Hi Wazzup
More than likely, China figher is gone.<<
Yes - name it! Anticipating the theory “More than likely, China figher is gone” the average Japan player will consider the carrier free of all protection duties and ready for fight, and as a result a tranny may be left unprotected as a target of opportunity for the sub.
More than likely, 3 hits are almost gauranteed in Pearl Harbor Japan attack<<
Well, since (in any case regardless of editions and rule versions) the outcome of the very first round of japanese fire logically is considered beyond the sphere of influence of U.S. tactics, let us then academically reduce the possible
effective tactical extension of the aforementioned U.S. initial choice of tactics (we can call it “Colonel Cool’s Manoeuvre” to simplify reference) by agreeing to the logical deduction which we may from now on, refer to as:
:wink: COLONEL COOL’S LAWÂ :roll:
(Law on the US choice of tactics during the very first possible Japanese attack on US Pacific Fleet in the strategic boardgame Axis & Allies classic)
Saying that:
§1: Proposition: There exist a threat to Japan, a choice of move here labeled “Colonel Cool’s Manoeuvre” that has an element of possible tactical surprise that can be exploited to increase the US Pacific Fleet’s tactical influence of the battle outcome, given a first possible Japanese attack on US Pacific Fleet.
§2: The definition of Cool’s Manoeuvre is to retreat the U.S. sub to a sea-zone adjacent to Sea Of Japan (e.g. N.W.Pacific) at first possible chance to do so. The move represents a genuine threat to Japan during a given first Combat Move attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet with reference to §3-5.
§3: When attacking the US Pacific Fleet in first Combat Move, Japan can NEVER be absolutely certain to hit all three units during first round of fire.
§4: If the U.S. are allowed to retreat the sub, it can IN NO CASE be blocked from retreating to a sea-zone adjacent to Sea Of Japan. (threatening the important staging point of Sea of Japan, and thereby achieving a strategic victory which cannot be achieved otherwise).
§5: because of §4, Japan has no possible way during the following non-combat move to intercept a subsequent U.S. strike capability on the Sea Of Japan (or any vessels in adjacent territories except by moving these out of range during non-combat - which is not always allowed).
§6: To nullify the threat tactically: The potential effect of the possible element of surprise in Colonel Cool’s Manoeuvre will decrease only as skilled japanese opponents takes §1-5 into consideration.
§7: Strategic implications: When skilled japanese opponents takes §1-5 into consideration, they aknowledge the tactical potential of Cool’s Manoeuvre BEFORE the rolling of the dice, giving the tactical implications of the manoeuvre some independent strategic influences (e.g. encouraging Japan to avoid landings on russian territory with unprotected tranny, or keeping Japan from purchasing a tranny that will be left unprotected in the Sea Of Japan, etc.)
§8: Consequently Colonel Cool’s Manoeuvre represents THE ONLY POSSIBLE WAY (given §4 during Japans first combat move) TO TACTICALLY INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME and the subsequent tactical drawing of the battlefield BY TACTICAL SURPRISE. In other words; If U.S. do not move the SUB when it’s possible to do so, then the outcome (the subsequent tactical drawing of the battlefield) will in reality be determined only by the rolling of the dice, and the U.S. will most surely be forced back to play a passive role, during the following U.S. turn.
If anyone has a critical comment or analysis to this law of nature, please come forward. The important question concerning Cool’s Manoeuvre is: is it worth it?
-or as Wazzup put it: What is the bid?
If convenient anyone; then check out the move a few times to analyse what possibilities comes up - or what heavy consequenses comes down, then be kind to come back and share ya thoughts.
Will Cool’s Law prevail? :|