Most over-rated WWII Leader

@Gargantua:

This thread should be titled.

“Most over-rated forum poster”.

Hmmm……I think it should be.  :lol:

@Lazarus:

@Deaths:

Montgomery, imagine if he would have been supreme commander……scary

He was ‘supreme commander’ of the forces in Normandy  from June 6th to August 31st.
Not a lot of people seem to know that.

I believe he was Commander of land forces only, not naval or Air, and I am pretty sure Churchill did it to appease Monty

@Deaths:

I believe he was Commander of land forces only, not naval or Air, and I am pretty sure Churchill did it to appease Monty

Incorrect. It may be hard for some to swallow but  it was decided he was the best man for the job.
You should look into how difficult it was for Eisenhower to get the USAAF/RAF to work with him.  Control of them (or the Navy) was never on offer.

@Clyde85:

Lazarus,
You have to realize that you have zero credibility at this point and with every post you just keeping digging the “i’m a jingoistic Anglophile” hole you’ve put yourself in alittle bit deeper. You came here to wave the union jack and try to uphold the honor of your golden boy Montgomery, but have only made yourself look silly.

I am going to ignore any further posts you put here about how glorious the bold and invincible Montgomery was and How the British had the biggest army in NW Europe and single handedly won the war, God Save the Queen!

So what are some over-rated Axis commanders?

I agree that Lazarus lacks credibility; and that his participation in this discussion has been very biased. For him, “Montgomery never suffered a reverse” means the same thing as “Montgomery was at least as good as Patton,” and anyone who thinks otherwise has succumbed to “legend.” He has used his participation in this discussion to make exaggerated or misleading claims, biased interpretations, inflammatory rhetoric, etc.

However, I have no reason to believe Lazarus is an Anglophile. I think his reason for trying to convince us that Montgomery was as good or better than Patton has nothing to do with Montgomery or Britain, and everything to do with Patton. Lazarus’s political views are very far to the left–so much so that I cannot recall a single instance in which he’s written something with which a communist would have disagreed. Patton had right wing political views, and protested the harsh treatment meted out to German civilians after the war. Lazarus has evidently decided this particular hero of the right needs to be torn down. That is why his tone has been so strident, and why he’s made so little attempt to engage in reasonable or dispassionate discussion. He gets like this whenever he defends his own political views, or attacks someone with different views.

For at least the last half page or more, he has succeeded in derailing the discussion away from big picture questions, and sidetracking it into pedantic squabbles with little bearing on the overall question. As an example, in post 70 on this thread, he mentioned that in June and July of '44, most of Germany’s Western European tank strength was allocated against the British portion of the Normandy invasion, not the American portion. But his data are relevant only for the time around Operation Goodwood. He has not shown us that Montgomery had done anything particularly creative during that invasion. If anything, Montgomery’s advance looks clumsy and inept, even taking into account the fact that he actually (gasp!) had to face a reasonably large and well-prepared enemy force.

The (very limited) gains of Goodwood were due in large part to the initial, massive aerial bombardment. The area subjected to aerial bombardment had been small, so as to allow massive concentration of firepower. Once the British had moved past that area, British divisions generally ground to a halt. Goodwood cost the British 250 - 400 tanks, as compared to 75 - 100 tanks for the Germans. Admittedly, German tanks–or at least Panthers and Tigers–were significantly better than their British counterparts. On the other hand, the Allies had complete air supremacy, and many of Germany’s tank losses were the result of aerial attacks.

Goodwood was an uncreative, brute force approach which achieved very minimal success at a high cost. Its main accomplishment was to keep German attention turned primarily towards the British force in the immediate aftermath of Goodwood, thereby facilitating the subsequent American breakout during Operation Cobra. Nothing I’ve read, either in this discussion or elsewhere, has even suggested the possibility that Montgomery did anything special during Operation Goodwood–anything beyond what one would expect of a standard-issue general of average ability. While it may be too much to expect every battle a general fights to display strategic brilliance, Lazarus has not shown us any instance in which Montgomery rose above the level of a standard-issue average general. Montgomery’s performance at the Battle of the Bulge does meet that standard; albeit to a lesser degree than Patton’s performance during that battle. But other than the Battle of the Bulge, I can’t think of any examples of Montgomery having risen above an average level of competence.

Lazarus seems intent on convincing us that Montgomery was at least Patton’s equal. He’s not going to be able to do that by objectively discussing the relative merits of the two generals; because that kind of discussion would clearly favor Patton. He seems to think his best bet is to sidetrack the discussion into debates about relative German, British, Canadian, and American force concentrations in the months immediately after the D-Day landing; with the unstated implication being that those figures somehow support the notion that Montgomery was at least as good as Patton. I advise you and the other participants in this thread to avoid getting sidetracked by that kind of stuff. Stay on topic by demanding specific examples of how Montgomery exceeded the level one would expect from an average general. Such examples will be very few and far between!

@Lazarus:

@Deaths:

I believe he was Commander of land forces only, not naval or Air, and I am pretty sure Churchill did it to appease Monty

Incorrect. It may be hard for some to swallow but  it was decided he was the best man for the job.
You should look into how difficult it was for Eisenhower to get the USAAF/RAF to work with him.  Control of them (or the Navy) was never on offer.

Lazarus, you are confusing the issue. “It was decided he was the best man for the job” makes the decision to appoint Monty appear merit-based and apolitical. If you’re claiming there was no political component to the Allies’ command decisions, then your perspective bears no relationship with reality.

The Allies clearly felt that a decent general with good political credentials > a good general with bad political credentials. I hope that you and I can acknowledge that basic a point and move on.

Test

@KurtGodel7:

I agree that Lazarus lacks credibility; and that his participation in this discussion has been very biased. For him, “Montgomery never suffered a reverse” means the same thing as “Montgomery was at least as good as Patton,” and anyone who thinks otherwise has succumbed to “legend.” He has used his participation in this discussion to make exaggerated or misleading claims, biased interpretations, inflammatory rhetoric, etc.

I will again post the words of the actual German Generals. Remember these are not my words but the thoughts of the men who faced both Patton and Montgomery.

The Other Side Of The Hill

page 355

What did the German generals think of their Western opponents
? They were diffident in expressing an opinion on this
matter, but I gathered a few impressions in the course of our
talks. In a reference to the Allied commanders, Rundstedt said:
"Montgomery and Patton were the two best that I met. FieldMarshal
Montgomery was very systematic." He added: “That
is all right if you have sufficient forces, and sufficient time.”
Blumentritt made a similar comment. After paying tribute to
the speed of Patton drive, he added: “Field-Marshal Montgomery
was the one general who never suffered a reverse. He
moved like this”-Blumentritt took a series of very deliberate
and short steps, putting his foot down heavily each time.
Giving his impression of the different qualities of the British
and American troops, Blumentritt said: “The Americans attacked
with zest, and had a keen sense of mobile action, but when
they came under heavy artillery fire they usualy fell back-even
after they had made a successful penetration. By contrast, once
the British had got their teeth in, and had been in a position
for twenty-four hours, it proved almost impossible to shift them.
To counter-attack the British always cost us very heavy losses.
I had many opportunities to observe this interesting difference
in the autumn of 1944, when the right half of my corps faced
the British, and the left half the American.”

There you have it straight from the horses mouth.
The choice is clear.
Do you share  Kurt’s view or the considered opinion  of Rundstedt and Blumentritt?
Tough choice isn’t it?

@KurtGodel7:

As an example, in post 70 on this thread, he mentioned that in June and July of '44, most of Germany’s Western European tank strength was allocated against the British portion of the Normandy invasion, not the American portion. But his data are relevant only for the time around Operation Goodwood.

Must be bad when you have to resort to fabrication.

Here is the chart again.

Note the exact opposite of Kurts claim.
At the time of Goodwood (July 18-20th) the German tank totals are at their second lowest since June 25!
Yes that s right for the time Kurt says the numbers were highest they were actualy lower than they were 5 days later
How wrong can one man be?
Throughout the campaign the bulk of the panzers were facing 21st Army Group and that is a solid fact. If it wasn’t then Kurt would post figures showing otherwise, something he will never be able to do.

@KurtGodel7:

Lazarus seems intent on convincing us that Montgomery was at least Patton’s equal. He’s not going to be able to do that by objectively discussing the relative merits of the two generals; because that kind of discussion would clearly favor Patton

That  claim is demolished by the words of  Rundstedt and Blumentritt who both clearly state Montgomery and Patton were ‘the best’
It must really irk Kurt  to hear the Germans so comprehensively  reject his argument.

.@KurtGodel7:

Lazarus, you are confusing the issue. “It was decided he was the best man for the job” makes the decision to appoint Monty appear merit-based and apolitical. If you’re claiming there was no political component to the Allies’ command decisions, then your perspective bears no relationship with reality.

I think I see your problem.
Your hatred of Monty makes you assume he could never get the job on merit.
You are wrong and furthermore your (implied) assumption that the choice of a US Supreme Commander  had nothing to do with ‘politics’ shows your are naive in the extreme.
Let me give you one example where US Elections distorted the campaign in France:

17 August 1944
MARSHALL TO EISENHOWER
"Stimson and I and apparently all Americans are strongly of the opinion that the time has come for you to assume direct command of the American contingent because reaction to British criticism has been so strong by American journalists that it could become an important factor in the coming Congressional Elections. The astonishing success has produced emphatic expressions of confidence in you and Bradley but this has cast a damper on public enthusiasm

Not that I think anything I say can open your eyes to reality……

@Lazarus:

@KurtGodel7:

Lazarus seems intent on convincing us that Montgomery was at least Patton’s equal. He’s not going to be able to do that by objectively discussing the relative merits of the two generals; because that kind of discussion would clearly favor Patton

That  claim is demolished by the words of  Rundstedt and Blumentritt who both clearly state Montgomery and Patton were ‘the best’
It must really irk Kurt  to hear the Germans so comprehensively  reject his argument.

As for the chart, I have not made the claims you’ve said I’ve made. I will not allow you to sidetrack the discussion with something so petty. My only observation about it had been that it was relevant for only a very narrow time range (around two months, with Operation Goodwood occurring around the middle of that time). I’m not sure what point you’re trying to prove with this–your writing is rather opaque–but whatever your point may be, I’m not interested.

In the quote you provided, only Rundstedt put Montgomery on a level with Patton. Blumentritt did not make that claim, despite your assertion to the contrary. Even the Rundstedt portion of your quote is open to discussion. As you’ve seen fit to regurgitate your earlier quote from the German generals, I will likewise revisit the following text from the Wikipedia article about Patton:

From 1943 on, it was clear that a consensus existed in the German Army officer corps that of all Allied ground force commanders, the enemy general they feared the most was Patton. Adolf Hitler himself was impressed by Patton, reportedly calling him “that crazy cowboy general”, and “the most dangerous man [the Allies] have.”[136] Erwin Rommel credited Patton with executing “the most astonishing achievement in mobile warfare.” [137] Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, chief of staff of the German Army, stated that Patton “was the American Guderian. He was very bold and preferred large movements. He took big risks and won big successes.” Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring noted that “Patton had developed tank warfare into an art, and understood how to handle tanks brilliantly in the field. I feel compelled, therefore, to compare him with Generalfeldmarschall Rommel, who likewise had mastered the art of tank warfare. Both of them had a kind of second sight in regard to this type of warfare.” Referring to the escape of the Afrika Korps Panzerarmee after the battle of El Alamein, General Fritz Bayerlein opined that “I do not think that General Patton would let us get away so easily.”[138] Oberstleutnant Horst Freiherr von Wangenheim, operations officer of the 277th Volksgrenadier Division, stated that “General Patton is the most feared general on all fronts. [His] tactics are daring and unpredictable…He is the most modern general and the best commander of [combined] armored and infantry forces.”[139] After the war, General der Infanterie Günther Blumentritt revealed that “We regarded Patton extremely highly, as the most aggressive Panzer-General of the Allies. A man of incredible initiative and lightning-like action.”[140] General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel, who had fought both Soviet and Anglo-American tank commanders, agreed: “Patton! No doubt about this. He was a brilliant panzer army commander.”[141]

In an interview conducted for Stars and Stripes just after his capture, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt summed up the predominant German view of the American general: “Patton,” Rundstedt concluded simply, “he is your best.”[4]

Incidentally, the last part of the quote casts doubt on whether even von Rundstedt saw Montgomery as Patton’s equal. If you lose the von Rundstedt portion of your quote, you’re pretty much out of luck; because there’s nothing else you can fall back on which would suggest Montgomery was at or near Patton’s level. Unlike Montgomery, Patton achieved things an ordinary general could not have. His Third Army rolled through France, until his superiors cut off his gas supply when he was in front of Metz. Patton’s advances were successful in large part because he didn’t give the Germans the chance to get back on balance. Patton also took ruthless advantage of the Allies’ advantages in air power and mobility. He had a killer’s instinct to go for the throat, which, if you can get away with it, is exactly suited to quickly eliminate enemy resistance. Patton’s recommendation that the Allies cut off all the German forces involved in the Battle of the Bulge is typical of his way of thinking, just as it was also typical for his less able and creative superiors to reject that sort of suggestion. The difference between Patton’s superiors and Patton was the difference between competence and excellence. Excellence can never be attained by those determined to be plodding, predictable, and risk-free.

@Lazarus:

.@KurtGodel7:

Lazarus, you are confusing the issue. “It was decided he was the best man for the job” makes the decision to appoint Monty appear merit-based and apolitical. If you’re claiming there was no political component to the Allies’ command decisions, then your perspective bears no relationship with reality.

I think I see your problem.
Your hatred of Monty makes you assume he could never get the job on merit.
You are wrong and furthermore your (implied) assumption that the choice of a US Supreme Commander  had nothing to do with ‘politics’ shows your are naive in the extreme.
Let me give you one example where US Elections distorted the campaign in France:

17 August 1944
MARSHALL TO EISENHOWER
"Stimson and I and apparently all Americans are strongly of the opinion that the time has come for you to assume direct command of the American contingent because reaction to British criticism has been so strong by American journalists that it could become an important factor in the coming Congressional Elections. The astonishing success has produced emphatic expressions of confidence in you and Bradley but this has cast a damper on public enthusiasm

Not that I think anything I say can open your eyes to reality……

At what point in this discussion have you attempted to open anyone’s eyes to reality? My sense is that you came here to promote a very specific view–regardless of whether that view is actually accurate.

Further, you continue to either accidentally or deliberately misinterpret my posts. I never implied that the choice of a U.S. Supreme Commander had nothing to do with politics. I’ve implied precisely the opposite. Eisenhower was competent, but he was no military genius. But if he was nothing out of the ordinary as a general, he made up for that by being very sensitive to the political and social realities around him. Instinctively moving away from politically inadvisable views–regardless of their underlying military merit–may or may not be something you want in a Supreme Commander. Certainly that trait did wonders for Eisenhower’s career, both during and after the war. But it was not always militarily necessary to make the Americans play second fiddle to the British. (As the British generals had wanted during '43 and '44, and as Eisenhower had often given them.) It does not necessarily take a genius to adopt a strategy of, “figure out what the power holders want to hear, and then say it to them.” Which is what much of Eisenhower’s “leadership” boiled down to.

But if politics played a role in Eisenhower’s advancement–as they very clearly did–we should be open to the possibility that they also played a role in other decisions to appoint generals at or near that level. Including Montgomery. You seem to be implying that those who awarded Montgomery his position did so on merit only, without regard for political considerations. If this is what you’re claiming, then you do not understand or have chosen to misstate how the game was played at that level and at that time.

@Lazarus

From KurtGodel7 to you:

“If you’re claiming there was no political component to the Allies’ command decisions, then your perspective bears no relationship with reality.”

How did you derive the exact opposite of that?

You also go from one post where you say Eisenhower was always in overall command, then in more than one post say how many people didn’t know that Montgomery was in overall command. Which is it?

If you can’t even keep your own story straight, how do you expect anyone to take you seriously?

@Col.:

@Lazarus

From

“If you’re claiming there was no political component to the Allies’ command decisions, then your perspective bears no relationship with reality.”

How did you derive the exact opposite of that?

You also go from one post where you say Eisenhower was always in overall command, then in more than one post say how many people didn’t know that Montgomery was in overall command. Which is it?

If you can’t even keep your own story straight, how do you expect anyone to take you seriously?

It is quite simple. Montgomery was in Command from June 6th to September 1st.
From that date Eisenhower assumed the mantle.
I am at a loss as to how such a simple statement can be the cause of any confusion.
.

@KurtGodel7:

As for the chart, I have not made the claims you’ve said I’ve made. I will not allow you to sidetrack the discussion with something so petty. My only observation about it had been that it was relevant for only a very narrow time range (around two months, with Operation Goodwood occurring around the middle of that time).

It is hard to take seriously someone who clearly has trouble understanding a simple  chart.
First you  falsely claimed  the chart was  only relevant for the period of Goodwood (3 days July 18/19/20)
Now you  opine that the chart covers a 2 month period.
How hard is it to figure out the chart covers the period  June 25th to July 25th, a month?

@KurtGodel7:

As you’ve seen fit to regurgitate your earlier quote from the German generals, I will likewise revisit the following text from the Wikipedia article about Patton……

Feel free to repeat your errors.
I remind you that the ‘quotes’ contained in the Wiki article are � corruptions of the original quotes from Liddel Hart.

To wit the part where Wiki claims Rundstedt said:
@KurtGodel7:

In an interview conducted for Stars and Stripes just after his capture, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt summed up the predominant German view of the American general: “Patton,” Rundstedt concluded simply, “he is your best.”[4]

has been doctored by removing the words that refer to Montgomery.

The original:

In a reference to the Allied commanders, Rundstedt said:
“Montgomery and Patton were the two best that I met”.

Deliberate falsification.

Quote from: KurtGodel7 on Today at 06:06:17 am

In an interview conducted for Stars and Stripes just after his capture, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt summed up the predominant German view of the American general: “Patton,” Rundstedt concluded simply, “he is your best.”[4]

has been doctored by removing the words that refer to Montgomery.

The original:

In a reference to the Allied commanders, Rundstedt said:
“Montgomery and Patton were the two best that I met”.

Deliberate falsification.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cLyxmD_UAK4

I think the link is a perfect anology-fact is discarded in favour of the comfort of  fiction.
The 3 Wise Monkeys are alive and well……

@Lazarus:

I think the link is a perfect anology-fact is discarded in favour of the comfort of � fiction.
The 3 Wise Monkeys are alive and well……

I think Gar is making fun of you, though there are worse things to be compared to then a whiny Luke Skywalker  :-D

Anyway, rather then treading old ground (ground sooo well trod that it is nearly completely worn through) I think that as Cwo Marc and I were discussing, do(or rather did) the early victories of the Axis powers give then a false sense of superiority, as their early opponents weren’t really that tough. This obviously extends to the Italians (Ethiopia and Albania, really Italy?) but I would say should especially apply to Japan. Their first opponent, China, was more then they could handle and during the war their tactics seemed to resemble more of the WW1 variety. The US suffered higher casualty rates against Japan but when you’re fighting over such small spaces and have such dense troop concentrations is that really a surprise? Not to mention all the logistical difficulties in transporting men a material to assault small islands. I have heard talk that in a fight over open ground, like the Asian mainland, against decent opponent, not a Chinese rabble, the Japanese would not have lasted very long.

@Lazarus:

The 3 Wise Monkeys are alive and well……

And the great and wonderful Wizard of Ox is just some guy behind a curtain who can’t even keep his story straight.
It amazes me how many facts you are willing to change to convince yourself you are right.

And apparently it’s not so simple for you. On May 6 you said Eisenhower was always the supreme commander. He just knew when to delegate authority. But then you come back and say that Monty was in supreme command from June 6 until Sept. 1. You don’t even know what you’re talking about. Please figure out what you actually believe before you try to tell it as fact.