I linked to that testimony in my post above. You can read at your leisure.
I can argue all day and give numerous facts and circumstances which have been given before… and it still will not change your mind. So I am not going to bother. However, if you have the time, I would highly recommend reading this http://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/85001/the-pacific-war-1931-1945-by-saburo-ienaga/9780394734965/. Ienaga is a Japanese scholar who was in Japan during the war. His take is critical on both the Japanese and the Americans, but focuses very much on how Japan entered into and continued a futile war entirely of its own accord. His research goes back to the late 1800s and the Meiji Restoration and many events leading up to Japanese aggression in the 1930s. This is a well balanced and pointedly realistic assessment of the origins of the Pacific War. You would do well to read it and compare to your existing conclusions about the war.
What you are suggesting is an incredibly circuitous and complex route for President Roosevelt to achieve his ultimate objective of war with Nazi Germany… and beyond that some type of post-war world hegemony between the USA and USSR. It again portrays Roosevelt as a manipulative puppet master, orchestrating world events entirely on his terms. And everything worked out exactly as planned. EDIT: Except dying before you can see it all work out.� :wink:
I clicked on the link to the book you recommended, eventually working my way to Amazon, attempting to get a feel for what the author had to offer. Some of the customer reviews I read were written by those who liked the book; others by those who didn’t. But none of the book’s fans or critics went into any detail. The best the reviews had to offer was a tidbit here, a tidbit there. One reviewer mentioned that the author had to go to court to get the book published, because the government considered it too anti-Japanese. Another reviewer complained that the book was not anti-Japanese enough, and stated that the death march of Bataan was not mentioned, and that the rape of Nanking was given relatively little attention. While I’m certainly open to learning more about WWII, I typically like to get a feel for what a book has to offer before deciding to make the time investment into reading it. If you have specific content from the book which you believe absolves the FDR administration from the guilt of starting the war between the U.S. and Japan, I will certainly read whatever quotes you provide, and will do my best to consider them as impartially as I can.
Speaking of bringing forth specific content from books, I’d like to present a few quotes from Herbert Hoover’s book Freedom Betrayed.
Page 846:
The third wrong turning was the imposition of the economic sanctions in July. That was undeclared war on Japan by which starvation and ruin stared her in the face and if continued would soon be war, for the simple reason that no people of dignity would run up the white flag under such provocation. It could effect no strategic purpose in the protection of the United States or China or even the British Empire.The fourth wrong turning was certainly the rejection of the Konoye proposals of September and the Emperor’s proposals of November. . . . Konoye had begun his negotiations two months before the sanctions. . . . It can never be forgotten that three times during 1941 Japan made overtures for peace negotiation. America never made one unless a futile proposal to the Emperor the day before Pearl Harbor could be called peace.
P. 833
[MacArthur] said that Roosevelt could have made peace with Konoye in September 1941 and could have obtained all of the American objectives in the Pacific and the freedom of China and probably Manchuria. He said Konoye was authorized by the Emperor to agree to complete withdrawal.
p 828
"[Ambassador Joseph Kennedy, father of JFK] said that when the Ghormley Commission went to England in mid-1940, it was for the purposes of preparing joint military action, and yet through that entire election campaign Roosevelt was promising the American people he would never go to war.
p 827
Kennedy said that Bullitt, under instructions from Roosevelt, was constantly urging the Poles not to make terms with the Germans and that he Kennedy, under instructions from Roosevelt, was constantly urging the British to make guarantees to the Poles. Kennedy said that he had received a cable from Roosevelt to “put a poker up Chamberlain’s back and to make him stand up.” . . . He said that after Chamberlain had given these guarantees, Chamberlain told him (Kennedy) that he hoped the Americans and the Jews would now be satisfied but that he (Chamberlain) felt that he had signed the doom of civilization.
Collectively, these quotes leave little room for doubt that FDR’s objectives were 1) to create a war in Europe, and 2) to join the war as quickly as he could. As IL pointed out in his otherwise error-ridden post, Japan had been engaging in aggression in China since 1931. If stopping Japanese aggression against China was important to FDR, why wait until 1941 to do anything about it? Why was stopping that aggression so much more important in 1941 than it had been in 1937 when Japan launched a major offensive against China? (An offensive which FDR ignored.) If saving China’s bacon was truly the objective, then why not simply accept the Konoye proposals made in 1941–proposals which would have accomplished exactly that?
FDR’s actions would have been nonsensical, had his actual objectives borne any relation at all to his stated objectives. I firmly believe he was working toward a different set of objectives: the twin objectives of the destruction of National Socialist Germany and the victory of the Soviet Union. A war between the U.S. and Japan would help achieve both, even if FDR hadn’t managed to use the Pacific war as a doorway through which to enter the European war. Even if the U.S. had done nothing more in WWII than go to war against Japan, that alone would have been sufficient to prevent any sort of serious Japanese invasion of the U.S.S.R. Stalin would have a one front war, greatly increasing his chances of victory. But Pearl Harbor (from FDR’s perspective) was even better than just that, because he got what he truly wanted: direct American involvement in the European conflict, on the side of the Soviet Union.