@Clyde85:
@KurtGodel7:
Unfortunately, both your post and mine are off topic. My next post in this thread (assuming there is one) will be on topic.
Actually, if anything how over-rated, the Japanese are in WW2 in directly on topic and lowering yourself down to the level of “flinging poo around the monkey cage” behavior that others preoccupy themselves with is more off topic then anything else.
It really seems to me that the Japanese had learned a great deal from its limited experiences in war with the west and from WW1, but never evolved in the inter-war years as the other powers did. The Japanese didn’t even have a standard issue for the main infantry rifle (with some versions requiring different caliber ammunition) let alone proper artillery. Their infantry tactics (as they had little else) seem to be a mirror image of Germany’s Storm trooper tactics from 1918. Pointing out that Japan was able to achieve a 1 to 1 exchange ratio with the Soviets, while other nations achieved ten fold, highlights how backward the Japanese military really was.
Two interesting historical facts, 1) Japanese infantry formations were larger then Soviet infantry formations, which makes the whole idea of the Soviets “human wave” attacks interesting, and 2) the Japanese rifle used in WW2, the type 99 rifle, was actually created in response to the IJA experience fighting in China and discovering that the Chinese “Zhong-shan” rifle was superior. Puts the IJA into a little bit of a different perspective
Good post. I enjoyed reading it. As you’ve pointed out, petty personal squabbles are always off-topic, and in addition are generally dull to read. They’re not what most of us came here for. Unfortunately, there are those here who seem to feel determined to derail discussions into any number of rabbit trails, with petty personal squabbles being one such rabbit trail.
This is a thread about overrated leaders, not a thread about overrated things in general. In order to stay on topic, I’ll add a name for consideration: Herman Goering. While he’s not generally considered a military genius–or anywhere close–he’s not lowly rated enough!
In 1940, Germany was significantly farther along in developing jet aircraft than were the British or (especially!) the Americans. Goering responded by greatly reducing the number of engineers allocated to jet development. He also talked Hitler into pausing the attack on the trapped British Expeditionary Force in France. He said the soldiers could be destroyed from the air, and that there was no need to expose Germany’s tank force to hostile fire. That directly lead to the evacuation at Dunkirk. Goering then went for a trifecta in 1940, when the Luftwaffe lost the Battle of Britain, in large part because Germany’s planes were not as advanced as British Spitfires.
In 1942, Germany’s force in Stalingrad had gotten cut off. Conquering the city in the first place had been very costly. Earlier in the war against the Soviet Union, a relatively small German force had been cut off for a while, and was supplied by air until it could be relieved. Goering assured Hitler the same could be done for the Stalingrad force. Goering waved away any concerns which were raised about whether the supply effort would be adequate. (Casually waving away legitimate concerns seems to have been a habit of Goering.) The Stalingrad force remained in place, and starved to death, after Goering had wholly failed to live up to his lofty promises of supply.
Germany deployed a few jet aircraft in 1944 and ‘45; but the overwhelming majority of its late war aircraft production continued to consist of piston-driven aircraft. Had Goering not removed so many engineers from jet development back in 1940, it’s possible that outcome would have been different. Germany’s lack of jets allowed the Allies’ D-Day invasion to be successful, and was also pivotal to the success of their strategic bombing effort against Germany. Goering thus had a hand in nearly every major tactical or strategic defeat Germany suffered; and thus deserves consideration for most overrated WWII leader.