WW2 Article: Advanced German Technology

@abworsham4

Cool story. Let’s hope this gets preserved.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hSaScGMPJi0

@Gargantua:

I saw a documentary one time, that discussed the halt order.

The conclusion was that it was to do with the power dynamic of who was in charge of the Wehrmacht.  Hitler, or the High command.

The Dunkirk thing basically became a pissing match between the two parties, with Hitler winning the “halt” order, and exerting his will over total command.  At least… that was the opinion of the documentary, and I don’t know remember what the dynamics behind why Hitler wanted the halt order were, and why the Wehrmacht forces didn’t.

My impression–and I could be wrong–is that a large portion of the German general staff wanted the halt order. However, its most able, creative, aggressive generals–such as von Manstein–were strongly against the halt order.

Maybe the scale of the evacuation came as a surprise to many. On the other hand, it was common knowledge that Britain was a sea power with plenty of boats in or near the English Channel, so the idea that the soldiers might be evacuated should not have been a surprise. Perhaps more importantly, those Allied soldiers were on the run. The halt order gave them time to regroup, assume defensive positions, and to become a much harder nut to crack.

Von Manstein wrote that there are times when very important–but very fleeting–opportunities present themselves. When such is the case, it is often necessary to push soldiers to the absolute limits of human endurance. While this may seem cruel, seizing the opportunity in question is absolutely necessary to save your own soldiers’ lives.

The halt order was one of the two most important deviations from von Manstein’s original plan to conquer France. (Both deviations occurred over his objections.) The other deviation was that von Manstein had wanted to proceed to phase 2 (the conquest of Paris) even before having completed phase 1 (the encirclement and destruction of the BEF and nearby French forces).

You will recall that after the Germans reached the Channel, the French counterattacked from the south. Von Manstein didn’t want Germany to sit around waiting for that counterattack. Instead, he wanted to attack the French in their assembly areas, before they were ready to strike. That German attack would have secured the German path to the Channel, while also constituting the first part of phase 2.

In his history of the war Churchill expresses regret that operation Jupiter, the liberation of Norway, never was carried out.  The Brits would never have invaded Sweden.

The Italian ones are new to me, only because they were never discussed.  However there are plenty of records of the ones in action during the Phillipines and South Pacific Campaigns (JFK, etc.) which gave them plenty of heroic press.

@abworsham4

I think there are two possible problems with this strategy:

Firstly, whilst it would have been indeed much easier to produce, could Germany have produced enough of them to match Soviet production with Western Allied bombing and fighting in North Africa and later in France and Italy? At least Germany would have a qualitative advantage due to crew training.

Secondly, could Germany hypothetically had enough manpower to equip those tanks? I admit this is a lesser problem, as I would favour having one tank than 3-6 infantrymen.

I’d announce to the Allies that I had the bomb and that It was ready to deploy at any sign of invasion. I’d have Goebels make a film as if I had several and film it as I blew up Moscow.

@balungaloaf:

i heard on a show lately that the german army lost 1/4 of all supplies and material that the germans ever produced in the ENTIRE SECOND WAR!

i was like whaaaaaaa?!

is this accurate?  it makes sense of a lot of things for me.  by number losses of troops alone i always thought that the germans should be able to recoup their losses by their volunteer campaigns in occupied territories, or by forcing human labor in the territories occupied to free up more german men to be put into the wehrmacht.

1/4 of all supplies produced lost is staggering.

makes you wonder why in the hell Hitler didnt allow a tactical retreat from the area after the soviets counterattacked en masse.

the question is this. is the 1/4 loss number accurate?

I think this may be be reference to a line in the “Stalingrad” episode of “The World at War”.  Towards the end of the episode, as the narrator describes the German losses in men and equipment at Stalingrad, he says that enough equipment was lost to equip one-quarter of the German army.  So it’s not a reference to one-quarter of the equipment produced, which would be a much larger number.