Thanks for this RJL. I had never heard of it. Very interesting.
Most over-rated WWII Leader
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Case in point Lazarus you aren’t being objective, you’re being extremely pro-Monty, or an Anglophile or something.
The way Lazarus has acted in this discussion is, unfortunately, fairly typical for him.
[Lazarus has] made numerous claims about Monty that don’t hold up to scrutiny
That’s certainly true! Lazarus described Montgomery as
the man who brought about the complete collapse of the German Army in France in 1944
That statement conveniently ignores Patton’s contribution to bringing about that collapse. If one were to give Montgomery credit for Patton’s accomplishments–as Lazarus seems intent on doing here–then Lazarus will succeed in his goal of making Montgomery look at least as good as Patton.
From the Wikipedia article about Patton:
The Third Army simultaneously attacked west (into Brittany), south, east towards the Seine, and north, assisting in trapping several hundred thousand German soldiers in the Chambois pocket, between Falaise and Argentan, Orne. . . . Patton’s forces were part of the Allied forces that freed northern France, bypassing Paris. . . . .
General Patton’s offensive, however, came to a screeching halt on August 31, 1944, as the Third Army literally ran out of fuel near the Moselle River, just outside of Metz, France. . . .
Patton expected that the Theater Commander would keep fuel and supplies flowing to support successful advances. However, Eisenhower . . . gave Montgomery and his 21st Army Group a strong priority for supplies for Operation Market Garden.[68] . . .
Patton’s rapid drive through the Lorraine demonstrated his keen appreciation for the technological advantages of the U.S. Army. . . . However, probably the key to Patton’s success compared to all of the other U.S. and British forces, which had similar advantages, was his intensive use of close air support; the Third Army had by far more G-2 officers at headquarters specifically designated to coordinate air strikes than any other army.[71] . . .
On December 21 Patton met with General Bradley to go over the impending advance: “Brad, this time the Kraut’s stuck his head in the meatgrinder, and I’ve got hold of the handle.”[79] Patton then argued that his Third Army should attack towards Koblenz, cutting off the Bulge at the base and trapping the entirety of the German armies involved in the offensive.[78] After briefly considering this, Bradley vetoed this proposal, as he was less concerned about killing large numbers of Germans than he was in arranging for the relief of Bastogne before it was overrun.[78][82] . . .
By February, the Germans were in full retreat and Patton had pushed units into the Saarland. Once again, however, Patton found other commands given priority on gasoline and supplies. Field Marshal Montgomery suggested deprecatingly that Patton’s forces be limited to holding a defensive line at the Rhine River. However, Patton had no intention of being left behind, and promptly began initiating several “reconnaissances in force”. The 5th Mechanized Infantry Division of the Third Army crossed the Rhine at Oppenheim on the night of March 22, 1945, thirty-six hours ahead of Montgomery’s Rhine crossing, Operation Varsity. To obtain gasoline and supplies, Third Army Ordnance units passed themselves off as First Army personnel, in one incident securing thousands of gallons of gasoline from a First Army gasoline dump.[86][87] Within a day, Patton’s forces had established a six-mile (10 km) deep bridgehead, after capturing 19,000 demoralized German troops. . . .
From 1943 on, it was clear that a consensus existed in the German Army officer corps that of all Allied ground force commanders, the enemy general they feared the most was Patton. Adolf Hitler himself was impressed by Patton, reportedly calling him “that crazy cowboy general”, and “the most dangerous man [the Allies] have.”[136] Erwin Rommel credited Patton with executing “the most astonishing achievement in mobile warfare.” [137] Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, chief of staff of the German Army, stated that Patton “was the American Guderian. He was very bold and preferred large movements. He took big risks and won big successes. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring noted that Patton had developed tank warfare into an art, and understood how to handle tanks brilliantly in the field. I feel compelled, therefore, to compare him with Generalfeldmarschall Rommel, who likewise had mastered the art of tank warfare. Both of them had a kind of second sight in regard to this type of warfare.” Referring to the escape of the Afrika Korps Panzerarmee after the battle of El Alamein, General Fritz Bayerlein opined that “I do not think that General Patton would let us get away so easily.”[138] Oberstleutnant Horst Freiherr von Wangenheim, operations officer of the 277th Volksgrenadier Division, stated that “General Patton is the most feared general on all fronts. [His] tactics are daring and unpredictable…He is the most modern general and the best commander of [combined] armored and infantry forces.”[139] After the war, General der Infanterie Guenther Blumentritt revealed that “We regarded Patton extremely highly, as the most aggressive Panzer-General of the Allies. A man of incredible initiative and lightning-like action.”[140] General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel, who had fought both Soviet and Anglo-American tank commanders, agreed: “Patton! No doubt about this. He was a brilliant panzer army commander.”[141]
In an interview conducted for Stars and Stripes just after his capture, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt summed up the predominant German view of the American general: “Patton,” Rundstedt concluded simply, “he is your best.”[4]
In a lot of ways Montgomery’s fighting style bares a striking resemblance to the contemporary French
theory of battle methodic, slow, ponderous, and defensive in nature, in other words not bold.I can’t argue with this. His attack from Egypt was launched only after he’d achieved overwhelming force. It’s much like the kind of attack General McClellan, of the U.S. Civil War, might have launched. If you happen to have overwhelming force anyway, there’s no shame in using it to attack. But these kinds of attacks are not typically interpreted as proof of good generalship. McClellan himself was later relieved of command by Lincoln.
After the conquest of North Africa had been complete, the Allies moved on to Italy. The Allied (and Montgomery’s) advance there was slow and plodding. Germany’s force in Italy was much smaller than its Allied counterpart. That small force was successful in trading land for time. Lots of time.
As you pointed out, Montgomery’s performance during the attempted Allied breakout from Normandy was uninspiring. He would later follow that up with the Operation Market Garden fiasco. On the other hand, he was calm and rational during the Battle of the Bulge; and provided good generalship there. My sense is that he was better-suited, by nature and temperament, to defensive battles, or slow, plodding offensives, than to rapid advances. From the Wikipedia article about him:
Eisenhower had then wanted Montgomery to go on the offensive on 1 January to meet Patton’s army that had started advancing from the south on 19 December and in doing so, trap the Germans. However, Montgomery refused to commit infantry he considered underprepared into a snowstorm and for a strategically unimportant piece of land.[citation needed] He did not launch the attack until 3 January, by which point the German forces had been able to escape. A large part of American military opinion thought that he should not have held back, though it was characteristic of him to use drawn-out preparations for his attack.
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The way Lazarus has acted in this discussion is, unfortunately, fairly typical for him.
Kurt. The man who has complet faith in Wiki and loves it so much he keeps reposting most of it here verbatim.
Take the following example:
Clyde posts this (taken from the Wiki page)about Goodwood;
@Clyde85:British infantry supporting the operation suffered 4,000 casualties where as the Germans suffered only 2,000
And Kurt is so impressed he chips in:
@KurtGodel7:It’s unfortunate that no one in this discussion has offered answers to the kinds of questions you’re asking. The closest has been Clyde, whose posts and information about Operation Goodwood have been very informative.
Unfortunately the information is completely wrong. It is not correct. There is no information about German dead and Cylde’s estimate is a simple misreading of the information on the Wiki page. Kurt believes anything that chimes with his uber-panzer mentality!
Anyway I wonder why Kurt reposts the same information that was so comprehensively demolished earlier.
See here for a detailed refutation of all the points in his latest post
http://www.axisandallies.org/forums/index.php?topic=18537.msg794489#msg794489If you prefer the short version then briefly:
The Wiki article is referenced to third hand accounts that all are corruptions of the original quote that I gave here
http://www.axisandallies.org/forums/index.php?topic=16779.msg633151#msg633151
All mention of Montgomery had been removed and the quotes from the German Generals made to sound as if they were talking about Patton alone. -
Time for a reality check .
See the numbers and draw your own conclusions.
German armour confronting Allies by sector
Who had the better chance of making a breakthrough.
An Army facing 25% of the german tank force or the one facing 75%?If you were a German commander  and you concentrated 75% of your tanks on the  right of your line and 25% on the left does that give any indication of where you see the main threat against your army?
_“21st Army Group hurled itself against some of the densest concentrations of high quality opposition in the entire war. The importance of Caen as the fulcrum of events in Normandy was apparent to the German staff, and within days of the Allied landings, 21st Army Group was confronting 21st Panzers, 12th SS and Panzer Lehr around that disputed city. By the time of Epsom on 26 June, Dempsey’s 2nd Army was facing the deepest and most hostile opposition across the theatre, and arguably anywhere in Europe.”  _
and:
" why is it that when Bradley’s First Army took a month to cover the last five miles to St. Lô this is attributed (correctly) to the bocage and the enemy but when the British Second Army took as long to cover the six miles into Caen that is attributed to Monty’s “timidity,” “caution,” and “slowness”? The presence of seven German panzer divisions in front of Caen is usually left out of this equation "
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" why is it that when Bradley’s First Army took a month to cover the last five miles to St. Lô this is attributed (correctly) to the bocage and the enemy but when the British Second Army took as long to cover the six miles into Caen that is attributed to Monty’s “timidity,” “caution,” and “slowness”? The presence of seven German panzer divisions in front of Caen is usually left out of this equation "
Because Monty was an over-rated commander hence his inclusion on this list. He was only pulled from Italy for Normandy for political and propaganda reasons. Britain’s hero, victor of the El Alamein, Returns to the continent to lead the allied armies in the liberation of Europe. Sounds good and I bet it sold a lot of newspapers, but he was only in command to please British public opinion and boost moral on the home-front, which after nearly six years at war, was becoming a little weary. Only during the initial landings on June 6th were there an even number of US and British forces(5 and 5) and as the battles progressed US forces outnumbered their British counter-parts more then 4 to 1 by the end. This is why Monty was dropped as overall commander 3 months after the landing, which proves his appointment was for purely political reasons.
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This is why Monty was dropped as overall commander 3 months after the landing, which proves his appointment was for purely political reasons.� Â
Nope.
It was always the case that Eisenhower was to take over command. The time was not fixed and the option was not exercised until September 1st-after Montgomery beat the Germans. -
Only during the initial landings on June 6th were there an even number of US and British forces(5 and 5) and as the battles progressed US forces outnumbered their British counter-parts more then 4 to 1 by the end.
June US Tank strength 1710
June UK Tank strength 2666July US 3407
July UK 3828Aug US 4379
Aug UK 4297Have another try.
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SO tanks were the only thing on the continent?
Please tell more of these Montogemry victories. Do you speak of the one he finally got in North Africa with far superior forces against Germans with no supplies and no further reinforcements?
Or are you speaking of how he couldn’t get off the beachhead in Normandy then failed miserable at Market Garden?
Kind of hard to give him credit for El Alamein, then give him a pass everywhere else.
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@Col.:
SO tanks were the only thing on the continent?
No sir.
Manppower numbers
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-Supreme/USA-E-Supreme-E.html
UK/ Canadian 16 June 1945 Â 1,072.717 Â
US Â May 3,021,483
and the note on UK/Canadian  numbers says:
 These statistics must be used with the warning that they cannont be the basis of comparison between the U.S. and British air efforts. U.S. air strengths listed in Table 7 inlcude the air forces both in the United Kingdom and on the Continent. The British forces in this table include only those on the Continent. Total British air force strength (including WAAF) amounted to 819,578 on 1 May 1945. Needless to say a considerable part of this force was used in the preinvasion period and during the campaigns in northwest Europe in support of the Allied campaigns
So if done on a like for like comparison we can say 1.5 million v 3 million
Who said 4 to 1 in Normandy again?
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@Col.:
Or are you speaking of how he couldn’t get off the beachhead in Normandy.
I think you will find he did because I saw photos of him taking the German surrender in 1945.
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Nope.
It was always the case that Eisenhower was to take over command. The time was not fixed and the option was not exercised until September 1st-after Montgomery beat the Germans.I must assume you are a barber because you sure do like splitting hairs. Also I am very impressed with you selective reading skills (I’ve heard of selective hearing and all though) as you seem to only read the parts of the posts you dislike and ignore all the rest. Though to be fair, I suppose I should have been more specific with such a delicate reader, US forces out numbered British force by more then 4 to 1 by the end OF THE WAR. The US had 72 divisions in the field by the end of the war out of a total of 85 allied divisions, a factor of more then 4 to 1.
Have another try.
No, you can try again now
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I’ll think you’ll find that he as the only command at D-Day who failed to get off the beach and blame their problems on logistical failures.
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Also, I don’t think you should get to count Canadian forces under the British total as they were a separate and equal power in the war. Canada had its own Army and its own indigenous commanders who were raised and trained in Canada. Men like Guy Simonds, Harry Crerar, Andrew MaNaughton, and the men of the first Canadian Army were the one who led the breakout from Normandy and closed the Falaise pocket, not Monty.
And I think this really proves it. Here is an army and a group of commanders that gets over shadowed by the “British” war effort and grouped in with what Monty did, when in reality they should be recognized for their individual contributions to the war as Canadians not British and not Monty.
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@Col.:
I’ll think you’ll find that he as the only command at D-Day who failed to get off the beach and blame their problems on logistical failures.
Sorry but that is just plain wrong. Every single beach failed to reach its D-Day ‘phase line’ Every beach.
If you want we can talk about the one beach where progress was so bad there were serious thought given to re-embark and abandon it.
Can you guess which one it was…… -
US forces out numbered British force by more then 4 to 1 by the end OF THE WAR. The US had 72 divisions in the field by the end of the war out of a total of 85 allied divisions, a factor of more then 4 to 1.
And yet the numbers say the manpower totals are 1.5 million to 3 million?
US forces out numbered British force by more then 4 to 1 by the end OF THE WAR.
Note the dates I gave. May and June 1945.
That, I believe, is THE END OF THE WAR -
Also, I don’t think you should get to count Canadian forces under the British total as they were a separate and equal power in the war. Canada had its own Army and its own indigenous commanders who were raised and trained in Canada. Men like Guy Simonds, Harry Crerar, Andrew MaNaughton, and the men of the first Canadian Army were the one who led the breakout from Normandy and closed the Falaise pocket, not Monty.
Ah but you said earlier  Monty ‘failed’ to close the gap. Now you backtrack and say the Canadians were responsible?
What made you change your  line of argument?
I might add that the 2 Divisions chosen to ‘close the gap’ were relative newcomers and ony one  was Canadian. I leave you to find  out the nationality of the other……And I think this really proves it. Here is an army and a group of commanders that gets over shadowed by the “British” war effort and grouped in with what Monty did, when in reality they should be recognized for their individual contributions to the war as Canadians not British and not Monty.
OK now point me to a US source that seperates out the achievements of the French Armoured Division as distinct from the US success.
Perhaps you could also give me the force ratio for Bradley during Cobra.
If Monty is said to have only won because he vastly outnumbered the
Germans then it can  be said Bradley and Patton had greatly superior advantages (than Montgomery) when they attackedThe US had 72 divisions in the field by the end of the war out of a total of 85 allied divisions, a factor of more then 4 to 1……you can try again now
Wrong.
The reality can be seen here
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-Supreme/USA-E-Supreme-D.html
US 61
UK 17
Can 5F/French 7
These figures are for Divisions only. For the UK/Can this excludes 6 Armored Brigades. For the uninitiated an Armoured Brigade was the tank strength of an Armoured Division and they do not appear on the Divisional headcount.
Furthermore one of the UK Armoured Divisions (79th) was a specialised Unit that had 3 times the tank units of an ordinary Armoured Division.
It is obvious now that an attempt to count Divisions only is a partial counting method that undercounts the Commonwealth contribution. -
The US had 72 divisions in the field by the end of the war out of a total of 85 allied divisions, a factor of more then 4 to 1……you can try again now
The reality can be seen here
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-Supreme/USA-E-Supreme-D.html
US 61
UK 17
Can  5F/French 7
These figures are for Divisions only. For the UK/Can this  excludes 6 Armored Brigades. For the uninitiated an Armoured Brigade was the tank strength of an Armoured Division and they  do not appear on the Divisional  headcount.
Furthermore one of the UK Armoured Divisions (79th) was a specialised Unit that had 3 times the tank units of an ordinary Armoured Division.
It is obvious now that an attempt to count Divisions only is a partial counting method that undercounts the Commonwealth contribution. -
Victory in the West Volume II of the Official British History of the Second World War by Major LF Ellis, Appendix VII
Allied strength on April 30th 1945 was:-
British: Army 835,208 Naval 16,221* Air Force 460,000** Total 1,311,429
Canadian: Army 183,421 Naval 0 Air Force34,000** Total 217,421
Australian/NZ: Army 0 Naval 0 Air Force 12,500** Total 12,500
American: Army 2,618,023 Naval 7,035 Air Force 447,482*** Total 3,072,540
French: Army 413,144 Naval 0 Air Force 24,000**** Total 437,144
Others: Army 34,518 Naval 0 Air Force 15,500** Total 50,018
Totals: Army 4,084,314 Naval 23,256 Air Force 993,482 Grand Total 5,101,052*RN & USN in the campaign area
**RAF: Bomber Command, Fighter Command, Coastal Command (16,18 & 19 Groups), 2nd Tactical AF and Special Groups (38 & 46)
***USAAF: 8th & 9th AF, First (Provisional) Tactical AF and IX Troop Carrier Command
****First French Air Corps, French Western Air Forces and French Sqns in RAF commands
*****Others relates to contingents from Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Netherlands, Norway and Polish -
SNORE
Sleeps through this part of the class
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Yeah sure, if you want to include the ENTIRE armed forces of Britain in Europe, but im sorry, there is no way in hell that your figures are correct. The whole reason Monty was dropped as over all commander in Europe was because US forces outnumbered British forces by. As I said before 72 out of the 85 divisions in Europe by the surrender in 1945 were American and not British.
Victory in the West Volume II of the Official British History of the Second World War by Major LF Ellis, Appendix VII
This is your source? LOL bwahahahahah! Yes im sure this is a very reliable source as the British would never fudge some numbers to appease their sense of national pride :roll:
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Yeah sure, if you want to include the ENTIRE armed forces of Britain in Europe, but im sorry, there is no way in hell that your figures are correct. The whole reason Monty was dropped as over all commander in Europe was because US forces outnumbered British forces by. As I said before 72 out of the 85 divisions in Europe by the surrender in 1945 were American and not British.
You can repeat your fabrications as often as you want but it will never change the actual numbers.
Your claim there were 72 US Divisions in NW Europe is bogus.
The Commonwealth numbers are the exact comparison to the US numbers.
It is incorrect to say it is the total of the entire Commonwealth Armed Forces.
Your claim is a falsification.
The figures I gave you come from a book entitled
US Army In WW2. The European Theatre Of Operations. The Supreme Command. and are in Appendix D,
Forces Under SHAEF, 1944-45.
The full citation for the printing is:
CMH Publication 7-1
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1954
Library of Congress Catalog Number: 53-61717
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C., 20402
Nothing to do with appease their(British) sense of national prideThis is your source? LOL bwahahahahah! Yes im sure this is a very reliable source as the British would never fudge some numbers to appease their sense of national pride :
bwahahahahah to you because I gave you 2 sources. The official British numbers and the official US ones.
It is up to you which ones you want to use but they both blow apart your bogus numbers.So far in this thread every ‘source/number’ you give turns out to be wrong!
Just in case you missed it here are the US figures
US Forces in Europe
Infantry Divisions: 42
1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, 26th, 28th, 29th,
30th, 35th, 36th, 42d, 44th, 45th, 63d, 65th, 66th, 69th,
70th, 71st, 75th, 76th, 78th, 79th, 80th, 83d, 84th, 86th,
87th, 89th, 90th, 94th, 95th, 97th, 99th, 100th, 102d, 103d,
104th, 106th
Armored Divisions: 15
2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 16th, 20th
Airborne Divisions: 4
13th, 17th, 82d, 101stFrom:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-Supreme/USA-E-Supreme-D.html
Please use them to confirm your earlier claim:
The US had 72 divisions in the field by the end of the warout of a total of 85 allied divisions, a factor of more then 4 to 1
The claim Monty was ‘dropped’ is frankly bizzare and betrays a complete lack of any real understanding. Eisenhower was always the overall Commander but he (wisely) allowed the most experienced man run the battle on his behalf. A wise move as it turned out!
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