Good posts, Bunnies and Gargantua! :) I feel like my work is half done before I’ve input a single character. Now it’s time for the other half.
The single best book about WWII which I’ve encountered is The Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze. The book received the Wolfson History Prize, and has been praised by The Times (London), The Boston Globe, Financial Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Guardian. Adam Tooze is an historian who also knows economics; having received a PhD in economics from the London School of Economics. He teaches history at the University of Cambridge.
Below are quotes from The Wages of Destruction
Grain imports in the late 1930s had run at the rate of more than 7 million tons per annum. . . . These sources of supply were now closed off by the British blockade.
P. 418
Backe was in an impossible position. The Fuehrer had demanded more workers. Gauleiter Sauckel was dedicated to delivering them. Hitler and Sauckel now demanded that they be fed, which was clearly a necessity if they were to be productive. And yet, given the level of grain stocks, Backe was unable to meet this demand. What was called for was a reduction in consumption, not additional provisions for millions of new workers. The seriousness of the situation became apparent to the wider public in the spring of 1942 when the Food Ministry announced cuts to the food rations of the German population. Given the regime’s mortal fear of damaging morale, the ration cuts of April 1942 are incontrovertible evidence that the food crisis was real. Lowering the rations was a political step of the first order, which Backe would never have suggested if the situation had not absolutely required it. . . . When the reduction in civilian rations was announced it produced a response which justified every anxiety on the part of the Nazi leadership. [News of the cuts was] ‘devastating,’ like ‘virtually no other event during the war’. Studies by nutritional experts added to the regime’s concerns. . . .
Against this backdrop, there was no hope of pushing through any improvement in the rations for Sauckel’s newly arrived Ostarbeitter. . . . Whilst Sauckel’s office vainly issued memorandums calling for adequate treatment of the Ostarbeiter, hundreds of thousands of underfed and underclothed workers arrived from the Eastern territories, to find themselves penned in barbed wire encampments and facing a diet of slow starvation. . . .
At a meeting with DAF officials in early September, Sauckel stamped his foot. The Fuehrer himself had made it clear that it was completely unacceptable for anybody to be starving on the territory of Germany, when the Wehrmacht had full control of the Ukraine.
pp. 541 - 543
The result of all this was that Germany became even more aggressive about extracting food from its eastern territories; thereby increasing the number of famine deaths in the east. Doing so allowed Germany to avoid widespread malnutrition among its civilian populace. But its food supply was not sufficient to both achieve that and avoid widespread starvation among the millions of Soviet POWs.
Lazarus wrote, “I make no distinction between those Soviets murdered on capture or slowly strarved to death in the following weeks. To me they are both inhuman acts of savages.” He has presented us with a half truth. It is correct to state that millions of Soviet POWs starved to death in German captivity. It is wildly inaccurate to imply (as he has) that the reason for the starvation was because Hitler or other Nazi leaders were suddenly seized with the savage desire to exterminate their own labor force during the middle of a war! Millions of POWs starved to death because the British food blockade achieved its intended task: it created famine conditions within Germany.
If Lazarus’s comments about Soviet POWs are half truths, his remarks about postwar occupation policy are entirely untrue, and bear no connection to reality. Nothing he’s written on that point is credible.