were thrown on the defensive and ultimately on the road to defeat.

The Japanese feeling and point of view are importants.
Naturally the History have to listen to the witnesses but have also to work on the global picture of the historical events.

The fact the Japanese are not willing to accept defeat can not change the importance of the Midway Battle. Its outcome was devastating for the IJN.

The Imperial Japanese Army was fighting China from 1937 Being unable to defeat it. What could have done against the USA Navy? Defended each island to the last man? They did and still did not win the war.
Hardly Imperial Japanese Army defending the island, may have defeated the USA Navy. Such idea is a signal of the erroneous evaluation of the relative strenght of the two country.

The fact that Japanese politician did not understood that losing four irreplaceable carriers with all their veteran pilots is not a motive of praise. In fact, having not understood that the balance of sea power was related to the Aircrafts carrier and not the the Battleships was one of the big mistakes of the Japanese leadership.

Japanese entered the war with a really powerful squadron of six Aircraft Carriers and veteran pilots. They considered them expendable. After six months four of them was sunk and the other two had lost almost all their veteran pilots. Looking at those facts (not opinions) it is obvious that Japan was losing the war before the battle of Guadalcanal even began. No matter what Japanese feels.

Moreover, I repeat: without Midway victory there should not be a Guadalcanal battle.
With Midway victory USA takes the initiative and even if they had lost at Guadalcanal they had won the war.

Certainly no one is debating the decisive nature of Midway. And the Japanese really had no chance to win a war against the US. Economically the Japanese were at a huge disadvantage. consider only about 15 % or so of US military output went to the Pacific.

The US might have lost the war by being weak, losing its nerve, or having the american press or people turn on the conflict. Thank goodness previous american generations wern’t as comfortable as we currently are.

But really wars are not waged based on logic of having a chance, even those who may know they have no chance still will sometimes role the dice. You never know what might happen and sometimes you just have to fight.

Poland had no chance against Hitler but they refused to give in to his demands and they fought.

Czechoslovakia probably had a chance against Hitler but were sold out and did not fight.

The Confederacy had little chance of really beating the Union.  Should have quit after Gettysburg and Vicksburg, should have quit after the fall of Atlanta and the reelection of Lincoln. But by then it was too late. And when the South attempted a peace conference in early 1865, Lincoln and his generals told them to pack sand.

The Romans at their height lost wars. The people beating them probably had no chance to win but win they did.

The continentals had little chance of really beating the British. - but they did

Iraq had little chance of beating the US. - in either war but fight both of them they did.

and on and on throughout history.

And once your in the war its real hard to make peace. The Japanese would never had looked for peace after one defeat. Heck it took them getting nuked twice and they still debated fighting on and even had a junior officer’s revolt to keep the war going.

Ok legion3, I see your point. You are right and also I am convinced that war is not a matter of logic or percentage. I have also exposed my point of view on this in my previous posts and my vision is similar to yours one.

Historical analysis have to take in account the facts for understanding how the things are really went and the possible alternatives. For a battle this means that the possible outcome should be weighed in respect of the possible effect on the course of the war.

Midway is important for the reason you are stating. A Japanese victory hardly had changed their economic inferiority but could have had a dangeroous moral impact on the USA. At Guadalcanal they coul not reach the same objective.

I agree with you, a Japanese victory at midway would (probably) not have changed the inevitable outcome, might have prolonged it, and I don’t think that generation of Americans would have trimbled and lost heart.

Loss at GC would also not have done anything more than give Japan further breathing space but America’s untouchable economy would have eventually plowed under Japan.

Japan simply did not have either the economic resources or the military power to wage a long war, frankly neither did the Germans.

A good book to read is KAIGUN Strategy, Tactics and Technology of the IJN 1887-1941 by Evans and Peattie. Apart from the technical aspects of the IJN and its early victories over china and russia, the book goes into great detail of the war the Japanese planned to fight, hoped to fight but in the end was unable to fight do to the changing nature of the Pacific War and the modern economic face or war.

Both battles give examples of lessons not learned. When the Japs were clearing the Brits from Ceylon and the surrounding area the search pattern they used to find naval units proved flawed. Since the Japanese met their objectives due to weight of numbers they used the same search pattern at Midway. Stupid.

The Japanese had a habit of splitting naval forces with the thought of having them meet IN THE COMBAT ZONE. That worked exactly zero times when the tactic was discovered. So they approached Midway with a Landing Force and a Carrier Group. I’m going to go out on a limb to say if the Japs kept both groups as one the millions of additional rounds they could have thrown at the attacking American aircraft may have proved helpful.

The actions leading up to Leyte Gulf were the result the Japs learning nothing from Midway and other battles. They went into the Phillipines with three naval forces and these were handled one at a time. One force was mualed twice in fact. Of course with a little more resovle the Japanese could have turned Leyte into an American grave yard.

The Pacific war was filled with stories of needless sacrifice on the part of the Japanese service member. Guadalcanal showed the banzai charge to be a less than useful tool in modern warfare. Yet it happened over and over throughout the war. I can imagine some NCO or officer saying “Ammo’s low. Time to get shot. Let’s go gang! BANZAI!” Kiss my a$$ sarge. I’m going coconut hunting.

Even when the outcome was no longer in doubt the Japanese military leadership poured resources into Guadalcanal. This was the result of them not being able to accept being wrong. In the end that would prove to be the biggest mistake the Nipponese would make. It took entirely too much convincing to get them to admit being wrong.

The biggest contribution of both battles was no contribution at all for one side. The Japs learned nothing from their mistakes. Our boys used that to tactical, operational, and strategic advantage throughout the war.

Yes they were guilty of:

1. dividing their forces which weakens the effort ( poor use of economy of force)

2. overly ambitious elaborate planes basing too much enemy reaction on Japanese way of thinking ( not having a simple plan)

3. over representation of their own capabilities, and under appreciating the enemy resolve. ( Bushido Machismo)

4. doing too many things at once

5. poor security of intentions ( broken code, violations of communication, crappy feints/diversions-easy to see thru)

11HP20, I agree with you for Midway and Guadalcanal but I do not agree about Leyte Gulf.

IJN was largely inferior in that battle and still fought valiantly.

Ozawa, with a false AC forces, drew away the USA Carrier Task Forces, while Nishimura managed to draw the attention of the Battleships forces. In the critical phases of the battle Kurita with his battleships reached the amphibious force in the off the coast of Samar. Only the desperate courage of the escorsting ships saved the amphibious force from the sure destuction at the hand of the Yamato. Kurita thought he have to fought the 3rd fleet and retreated. The plan was good and complex but was excuted not perfectly and sincerely I think that even if perfectly executed IJN hardly had any possibility to won against USA fleet in October 1944.

I voted for Midway, but it is more a combination of Coral Sea and Midway in my view.  A bit of background.  In 1991, I spent several weeks with John Winton assisting him in researching his book on Ultra in the Pacific.  We spent a lot of time looking through the declassified intercepts and intercept summaries.  I have been studying the Solomon Islands campaign for 40 plus years, and in May of 2002, I spent 15 days in the Solomon Islands assisting Dr. Robert Ballard in his search for JFK’s PT-109.  I was responsible for wreck identification, onboard historian, general technical reference person, and explosives and weapons expert.  I have also assisted in identifying the wreckage of a Japanese carrier sunk at Midway that is on the bottom in 17,000 feet of water.

First, one of the more interesting intercepts they we read was one concerning the transfer of the surviving air crew from the Shokaku and Zuikaku to the carriers that were attacking the Aleutians.  Basically, the Japanese by May of 1941 were short of trained carrier aircrew.  The combination of losses at Coral Sea, Midway, and the Aleutians therefore crippled the Japanese to the point where they no longer could field qualified pilots to the surviving carriers.

Second, the Guadalcanal campaign and the advance up the Solomon Islands by the Allies subjected the Japanese to the devastating attrition that they could simply not afford.  Losses there could not be replaced  Japanese planning was heavily dependent on the decisive battle, with the enemy suffering massive losses while the Japanese were relatively unscathed, as occurred at the Battle of Tsushima.  A campaign of attrition was the last thing that the Japanese planned for.

Third, the Japanese Army, after having the 23rd Infantry Division mangled by the Russians at Nomohan/Khalkin-Gol, had no desire whatsoever to engage the Russians again on anything like remotely even terms.  Hence, they did not bother the Russians for the entire war.  Russian merchant ships carrying supplies from the West Coast to Vladivostok sailed through the Sea of Japan up to the Russian declaration of war in 1945.  The Japanese Army had limited knowledge of the US and Britain, and much of what they had was filtered through the Germans.  The Japanese Army was calling the shots in starting the war, not the Navy.  They needed resources, not Hawaii.

To Be Continued

Midway!  When you lose FOUR of your FIRST line carriers…it becomes demoralizing.  The Japanese offensive in the Pacific ended at Midway…they suddenly had to go on the defensive starting at Guadalcanal!

Neither Midway nor Guadalcanal had any great impact on the war on a strategic scale.
If Japan went all in against Hawaii, and killed off every US ship and all the other US ships that was heading for Hawaii, then they might had a snowballs chance in hell to keep anything, and/or to avoid the US demand of total surrender.

The biggest error the Japanese did was that they did not understand the American mentality after they attacked Pearl Harbor.

@ABWorsham:

I’m surprised this post has found life.

I’ll sum up the two battles in football terms. Midway was the shocking interception that was returned for a touchdown, it stopped the Japanese momentum. Guadalcanal was the fifteen play drive for 98 yard that took 7 minutes off the clock for the U.S forces.

I love this analogy, very fitting.

@ABWorsham:

I’m surprised this post has found life.

I’ll sum up the two battles in football terms. Midway was the shocking interception that was returned for a touchdown, it stopped the Japanese momentum. Guadalcanal was the fifteen play drive for 98 yard that took 7 minutes off the clock for the U.S forces.

My man is a football fan and he puts this in such great terms…Absolutely perfect…

+2 karma to the ABW…