Who had more power

It’s been clearly documented that many people in the Soviet Union, fed up with Stalin’s rule and (in the case of non-Russians) seeking independence, initially welcomed the German advances during the first few months of Operation Barborossa, before the SS (and the Wehrmacht) clearly displayed Nazi Germany’s own brand of barbarism. It has been speculated that, had Germany invaded with appeals to independence, calls to throw off Stalin’s rule, and a mandate to treat the population humanely like on the Western Front, enough additional manpower would’ve been raised to enable a victory on the Eastern Front in either 1941 or 1942.

But what about Japan? Many of the areas they invaded in the early parts of the Pacific War had grievances with their colonizers (most notably India, which had a small minority of troops and officers fight under Axis command during the war with the goal of liberating their home country), with hopes of achieving independence once Japan pushed the Western powers out. These hopes were quickly dashed once Japan demonstrated their intent to treat Southeast Asia, the Dutch East Indies, and the Phillipines as their own colonies.

Obviously, this was the result of the plans set out by the militaristic and nationalistic forces in Japan’s government and military, and it’s near impossible the Imperial Japan as we knew it would’ve done anything else.

But what if Japan had authentically alturistic goals to liberate Asia from their Western occupiers? How would that have played out?

Well, the Second Sino-Japanese War couldn’t have started. Japan lost much of their reputation amongst the Indian people during their invasion of another independent Asian nation and merciless treatment of the Chinese in the Nanjing Massacre and other atrocities.

While Japan may have been able to get away with the Mukden Incident and subsequent invasion of Manchuria, there would’ve needed to be a different, far more assertive government aimed at smoothing out the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and keeping a tight leash on the IJA to prevent this from occuring (as well as a much different view of Japan’s role in the world, not as a racially superior nation destined to rule over Asia, but as simply one Asian country among many, trying to advocate for the rights of Asians everywhere).

Once the European war happened the way it did (it’s highly doubtful whatever Japan did would’ve impacted the course of events in Nazi Germany and Poland), once France and the Netherlands fell and Britain was on the ropes, Japan could’ve struck quickly, ignoring the Phillipines (which was already promised independence) and the US, announcing their military campaign as aiming to liberate Asia from the hated Western colonizers, allow the peoples to decide their fate independently of foreign intervention, and keep “Asia for Asians”. They could’ve used Thailand, hopefully far more assured of Japan’s benign intentions without the war in China, as a springpoint.

Given the results of the war in 1941-1942, it’s highly likely such an initial endeavor would’ve been successful, and an independent Vietnam, Burma, and Indonesia, amongst others, would’ve been created (as well as a massive expansion of Siam).

Roosevelt would’ve found himself hard-pressed to steer the country into war, given Japan’s less threatening stance, isolationism, and lack of enthusiasm over dying for European colonies.

Without their ground troops tied down in China, Japan would’ve been able to concentrate almost all of their military might against India (they might even have had enough “leftover” for a diverstionary attack on the Soviet Union if Germany still goes Barborossa).

If the Japanese made an all-out effort to cooperate with the Indian National Congess and other pro-independence leaders, they may have been able to inspire a major rebellion/revolution within the colony while they militarily advanced. It’s hard to see how the British forces would’ve been able to cope with this, especially with, at the very least, delayed US intervention in Europe.

I think the end result would’ve been an Imperial Japan seen as a hero by much of Asia, having driven the Europeans out and sacrificed their blood to liberate others (and to get nice trading agreements for natural resources, of course), a slew of independent Asian nations grateful for Japanese help, and potentially new land for Japanese settlers in Siberia, since with a much weaker Britain Germany would’ve been able to force at least a stalemate with the Soviets, leaving few resources to spare for a counteroffensive in the east (there is no question the Red Army would’ve prioritized the western areas of the country).

Of course, none of this could’ve possibly happened. Japanese beliefs among its leadership would’ve had to change fundamentally for anything like this to take place, similar to any Nazi German effort to sincerely appeal to the Eastern Europeans dissatisfied with the Soviets. A more realistic option would be for the Japanese to pretend to do such a thing more convincingly, granting increased autonomy to the peoples they “liberated” before throwing the mask off and carrying out their full plans once (if) a peace agreement was signed with the West. Little would’ve changed in such a scenario if Japan still went to war with the US and China.

So, what do you think of my scenario? Do you think it’s realistic? I look forward to feedback of all kinds.

Today or yesterday (depending on where you live) was the 80th anniversary of the Battle of the Phillipine Sea.

When the US landed in Saipan, the Japanese responded with a massive carrier attack (supported by aircraft from land bases), the first major Japanese carrier operation in a year and a half. Numerically, at least, this was the largest Japanese carrier force ever committed to battle and was faced by the largest and most powerful fleet ever put together in the history of warfare up to that point, America’s Fast Carrier Task Force.

Due to the sharp decline of Japanese pilot quality and a massive technological and numerical advantage from the American side, the Japanese 1st Mobile Fleet was dealt a giant defeat, losing 3 carriers and irreverisble numbers of aircraft for essentially no results.

The battle saw the combat debut of Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, arguablly one of the best Japanese carrier commanders, in command of a major Japanese carrier force. Previously Ozawa commanded various fleets and formations containing carriers, but never the Kido Butai (or its successor, the 1st Mobile Fleet) in combat.

@Witt

Thank you so much! I appreciate your input.

The US ‘Ghost Army’ was a unit specialized in deception: by building and operating mockups, they gave the Germans the impression of being a large army, drawing the enemy’s attention away from actual operations. They famously participated in Operation Fortitude in 1944, aimed at leading the Germans to believe that the allied invasion would occur somewhere else than it actually did. Later, they transferred to mainland Europe and continued to mislead the enemy.

Surviving veterans have now finally received their well-earned decorations.

@Karl7:

Why wouldn’t that have worked?  How big was the Brit garrison?  I am assuming no more than a couple thousand?

Infantry
In late 1939 the pre-war garrison was reinforced up to an infantry division (commanded by Major General Sir Sanford John Palairet Scobell).[13] The original infantry garrison, plus the three brigades that reinforced the island’s regular British Army were title 1, 2, 3, and 4 Brigades; but were subsequently renumbered in 1943 as follows:[14]

231 Infantry Brigade – assigned to the Southern Sector under Brig L H Cox. HQ Southern Infantry Brigade at Luqa. Its infantry battalions were:
2nd Battalion The Devonshire Regiment
1st Battalion The Hampshire Regiment
1st Battalion The Dorsetshire Regiment
2nd Battalion The King’s Own Malta Regiment
3rd Battalion The King’s Own Malta Regiment
232 Infantry Brigade – assigned to the Northern Sector under Brig W H Oxley. HQ Northern Infantry Brigade at Melita Hotel Attard next to San Anton Gardens. Its infantry battalions were:
2nd Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers
8th Battalion, King’s Own Royal Regiment (Lancaster)
8th Battalion, Manchester Regiment[15]
233 Infantry Brigade – formed on 30 July 1941; assigned to the Central Sector under Brig I De La Bere. Its infantry battalions were:
11th Battalion The Lancashire Fusiliers
2nd Battalion The Queen’s Own Royal West Kent Regiment[16]
10th Battalion The King’s Own Malta Regiment
234 Infantry Brigade – assigned to the Western sector under Brig F Brittorous. Its infantry battalions were:
4th Battalion The Royal East Kent Regiment (The Buffs)
1st Battalion The Durham Light Infantry
1st Battalion The Cheshire Regiment

Malta Forces

16th Fortress Company
24th Fortress Company
173rd Tunnel Company
2 Works Company
127th Bomb Disposal Section
128th Bomb Disposal Section
Malta Command Signals, Royal Signals
8 Special Wireless Squadron
Royal Army Medical Corps
39 General Hospital RAMC
45 General Hospital RAMC
90 General Hospital RAMC
15 Field Ambulance RAMC
161 Field Ambulance RAMC
69 Field Security Section Intelligence Corps
226 Provost Company Royal Military Police
Royal Army Service Corps[23]
32 Company RASC (MT)
Malta Supply Depot RASC
Water Transport Company RASC

@CWO:

I’d say it’s one of those exceptions that proves the rule.  If it took 70,000 to 300,000 Persians (Herodotus claims a figure as high as two-and-a-half million) to kill 300 Spartans, that’s actually a pretty pathetic performance on the part of the Persians.

True. However, speaking just about shots and arrows, the Persians did get them all.

@ABWorsham:

@KurtGodel7:

The initial invasion would deal the Soviets a hammer blow, and German strength would mean that there would not be the opportunity for them to recover. The German war machine would push eastward like a steamroller, destroying all resistance in its path.

You still have the problem in Russia of attacking with a Mechanized force across extreme conditions- little to no road systems, rivers, swamps, forest and fighting an enemy that will leave stronghold behind to be dealt with.

You will be asking your men to fight a battle with no chance chance of a quick victory. There are no vital targets, no death blows targets the first 400 miles inside Russia. Your army will have to fight an epic battle, near Moscow, with a 800 mile supply line; facing an enemy that is getting supplied a few miles away. That’s risking a lot.

Your post is absolutely correct. There can be no argument that conquering the Soviet Union would have been a gargantuan task. You’re right about the terrain, the length of the supply lines, and the implication that the required battles would be of epic proportions. In addition, the Soviets an overwhelming numerical advantage in available infantry. My impression is that the Soviet numerical advantage was 3:1 over the Germans, but declined to 2:1 after taking into account the Romanians, Hungarians, Finns, Italians, and anti-communist Soviet citizens who fought alongside German soldiers on Germany’s Eastern Front during WWII.

In the historical war, Germany lacked oil. As a consequence, its supply lines had to be largely oil-free. Coal-powered trains would deliver supplies most of the way to the front, and horses would take them the rest of the way to where they were needed. This transportation method can work well during a relatively static war, but is inadequate for the kind of mobile war necessary to conquer the Soviet Union. During the invasion of the Soviet Union some gasoline-powered transportation was available to supplement the horse and coal method. But this supply delivery mechanism was wholly inadequate because of Germany’s lack of oil. Germany’s inability to adequately supply its troops was why its soldiers often lacked winter uniforms during the winter of '41 - '42.

In the scenario I outlined, Germany would have control of the Persian oilfields for several years leading up to the invasion. That oil would allow military trucks to play a much greater role in supplying Germany’s soldiers than had been the case in the actual war. I realize this supply effort would become less effective in fall (muddy roads) and winter (freezing engines). Even so, this would still represent a dramatic improvement over the supply situation Germany faced in the historical war.

I envision the Soviets’ quantitative advantage being offset in three ways.

By outproducing them. Germany experienced a nearly threefold increase in its aircraft production between 1942 and 1944. My scenario envisions putting this kind of efficient production into effect several years before the invasion of the Soviet Union.

Largely offset the Soviets’ quantitative advantage in available infantry. Even if some group of foreign recruits proved one fifth or one tenth as effective as Germans on a man-for-man basis, it would still be better than nothing. And if, due to poor motivation or lack of discipline, foreign soldiers proved relatively ineffective, that problem could be solved through sheer numbers. A large non-German force invading northward from Persia could tie down a significant amount of the Red Army’s strength; and indeed could kill or capture a large number of Soviet soldiers. While the main hammer blow would be the German Army attacking from the west, it would be logical to create as many problems for the Soviet Army as possible.

By building a qualitative advantage over them. On a man-for-man basis, Germany’s infantry were about three times as combat effective as their Soviet counterparts (see http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/pdf/e-4epw1and2final.pdf ). But for most of the war, Soviet soldiers were, on average, as well or better armed than their German counterparts. That problem could be solved by the assault rifle. It was introduced late in the war, and in very small numbers. It proved exceptionally effective at allowing German soldiers to mow down their Soviet counterparts. The improved supply situation (Persian oil) and manufacturing situation means that German infantry and artillery would have plenty of ammunition.

By far the best handheld anti-tank weapon of WWII was the Panzerfaust. The first version of the Panzerfaust could penetrate the frontal armor of any widely deployed Allied tank, but only had a range of 30 meters. That range was soon doubled to 60 meters. By 1945, Germany had deployed a few Panzerfausts with a range of 150 meters, and with a better sighting mechanism and even better armor penetration than their predecessors. Germany was in the process of developing a Panzerfaust with a 250 meter range when the war ended. Had the invasion of the Soviet Union taken place in 1947 or '48, the Panzerfaust 250 could have been put into widespread deployment, making German infantry devastating against Soviet tanks.

Another important aspect of the qualitative situation involves tanks. The T-34 was an exceptional tank by the standards of 1941. But by 1944, even the upgraded version (T-34-85) was getting long in the tooth. In the Korean War, it had become clear that the T-34-85 was obsolete in competitions against the tanks Britain and the U.S. had begun deploying in 1945 and '46. In subsequent Arab-Israeli conflicts, T-44/54 model tanks would also prove highly ineffective/obsolete against very early postwar British and American tanks.

This is where the Entwicklung Series (E-Series) tanks could have been immensely valuable to Germany. Just as Panthers were qualitatively superior to T-34-85s, the E-50 would have been qualitatively superior to the T-44/54. The E-Series was designed to be much more easily manufactured and more mechanically reliable than its predecessors. Instead of a handful of Panthers against a horde of T-34-85s, it would have been a very large number of E-50s against those T-34-85s! Additionally, the E-50 would have been a better tank than the Panther or Tiger I, and the E-75 would have been superior to the Tiger II. Panthers and Tigers were often lost to mechanical problems or lack of fuel rather than enemy action. But with the increased mechanical reliability of the E-Series, and with the Persian Oil, German tanks would become much less likely to be lost to such causes.

The Soviet Union did not develop jet engines during WWII. In 1946, Stalin was able to license jet technology from a pro-Soviet British Labour government. That technology was then put to use in the Korean War; where the MiG proved an effective aircraft.

During the Korean War, the democracies’ most effective jet fighter was the F-86 Sabre. It would not be too much of an exaggeration to call the Sabre a knockoff of the Me 262, except with better engines. The Germans had begun using Me 262s in combat in 1944; and had already begun work on designing their next generation of jet aircraft. Had that next generation been deployed in the Korean War, both the Soviets’ and democracies’ aircraft would have been obsolete in comparison.

Had the German invasion of the Soviet Union occurred around 1947 or '48, German aircraft would have had a commanding qualitative edge over their Soviet counterparts, even if the Soviets had been able to license jet technology.

Not only were German air designs more advanced than their Allied counterparts. Late in WWII, Germany began developing advanced air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles. Waiting until 1947 or '48 to invade would have given Germany the chance to refine these designs and to put them into widespread deployment. Germany would have controlled the skies above the battlefield. It would have used that control to destroy Soviet tanks and artillery, to strafe retreating columns of Soviet soldiers, to take out bridges and trains, and generally to wreak havoc.

While the Soviet military’s strength was immense, not even they could have withstood an onslaught such as this.