This analysis should be a hint for meditation.
I say again one little infantry in Karelia may avoid more problems even if is for sure a loss for Russia!
I try to do an analysis similar to the one made by Switch, but considering for sure the lost of the territory:
1/3 of the time defending russian infantry should kill one attacking infantry (+3), then die(-3) and losing the territory(-2), net: -2
2/3 of the time inf die without killing nothing: 2/3 * -5
net loss for Russian: (1/3 * -2) + (2/3 * -5) = -0,66 - 3,33 = -3,99 on average -4 IPC
Am I right?
So we should retreat that inf to stack it with other inf (very likely) or move in Karelia more forces to take it (very very unlikely).
But… the possibility for German of blitzing a tank give them the following advantages:
So 2/3 of the time, you get the +4 from the territories, and then from +2 to +11 IPC MORE (with +11 being exceedingly rare, +2 being pretty common, assuming the Russians preserve their FIG and retreat once the INF are dead; otherwise you have a VERY small (2.1%) chance of Germany being up by as much as +21: 4 for the territories, 5 for the surviving ARM, 6 for the dead INF, 10 for the dead FIG…).
that usually are not taken in account!
Result?
Is it not worthy to reason in terms of economy about trading of territories?
Is it more important to reason in terms of opportunity negated to the enemy?
Is it more useful the dispersion of own forces (1 inf alone) that cause more dispersion for the enemy (2 inf and 1 fig attacking)?
I know that units are the more important asset of a nation in A&A (units are the actual power of a nation, IPC are potential power still to be concretized) but I am starting to think that dispersion of forces is useful when aimed to force a consequent dispersion of the enemy and when used to reduce options and lessening the optimal attack of the enemy.