WIP Basic Axis and Allies Strategy and Tactics / Defensive Profile Shortcomings

A lot of things happen behind the scenes that I don’t write about. Even if it’s interesting, even if it’s funny, sometimes I’m like hey. Let’s just not open that can of worms.

So there I was, I had a magnificent multi-post rant in another thread going (exceeded character limit so I’d have to split it into multiple posts), and I was like . . . you know what? I’m going to let this one go. So I deleted the whole thing before even posting.

But there was one part that I realized when reading over it that I really shouldn’t just let go. If players think defensive profile limitations are a small thing it’s not just about a minor disagreement. It says something about how players understand (or don’t understand) stack building / bleeding.

Stack building / bleeding is the absolute foundation of strategy. It is the alpha, it is the omega, literally as well as figuratively.

So I figure I’ll start in on it, give a few conceptual examples, edit and rewrite, stick a strategy thread in 1942 Second Edition boards, maybe submit it as an article, then for this thread bring it around to defensive profiles.

First, what do I mean by “strategy”, what do I mean by “tactics”? Everyone uses their own terminology, but what do I personally mean when I use those terms? I use “tactics” to reference effectiveness small actions with limited consequences. I use “strategy” to reference knowing how and when to combine individual small actions into an effective whole.

Suppose I have a “tactic” of “you love me and buy me pizza”. I say that’s not a real tactic, that’s just wishful thinking. There’s no plan for how to make it happen, no thought of opportunity cost, just boop, pizza. (That’s not real tactics!)

Suppose I have a “strategy” of using my “tactic”. Since everyone is buying me pizza (or so the reasoning goes), I can open up my own pizza chain and sell all these donated pizza. All the pizza and money I want, amazing strategy and tactics! But again that’s not real strategy!

For tactics and strategy to be real, you have to know what specific actions to take and why. That “why” not based on some vague “feeling” but specific mathematical assessment.

And if you choose not to use mathematics? There’s a difference between real life strategy and tactics, in which there are unknown variables, misinformation deliberately spread by opposition, quantities that cannot be assessed with currently available information, yet there is a need to act.

But in AXIS AND ALLIES strategy and tactics, you can know all there is to know - provided you trust the dice (which I’m not saying you should), but IF you do then it’s just a matter of calculating probability distributions and knowing how game possibilities collapse in on one another instead of infinitely diverging, as a function of game map and game rules. That’s just how it is.

No? Axis and Allies is so complex, surely there must be some wiggle room for inventiveness?

Suppose there are infantry on Eastern United States. How do you get them to Europe as efficiently and quickly as possible?

You could take a transport to French West Africa, then Union of South Africa, then double back? That’s not about being tricky or clever. We’re talking about Europe specifically, if US takes the scenic route it’s just wasting time.

Morocco to France / NW Europe? But again, think about the practical aspects. If Axis have a good-sized air force on France or NW Europe, they’ll threaten any transports sent to Morocco. So there needs to be a defensive fleet there. If there’s another transport fleet at France, the Allies need another defensive fleet there. If you only have one defensive fleet and move it between off Morocco and off France, then you’re going to be missing drops to Europe half the time.

So it comes down to, time and again, if you don’t want to build multiple defensive naval escort fleets, you walk US ground from East US to East Canada. Full transports move from an East Canada sea zone to offload in the sea zone northwest of Norway/Finland, ground units get to Norway/Finland. Empty transports move from sea zone northwest of Norway / Finland to off East Canada. US has to protect Alaska and Western Canada against Japan or the Axis get some cheap attack options, but that’s still fastest, easiest, and cheapest.

(Or you can have the Allied fleet northwest of France, depending).

But regardless, you see how it is. There isn’t endless romance and mystery, the possibilities collapse on industrial complex locations, optimal routes, and so forth. Can things turn out differently? Sure, you can get early US incursions at Southern Europe, but that too depends on “optimal” play depending on the conditions. No matter how you play, it comes down to the numbers, sooner (actually immediately), rather than later.

Before getting to the next part, understand. I’m not saying mathematics is EVERYTHING in Axis and Allies. Knowing how to read and assess opponent risk preferences, trying to influence opponent reads on your own plays, a lot of nonmathematical stuff is part of it too. But I’m saying, probability and mathematics is a real factor, and constantly ignoring the odds doesn’t make someone a genius.

Fast recap, basic terminology covered, math is a thing, I’m not trying for the feel-good movie treatment here; math isn’t everything but it certainly isn’t nothing either. Next up, what is stack bleeding and building?

Stack building and bleeding is strategic level thinking. It is not a tactic, except incidentally, and it must be understood, if you think stack bleeding and building is about elementary cost-benefit calculations, then you don’t know what stack bleeding and building is.

There’s a lot of confusion with some players that think “tactics” and “strategy” are interchangeable terms. It’s a bit more confusing as in his essays Don wrote about elementary cost-benefit calculations (tactics), but referenced infantry as part of solid overall play (strategy). So some players think, if you get elementary cost-benefit calculations, that IS strategy. But no.

Suppose you have a load of infantry, artillery, tanks, and fighters with Germany, and you can hit Archangel, West Russia, Belorussia, and Ukraine.

Suppose you consider sending 1 infantry and 1 artillery to attack 1 infantry for control of Archangel. Thinking about elementary cost-benefit calculations, you invest 7 IPCs to destroy 3 IPCs of units for control of a 1-IPC territory. Suppose USSR has plenty of counter power and you believe if USSR counters, you will have a bad-odds defense. Then suppose you calculate your counter to USSR’s counter, etc. And then suppose at the end of the day you figure, it’s just not worth sending 7 IPCs of units.

The back and forth, the projections run, the hypotheticals, the estimation of “worth” over projections running multiple rounds seems to be advanced cost-benefit? It’s a lot more detailed than a lot of players do, but that’s still elementary.

No, when you think stack building and bleeding it’s not just about “what is the immediate counter” or “what is my counter to their immediate counter”. It’s more like:

" Exactly what is the mathematics of ALL options I have, not just now, not just next round’s counters and counter-counters, but EVERY battle, EVERY outcome, not just now, but possible consequences seven turns from now, which is the earliest I may capture Moscow, and even then not limited to seven turns but what are my contingency plans and the mathematics and projections for well beyond that in case THIS specific does not go as reasonably likely and desired, and/or THIS specific and/or THIS? And not “mathematics” in some “let’s impress the kids that don’t know what’s happening, I’m fancy math!” but specific numbers on exactly what we can reasonably expect to see on Russia in seven turns, specific numbers on exactly how we plan to defeat that, and numbers everywhere, plans for everything "

You see the difference. It’s not just one calculation, or even a bunch of calculations and a bit of speculation. The whole thing is calculated, start to finish.

And for those that say “building a complete mathematical model of an entire game, of course, who doesn’t do that? What do you mean not elementary cost-benefit, it’s all elementary” - look. For the one player I know that builds better mathematical models than me, yes, I know, it’s all a big joke to you, but look around, players saying defensive profiles don’t make a difference. You know what that means.

Anyways, back on. I wanted to give players some idea of the scale of what’s going on behind the scenes, and it seems very crazy and complicated, but it’s not really. Like any big complex thing it breaks down into little pieces that can be examined.

So about stack bleeding / building. It’s big picture stuff, but without looking TOO closely and being blinded by details, what does that mean?

I’ve been referencing this for over two years in passing but I don’t think I’ve ever addressed it directly, as a discipline of its own rather than an application.

Suppose Germany has a big stack of ground units. It pushes those units to Russia, where it has to face a combination of USSR ground, UK ground, maybe some US ground, USSR air, UK air, US air.

How does that happen, exactly? Leaving off a LOT of details, it’s still a bit complex. Germany can produce two units at Karelia. Otherwise, it’s limited to transporting units from Italy to Ukraine/Caucasus (if the German battleship/transport survive which they probably won’t), and marching units over from Berlin and Italy.

Infantry are cost-effective, sure. But they’re also very slow. Also, later in the game Germany has to deal with UK and US. Tanks are fast but expensive. Air is faster but even more expensive.

. . . and?

Germany starts with a big block of units, but that block isn’t big enough to crack a unified Allied defense any time soon. Germany needs a big chunk of units to break the combined Allied stack, but it can’t just pop units out of Berlin right into the eastern front. No, by the time German infantry march from Berlin to the front, the Allies have had much more time to fly in reinforcements to Russia, and develop UK/US ground reinforcement to Europe as well. If Germany rushes tanks, that can help in the short term but Germany still has to deal with UK/US landings and tanks being so much more expensive than infantry, Germany may lack the numbers for a favorable attack against a unified Allied stack.

Given most reasonable expectations, it’s absolutely imperative that Germany preserve its units, because Germany can NOT expect to get over that combined Allied defense at all easily, even perhaps at all, if the Allied player is decent.

But? But also, if Germany tries to simply preserve its units ignoring other factors, that means Germany isn’t contesting territory, Germany isn’t getting that income, probably USSR is getting that income, which USSR uses to make more units.

So it’s simultaneously horribly important that Germany not lose any units, yet also horribly important that Germany use its units to contest territory in Europe. Germany is trying to “build” its forward stacks so it can credibly threaten Russia, even if not to capture, at least to weaken the combined Allied stack so much, on favorable overall terms to Axis, that Germany can reverse out of USSR to defend against UK/US while Japan finishes USSR. This means massive massive German stack, as big and as fast as possible.

But of course UK, US, and USSR know all this, and are trying to stop just that.

So you think about how the positions develop over time, the realistic expectations. What are UK, US, and USSR’s tools in this fight?

One of the big tools USSR has is punishing German overextension. USSR pushes mass infantry/artillery then perhaps followup tanks depending on the position. If Germany can be pushed off Karelia for a while, UK and US ground reinforcements can stream towards Russia and probably the Axis can’t pull off a win.

Notice that isn’t the usual definition of “overextension”, as in Germany parks all its tanks in one place where USSR can blow them up on the cheap, for no good reason. No, when I say “overextension” here it’s far more subtle. If Germany builds a load of early tanks it doesn’t look like an overextension, everything’s defended, everything looks fantastic. But in time, Germany has to deal with UK and US landings, and it has to protect Karelia. It can be that the Axis position cannot be recovered after G2 (despite looking fantastic for the short term), but that doesn’t become clear until G5 or so. But during that time, if Germany can’t capitalize on its position, then what? Then Germany is pushed back. And grabbing too much too early, that’s what overextension is all about. Whether the consequences are obvious and immediate or delayed, the idea is the same.

Understanding how positions develop over time, having a proper plan, having REAL estimates (with numbers and everything) for what exactly is projected to be needed, that’s what stack bleeding and building means. You’re trying to build your stacks in one spot, your opponent is trying to prevent you, you’re trying to prevent your opponent’s prevention, in the meantime your opponent is also building their stacks and you’re trying to counter while your opponent is trying to pre-emptively counter your counters etc.

And again, it’s very much about the practical application, and about understanding the real numbers in the big picture. It’s not about now, it’s not about next round, you have real expectations about what happens seven turns from now. And yes, you do NOT think everything happens EXACTLY as predicted. If anything, you KNOW they will NOT happen as predicted, even if you and your opponent all play exactly as predicted there’s still dice variance.

But that doesn’t mean you just throw the numbers out the window because they’re “incomprehensible” either.

Some readers will notice, everything I’m talking about is the same as what I’ve been writing going on two years. You have to look at the specific numbers. This is nothing new.

So you’re following along and nodding your head, yes yes, numbers, we all like the numbers, respect and love, yes yes.

But then you must understand how horrible defensive profiles are. No?

Suppose UK and US quickly set up transports to Finland/Norway, USSR has a stack on West Russia, Germany has a stack on Karelia, Japanese fighters have landed on Karelia after India fell, UK has a chunk of units on West Russia that escaped from the India region.

This is not me making wild claims to try to get cheap points. As I’ve written elsewhere, USSR fights for 2-IPC territories in Europe or 1-IPC territories in Asia. If anyone runs the numbers, they will see for themselves the balance in Europe is VERY tight. UK cannot race 3 units at India versus 8 from Japan for long even considering Japan’s weak starting stack sizes in Asia, any USSR units sent to India are far from the conflict in Europe so allow Germany to advance faster. This is just mathematics, game rules, and the board.

You think there’s some inventive way around it? Okay, show me how USSR tanks defend West Russia and also counter any Japan push to India, except West Russia is three spaces from India. Or show me how USSR tanks on Caucasus defend West Russia, except obviously they don’t; they can help counter a German push into West Russia but they can’t help defend West Russia if they’re on another territory. Etc. No matter what “smart” thing you try, you run up against those hard limits, not because I say so, but because they’re there.

And maybe I’m wrong about how it plays out? Sure. And when someone builds out a detailed projection that withstands close scrutiny, I’ll say welcome to the player’s club. But until then.

So again, UK and US quickly set up transports to Finland/Norway, USSR has a stack on West Russia, Germany has a stack on Karelia, Japanese fighters have landed on Karelia after India fell, UK has a chunk of units on West Russia that escaped from the India region.

Now what?

First, USSR is really eyeing Karelia. If Germany can be pushed off Karelia, a chunk of UK and US ground forces march in. From there UK/US can go to Archangel, West Russia, then to Russia itself. If Japan doesn’t have significant stacks (and everything I described can happen well before Japan has significant Asia/Europe stacks), then the Allies have a combined defense against any Axis attack. Germany will not get a good attack against that gigantic combined stack, nor will Japan, and the Axis MUST break the Allied stack sometime.

There’s other Allied options, like going for Italy or grabbing France. But those are either hard to sustain and/or have bad contingencies. If Italy is contested, the Allies must have a defensive escort fleet in the Mediterranean or be blown up by Japanese air. Yet UK must also have a defensive escort fleet in north Atlantic, or likewise be blown up. If UK pushes to Africa, then UK’s transport lines are inefficient. As to France, if UK/US can hold a beachhead that’s nice. But Germany can afford to hold at Berlin while hammering USSR down in the east. Once USSR is fatally weakened, Germany can reverse all its units out of east Europe, let Japan clean up (if Germany didn’t claim Moscow itself), and UK/US stall out in the attrition battle. In those scenarios, that doesn’t all necessarily happen, maybe the Allies get a bit lucky, or maybe the Allies don’t even need luck. But if the Allies get some bad luck, then UK/US can’t just reposition out of France to try to help out near Russia; it’s Dunkirk except this time Germany doesn’t hold back. As to Italy, let’s not try to blow things out of proportion, probably Japan doesn’t just blow up the entire US fleet or even the UK fleet. But two separate defensive fleets for two separate navies, with both Germany and Japan’s air force able to concentrate on either, with neither defensive fleet having any flexibility to reinforce the other - the Axis should be able to make something of that. Yes, Allies may well want to go to Italy and/or France early, yes the Allies can get stuck at Finland if they go that route, but you can see how UK/US to Norway/Finland has its benefits.

But back to Karelia, UK/US landing at Finland/Norway and stack building/bleeding.

Russia starts with 36 units in Europe, and can expect to build 7 a turn for a while, going down to 5, then even lower. I won’t bother to run an exact projection but let’s say by R4 58 units isn’t crazy to think about.

UK, on the other hand, counting the units in north Africa and Asia, and even the UK fighters on London, has 17 units. It’s sloppy and unrealistic but let’s add 3 units a turn for India, and say by UK4 that’s 29 units. UK can have some units at Finland too, let’s say by UK4 that’s another 15 units, which again is perhaps unrealistic, but just for argument’s sake.

Now let’s fudge some more numbers and say there was some trading involved, cut USSR’s count by 10 units, UK by 5. USSR has 48 units, UK 39.

So even with assumptions against the point I’m arguing, you get the idea. One Allied nation has more units than the other. You say UK has more units than USSR? Sure, doesn’t matter. But let’s just agree US doesn’t have anything close to 39 units in Europe by US4.

So remember again the essential issues around stacks. How do they grow over time, exactly, how can they be prevented from growing, what about logistics, counterthreats, and so on? And you realize, Germany has to crack the USSR/UK/US stack, USSR wants to break the German/Japanese stack. Each wants to fight, but they want the battle on their terms.

And if you have a major Axis stack, how do you think the Allies can best challenge that stack? With 48 USSR units? Or 39 UK units? There’s other considerations, but often it’s just better that the bigger stack attack.

Obviously? But what I see is posters often don’t think it through. Even if they know abstractly that the bigger stack attacks, they don’t understand the practical application, that the bigger stack doesn’t just pop into existence, it has to be carefully and deliberately built up, sometimes over several rounds.

Suppose Germany did an attack/retreat into West Russia, killed a load of units, withdrew to Karelia. I’m not saying the Axis were stupid, or that the Allies were stupid, let’s say there were calculated risks all around.

But then what?

USSR wants to preserve its units to hit Karelia on USSR’s turn.

When Germany rolls into West Russia, in 1942 Second Edition, for this example UK units are lost before USSR units, why? Because USSR knows it wants to line up a counter next turn. USSR wants all the numbers it can get. The Allies player takes deliberate action to make sure that happens. If it’s UK infantry, it’s removed before USSR infantry. But if it’s UK artillery? Even UK tanks? Depends on the numbers, but those too may be chosen as casualties before USSR infantry. When you have a major stack battle coming up, you do NOT skimp. If you save an IPC, if you save 5 IPCs by skimping, remember major stack battles change the IPC value of units on the board by hundreds, not just money in the bank but mobilized units that spent time getting to the front lines. Yes, you want to save 5 IPCs if you can, but not if that “saving” costs you 30 IPCs in projected outcomes elsewhere.

But with defensive profiles in 1942 Online what happens? Order of loss is poorly documented so who knows whether UK or USSR loses infantry first but regardless you’re going to lose USSR infantry before you lose any UK artillery. And again, that may not be what you want.

Often the details are different. UK has more units, or it’s late game so US has more, or Germany plans to attack/retreat from Finland into Karelia, or Japan reinforced Germany at Caucasus so it’s about loss of fine Axis control rather than fine Allied control. But what doesn’t change is defensive profiles rob a player of the control they need.

But it’s the same for both sides? It isn’t.

As I pointed out with the use of allied carriers in a Google document I wrote up going on two years ago, symmetric rules changes applied to asymmetric conditions are naturally going to have asymmetric changes to balance. If you must have an analogy, you have a very fat person and a very thin person, if they both lose 50 kilos, the very fat person gets healthier, the very thin person gets dead.

When do you get multinational Allied defense? Every game, and with competent play it’s not just pure UK/US fighters that die last anyways so the defensive profile “didn’t make a difference”. No, it’s UK/US ground in Africa where there’s only UK air cover so you want to preserve UK ground, it’s USSR/UK ground in Europe challenging the forward Axis Europe stack where you want to preserve one but not the other depending on the board position; if the Allies manage to contain Germany then it’s UK/US pressing from the northeast and USSR from the south. I’ve already written elsewhere how 1942 Online not allowing carrier use destroys Allied KJF, and how not allowing transport use messes with UK’s income in northwest Africa so obviously I don’t recommend KJF. But if KJF is attempted, even then there’s a preference to preserve USSR units over UK, for turn order if nothing else, not to mention potential income and logistics in Asia and Europe. Defensive profiles are always going to be bad for the Allies.

And for the Axis?

Yes, the Axis do multinational defense but it’s not the same. Unless the Axis are wildly incompetent, lucky, or facing an incompetent Allied player, any multinational Axis defense in Europe consists of German ground, possibly German air, and Japanese fighters. Yes, it could be that order of loss screws Axis over, but when Axis air is at stake the Axis will normally leave strong enough a defense that any Allied attack will probably fail and screw the Allies over much harder than the Axis needing to worry about whether Germany or Japan lost air. If it’s a multinational Axis ground defense at Caucasus or West Russia, again, the Axis are likely to win regardless.

Do not think to reinterpret and spin my words to try to argue that I’m saying defensive profiles don’t have any bad effect on the Axis. Don’t try to play this off as some sort of “win”, don’t say it “doesn’t matter”. Anyone that actually understands the first thing about stack building/bleeding understands defensive profiles screw over the Allies, in addition to the Allies being screwed over by inability to use allied carriers, in addition to the Allies being screwed over by inability to use allied transports. If someone wants to say it was thought necessary to make horrible compromises in the name of asymmetric play, I could go with that. But to pretend 1942 Online is “The complete Axis & Allies 1942 Second Edition experience” as described on the Steam store description, to market 1942 Online like it is actually supposed to be something like 1942 Second Edition, well, it’s just not.

Yes, not being able to use allied carriers cuts Germany’s Baltic fleet options. But Germany doesn’t have to build a Baltic fleet. But on the other hand, do the Allies do KGF or KJF? Take your pick, they’re screwed both ways.

But about the Steam store description. Cut and pasted from today, 22 May 2021:

==

What the developers have to say:
Why Early Access?
“For years, fans of Axis & Allies have been asking for an online option for their favorite board game. We want to ensure that Axis & Allies 1942 Online is a satisfying experience for veteran fans and new players alike.”
Approximately how long will this game be in Early Access?
“We expect to stay in Early Access for a few months with regular updates.”
How is the full version planned to differ from the Early Access version?
“Right now, Axis & Allies 1942 Online is fully playable against human opponents, AI, or a mix of the two. As we work towards launch, we’ll be adding new features, making user interface changes, fixing bugs, and incorporating feedback from Early Access players.

We’re working towards a number of Steam features such as friends list, trading cards, and achievements as a part of launch.”
What is the current state of the Early Access version?
“Axis & Allies 1942 Online in Early Access is fully playable as a single player experience against AI, local hotseat play, or online multiplayer.”
Will the game be priced differently during and after Early Access?
“No, Axis & Allies 1942 Online will be priced the same during and after Early Access.”
How are you planning on involving the Community in your development process?
“We’ll be actively reading and responding to comments and reviews posted here on Steam and in our Beamdog forums. We’re interested in player feedback and bug reports.”

==

About This Game
German tanks mobilize in the west, blitzing into France and pushing back the Soviet Union in eastern Europe. The United States rises in response to Japanese aggression in the Pacific. The United Kingdom rallies allies as bombers menace the skies. The year is 1942, and the world is at war!

Axis & Allies 1942 Online is an official adaptation of the beloved strategic board game, Axis & Allies, and includes the 1942 Second Edition game board and rules.

Axis & Allies 1942 Online accommodates 1-5 players, each controlling one or more of the Axis or Allied powers in Online Multiplayer, Hot Seat, or Single Player mode against the computer AI. Players command both their country’s military forces and its war-time economy.

Victory goes to the side that conquers its opponents on the field of battle and occupies the greatest cities of the world. Will the Axis continue to spread across the globe unchecked, or will the Allies rally to push back against imperialistic tyranny? Challenge your friends and change the course of history!
Many ways to play!

Hotseat play for 2 to 5 players
Online multiplayer allows you play with allies and enemies across the world
Challenge yourself against AI

Features

The complete Axis & Allies 1942 Second Edition experience
Play online with your friends
Optional computer AI players
Learn to play with introductory tutorials
Asynchronous gameplay with custom defense profiles
Selectable victory conditions
Keep informed with the action log and war diary
Over 20 minutes of all-new period appropriate music

==

Jesus wept.

Go on, look where it says the gameplay is compromised. It doesn’t, it’s just “The complete Axis & Allies 1942 Second Edition experience”, going on two years not even any announcements about intent to change 1942 Online to actually play like 1942 Second Edition.

Two years on.

Well, back to stack bleeding / building, recap / rewrite:

1. There’s a difference between strategy and tactics and wishful thinking. The more concrete your numbers, the more detailed your projections, the more possibilities you consider, the better your strategy and tactics. The less numbers, the less specifics, the more you’re just blindly hoping.

2. Mathematics isn’t everything, even for Axis and Allies. But for a game with limited rules, a static map, and probability distributions, without hidden information, without trade, without diplomacy, without - big list I won’t get into - anyways mathematics. It’s real. Players can ignore it but that doesn’t make it go away.

3. Stack building and bleeding is about understanding in detail how major stacks can move forwards or be pushed backwards, not just for one turn or another, but over the course of an entire game. It isn’t simply about theory, nor is it a magic wand. There’s a lot of real mathematics involved, and this can be difficult especially for newer players that are trying to build projections from scratch. Players can use shortcuts that greatly reduce computation; though accuracy suffers and options a player ought to have considered may not have been considered with the shortcut, over time a player that pays attention to how actual games differ from projections understands what shortcuts do or do not work. However, a player needs to remember shortcuts and personal experience do not compare to to mathematics. If a player bases their play simply on personal experience, assuming their range of experience applies to all games. If they are used to playing against a weak meta, their shortcuts and projections will be wildly optimistic. But simply the presence of lots of numbers is no guarantee of accuracy either. Even very intricate and detailed mathematical projections can miss important points if those considerations weren’t built into the model.

4. If you understand stack building and bleeding you know it’s not just an abstract concept, it’s always about practical application. Abstractly, a competently played game is going to have players that consider and predict stack movements, that try to influence stack movements. But how does that manifest, exactly? What is the practical application? The more realistic and fully fleshed out scenarios you construct on a detailed and mathematical basis, the more scenarios you see where defensive profiles are a problem for Allies with multinational ground defenses, and that the same is not true for the Axis.

But no? That’s just an empty claim? Think on it. Suppose the game plays out mostly as I described. Suppose you take exception to the idea Germany may attack West Russia with intent (even a backup plan) to retreat to Karelia. I’d say that’s very questionable, because with dice outcomes that’s exactly what Germany has as its contingency plan. Remember, Germany has the largest starting stacks; if it has the opportunity to cut Allied stacks down at reasonable cost, it must do so, especially if Japan is to have any hope of challenging an Allied stack on any reasonable time frame.

But even if that’s denied, think on this. UK holds India for as long as possible, if for no other reason to produce three units each turn that can move into mainland Europe. But when UK moves out of India, where does it go? Persia. And when does this happen? Again, we know it happens quite late. So there’s every chance if it’s on later rounds Germany has pushed a stack to Ukraine to throttle off USSR income. Then what happens? Germany has a combined attack from Karelia and Ukraine into West Russia. From there, USSR must decide between protecting Caucasus and Russia. But how is that relevant? Because where is the UK India stack during all that time? Did it move from India to Persia? Then where? Did it move to Caucasus? When? When that happened, what was the balance of USSR and UK forces? Could Germany, who again, has major forces in the area right about this time, carry out an attack with an aftermath where defensive profiles would prevent the Allies from taking the appropriate casualties? Very possibly. If UK pushed from Persia to Kazakh, what of Japan’s position in China? Could UK even move to Kazakh without being completely destroyed? Perhaps, but perhaps not.

Even if the Axis don’t get an opening at Caucasus, Kazakh, or Persia, what of Russia itself? If USSR gets backed up all the way to Russia, if UK and US are building pressure (and why wouldn’t they), Germany and Japan will try a sequential attack to break Russia before cost-effective UK and US ground units can arrive. Can it really be said that there will be zero possibility of any USSR counterplay, that the turn order of USSR-Germany-UK-Japan will not be an issue? With US units still cut off, mind. No. If the issue is somehow dodged at West Russia, if it is somehow even dodged at Caucasus, it comes up at Russia. Eventually the Allies make a multi-power defense of a territory with ground units from different powers, and defensive profiles screw the Allied response.

Or let’s talk about Allies in Africa. Suppose, as I’ve seen some “top meta” players recommend, Germany sends all its submarines to the UK battleship fight, and leaves the UK cruiser near Mediterranean alone. Very well, UK drops 1 tank to French West Africa and moves its infantry at Union of South Africa up; US moves four units in. How does the position then develop? Perhaps UK blows up Germany’s Med fleet, perhaps not, but let’s say Germany can expect to contest Egypt and if UK doesn’t pull some units away from reinforcing India to contest Germany in Africa, then Germany runs through Africa with tanks. Meanwhile say USSR held West Russia past G1 and UK landed fighters on West Russia. What happens then? UK has air in the area of West Russia that it later moves to help defend India depending on Japan’s threat. But UK fighters are not limited to defending India. With UK’s India stack they pose an added threat to Japan’s control of Burma, and they can swiftly move over to Africa. Why isn’t US’s fighter used the same way? If the US fighter survived, still there’s simply no US infantry to back up the fighter. If US didn’t use its US infantry immediately to try to slow Japan, US infantry still normally won’t make it to India; they get cut off. Instead, US infantry typically head west towards West Russia, and if they make it towards India it’s not through China and not any time soon, it’s only very late and then through Persia, and that’s only if the Allies can spare the units in Europe. So a US fighter in the Asia region has no tactical flexibility or real threat, and moving a US fighter to Africa means it can’t help out in the Atlantic or Europe, which is where all the US ground and navy are. It’s simply inefficient, even a US bomber in Africa has sharply limited options if it wants to help out the rest of US’s forces in Finland/Norway.

Does US air end up in Africa and/or India? Sure, eventually, but that doesn’t make things better. It makes things worse.

I explained that with UK/US in Africa, early on it’s better to preserve UK units. But later on the reverse is true. So I forget whatever the developers said somewhere about whatever automated casualty assignation - whether it depends on who the original controller, who moved in first, etc. Bleah. They never put up a sticky thread either.

But that aside, suppose US units would always be taken first. Okay, not the US tanks or US artillery before UK infantry, and I already mentioned how that was an issue, and if you looked at what US1 drops to French West Africa, sure enough, US artillery and tank (as well as infantry). Oof.

But what about late game? Suppose defensive profiles were changed (but they’re not) so all units of one nation were taken as a casualty before another? (still not good, still too many edge cases where you want to split, but it’s not happening anyways). But suppose, just theoretically, maybe all US units were removed as casualties before UK, always. Would that be good?

But that’s not good. Because what happens late game? Think about the turn order. Suppose the Allies break through at Karelia. Who goes after Germany? Who goes after Japan?

Suppose UK goes after Japan. Say UK recaptures USSR or US territory. UK gets no income off those territories. But when Japan recaptures, Japan gets income. Japan goes right after UK. So US never collects the income from territories UK captures if Japan recaptures; USSR never collects the income from territories UK captures if Japan recaptures.

Then there’s other things, like UK having good logistics from London to Europe. If there’s enough defensive naval escorts, one UK transport can offload one transport’s capcity of units to any of Finland, Norway, France, NW Europe (for badly needed income), but also Karelia and Baltic States, and also Berlin. UK also has the option of dropping to Archangel, though it means the next drop has to be to Norway. UK just has really great flexibility, provided the Allies have enough defensive fleet. And even if not? UK goes immediately after Germany. If a target in Europe needs to be hit before Japan can fly in fighters to reinforce. ONLY UK can get it done. So loads of UK units headed towards Europe. Make sense?

Suppose US goes after Germany. Suppose US captures a territory then USSR reinforces. That’s not good. UK never has a turn to reinforce; you see how if UK captures then USSR and US can both land fighters, but if US captures only USSR can land fighters? But even if not, if US captures territory in Europe, that’s bad. The best Allied logistics and stack sizes come from USSR; it’s best to give income to USSR if possible. If not, the next is UK. The absolute worst is US. Even when US has enough transports to offload its income capacity in infantry every turn (which I don’t recommend, that doesn’t leave any flexibility) - but anyways even when US reaches saturation, US is still limited to Finland/Norway if it wants to maintain drops from East Canada. Maybe US diverts to France, maybe not, but regardless US is always going to have very limited options until it has massive navy, like the Allies have three defensive fleets and three transport fleets operating in the Atlantic, that kind of massive. Probably not happening on any relevant timescale.

But contrast to if US goes after Japan. Well, US does go “after” Japan, just in terms of turn order. And as with UK going immediately after Germany, again, all the advantages are with going immediately after the target.

So later in the game, US air is in range of Asia/Africa, then US wants to preserve its units, and it’s UK units that should be lost first.

No matter how you build out the projection, defensive profiles are always going to mess with the Allies in particular. Even if defensive profiles are “improved”, the Allies still get the short end.

Even if you claim defensive profiles change somehow, they’re just never going to be “the complete experience”. They just won’t.

No? Surely there must be something I’m overlooking?

Think about this.

Suppose Germany attacks a multinational Allied defense. Let us agree there is dice variance, not too controversial I trust? So sometimes Germany will be lucky, sometimes unlucky.

Say Germany’s lucky. In that case, maybe a projection run after accounting for attacker hits requires Allies to get their “best defense” together. AA guns die first, then infantry, then artillery, then tanks, regardless of controlling power, just going for raw defensive power, because the Allies are trying to hold on by their fingernails.

Suppose Germany’s unlucky. Then, maybe projections have the Allies easily surviving the attack and USSR lining up a vicious counter. All UK units die before any USSR units, maybe it’s 10 IPCs worth of extra losses, that swings the major stack battle by 30 IPCs expected, plus collapse of the German position with expectation of won game.

And how does the defending player know in advance if Germany’s attack is lucky or unlucky? Well they don’t. So they have to specify in advance what happens if Germany is lucky, they have to specify in advance what happens if Germany is unlucky, they have to define precisely what “lucky” means, what the difference is, if there’s any additional scenarios - you get the idea. Oh, and of course maybe Germany doesn’t even do a major attack at all and they just do something else entirely, so you have to account for that too. Etc. etc.

If defensive profiles are made incredibly complex, that’s good for control, but very bad for ease of use. And there are still going to be possibilities that are not covered.

Imagine playing the board game. You don’t have to say “if they get one hit to three hits do this, if four to seven hits do this other thing, if eight plus hits do yet this other thing, except differentiate depending on attacking composition and opening defender AA gun results for the four plus and eight plus hit scenarios” etc. etc. You’re there live, you see what is rolled, you say what to take as casualties, you don’t spout off about might have beens going on and on, you just see what happens, say what happens, done.

But if defensive profiles are left terribly simple that’s bad for control even if it’s good for ease of use. All the problems I described and more.

So to wrap up this bit about defensive profiles. It’s not just that defensive profiles fall short as it is. A recent announcement says they’re going to increase defensive profile count to 15. But it’s still not enough, defensive profiles are always going to come up short. Properly, you are going to make different decisions based on

1. Attacker composition and count. E.g. Allies send everything to hit Berlin then Germany should take AA guns first, it’s going to be a major battle, Axis wants all the defense it can get. But what if Allies send just an infantry and an artillery? There’s no serious threat to Berlin, so why would the Allies do that attack at all? To destroy German AA guns on the cheap. I think I did exactly this in a recent game with TTG. It’s not anything to be proud of, it’s just taking cheap shots at defensive profile limitations, you never do something like that in 1942 Second Edition but that’s the point. You don’t ever do it in 1942 Second Edition. You do do it in 1942 Online.

2. Opening defense rolls. Defending AA guns fire, wipe out a chunk of attacking air. Think that doesn’t make a difference in projected outcomes? (It does). You’re not peeling 1s off the attackers, you’re going straight to their 3s, and attackers using simple calculation tools are using projections based off “average” AA gun hits. Yes, the projection the attacker started with was accurate before the attack started, but after the attack started and 5 out of 6 attacking air got shot down, the original projection only weighted that possibility or worse at around 0.06%. But after the fact of the dice, the weight on that projection is no longer 0.06%. It’s 100%, because it just happened, and the remainder plays out from there.

3. Opening attacker rolls. The defender doesn’t know what the defenders will roll, but they know what the attackers rolled. If the attackers roll amazing hits the defenders may have to give up on any possibility of counterattacking and go for raw defense. But if the attackers rolled lousy hits, maybe there’s a vicious counterattack in the offing so the defenders should preserve units of the power that’s going for the counterattack.

4. Everything above, modified for later rounds, along with remaining defender composition. Each and every round of remaining combats there’s a question about what the defenders do, dice outcomes can change the optimal response at any time, so defensive profiles - if trying to give all options as possible with live play - have to allow for all optimal responses as well. Things were already complicated with specifying every possible combat option for the attackers, but not only do the raw attacks need to be accounted for, each round of each potential attack needs to be fully detailed.

5. The outcome of other battles. Suppose Japan controls India and has a fleet in the India sea zone. Now suppose the Allies attack India from Persia (not an amphibious assault) and the India sea zone from wherever. Suppose that all the battles are close, that the Allies don’t have great odds, but consider the rewards if the Allies get a bit lucky and if defensive profiles are set a certain way.

Suppose the Axis player didn’t think Allies would even attack India from Persia as there was only a 40% chance for Allies to win and Japan had followup units at Burma. Suppose the Axis player thought their Japanese fleet off India was safe as it had a load of carriers and fighters.

But then say the Allies did attack India from Persia and did capture. Then say the Allies attacked the India sea zone. For close-fought naval battle defenses, often you lose carriers before fighters because you want to inflict maximum casualties on expensive attacking naval and air units. Carriers are expensive to replace, but so too are attacking units, and the attacker had to mobilize their units way out. So what happens here? Defender drops carriers first then attacker retreats. Defending fighters have one space to land, but there’s no place to land, say no other carriers in the area, and of course they can’t land on India. So boop, bunch of expensive fighters lost.

6. Territory / sea zone attacked. Suppose a power is maintaining a defensive naval position. That can mean that power wants submarines, not because submarines are good on defense, but because they’re good on attack. Before the “defending” power can be hit, the “attacker” needs to move into range, where the “defender” can whack them with cheap subs, air, whatever else is handy.

Now say the “defender” moves away from nearby “defending” industrial complexes. It’s entirely natural and expected; Japan hanging out at Japan’s sea zone only gets to Manchuria, which isn’t a great dropping-off point to pressure India; probably Japan maintains its fleet at Yunnan for a while then shifts to India or Africa to support transports that are grabbing for India’s IC and/or Africa income. Also US may be pressuring the Axis fleets off position.

So if Japan’s fleet shifts off nearby supporting ICs, what happens? It still wants to produce submarines at its mainland if US isn’t preventing it, and it wants to move those subs to join its main fleet where they’ll be safe from being picked off by US later.

But the sea zones between Japan’s sea zones and the Japanese fleet (especially if it’s at India) may be threatened by US fleet. Also Japan may be threatening Western US’s sea zone.

What it comes down to is, any submarines with Japan’s main fleet may want to fight. If there’s a major naval engagement, submarines aren’t great defense, but you add in two battleships, two loaded carriers, a cruiser, a couple destroyers, maybe a third loaded carrier, the attackers are not going to get off lightly.

But submarines not with Japan’s main fleet want to submerge. They’re all alone and surrounded by enemies. But the attacker will just have destroyers? That’s the expectation. But destroyers cost 8, submarines only 6. If the attacker sticks to destroyers, carriers, and fighters they’re hard pressed to keep up with Japan’s sub plus starting navy plus starting air, especially if they have to leave destroyers behind to protect lines of reinforcement. But if the attacker builds submarines, then those can’t stop Japan from moving submarines around freely. It’s not that the Allies have no answers, it’s that whatever the Allies do, Japan can do something different, and it’s not going to be easy for the Allies to get in. Anyways, Japan’s subs not with Japan’s main fleet submerge.

But defensive profiles don’t let you submerge some submarines yet fight with other submarines. It’s one or the other. And just moving a submarine out of position isn’t a “solution” either. You lose position, why? Because 1942 Online changed the rules.

Earlier I went into how stack building and bleeding is just one of these really fundamental things to strategy. Other stuff that’s important, contingency planning, understanding multipeak models, how to filter what shortcuts are or are not effective without needing to run through full mathematical models.

Understanding stuff like multipeak models will improve performance, but I don’t know that it’s really “basic”. Contingency planning is a part of stack building and bleeding, but as that’s not apparent from the descriptive term I suppose I should get into that separately. How to build shortcuts, hm. I guess that’s kind of basic?

So I’ll go into shortcuts a bit, get into contingencies a bit on the way, then loop back to some of the more interesting applications of stack building and bleeding.

Okay, so shortcuts.

Attacker builds infantry and artillery, defender builds two infantry. Same attack, same defense, but attacker costs more. Simply, attack is more expensive than defense. If the game goes to a stalemate, defender is favored.

Defense is actually attack. Attack is actually defense. Crazy eh? But previous post I described how subs that are an attacking unit are used by a navy that’s on the defensive. The “defender” mostly stays where they are, which is the definition of defense. But since the “attacker” must move, the “attacker” moves into range of the "defender"s attack before the “attacker” can attack in turn.

But that’s not true on ground? But it is. Abstractly you could say defense is favored on ground, but in practical terms that’s only going to happen if territories are lined up end to end in a string and that simply isn’t how the board is.

Suppose Germany has a massive defense on Ukraine. USSR can’t defend both West Russia and Caucasus. Suppose USSR decides to abandon West Russia and defend Caucasus. Then Germany moves its massive defense into West Russia. Germany advances, not through weight of superior attack, but from position; USSR must protect two territories to prevent an advance, Germany need only move into one.

Then with Germany defending West Russia, USSR must choose between defending Caucasus and Russia. USSR defends Russia, Germany moves into Caucasus.

Holding Caucasus allows Germany to produce units on the front line, a huge time savings compared to trying to move units over from Berlin, and even a time savings compared to Karelia.

Yes, Germany eventually wants to take on the Allied combined stack. But it’s defense, not offense, that gets it there.

What about defenders being attackers? Supposedly USSR wants to “defend” Russia. So why should USSR build infantry and artillery, or sometimes even tanks? Aren’t infantry the better buy?

But as already described, Germany marches up then USSR can’t defend two territories. Even barring that, if USSR can’t push Germany off, then Germany just marches right up to USSR anywhere, sits down, then what? USSR can’t push Germany off, that’s a territory that USSR can’t contest for income, that’s more guaranteed income for Germany.

But what if instead of just cowering with infantry, USSR can punch Germany in the nose? If Germany wants to withstand USSR’s blow, Germany wants cheap infantry. Which are slow. Which gives USSR more time to build defense. Meanwhile USSR is contesting territory.

So when you’re planning shortcuts, remember it’s not just about numbers in the abstract. The map is a factor, as is the starting setup, player choices, and dice outcomes. Often if you dig just a little you find that statements like “USSR should defend Moscow therefore infantry are best” just don’t work out in practice. Not because the numbers don’t work, but if you’re assuming a brute-force attacker must plow through a brute-force defender at a single territory, well, that’s just not an accurate model for how the numbers actually apply. You have to use a model that accounts for how Germany can simultaneously threaten two territories, how USSR doesn’t have the numbers to stop both, and how Germany thus advances.

Another rule of thumb for shortcuts, look at raw unit counts. It’s NOT a really good shortcut, don’t think it is. If 30 German units attack 30 USSR units it’s probably going to be a blowout. Why? Because in practical terms probably 14+ of those German dice are going to be tanks and/or fighters and/or bombers attacking at 3/4. Most of the USSR units will defend at 2, only say four will defend at three, and two at four. So where Germany initially is peeling off 1s off its attacking infantry, USSR is peeling off 2s off its defending infantry. Most of Germany’s attacking power remains intact while USSR is fading fast. I think Don referred to this as “skew” in his essays. But anyways, remember even accounting for skew, there’s the two-peak model, well, that’s all a bit complicated. Let’s just say unit count can be useful but it isn’t everything.

That said, why do you often see players say Germany should start with 11 inf 2 art buy? (Which obviously shouldn’t be the case if there’s a G1 W Rus break / tank dash but I digress). OFTEN 11 inf 2 art is good, though, but why?

What are you giving up? I don’t want to get too far into this, but let’s say you probably aren’t really going to be able to use G1 tank build to lock USSR out of Ukraine income on G2+. You could maybe do that by giving up Karelia but then you’d be down production on the front and USSR would have a 2-value territory income anyways, plus a gateway into Finland/Norway.

What about Karelia? That’s a little different. If R1 gets good dice then choking off USSR income at Ukraine early is too ambitious, but Germany wants to secure Karelia anyways. Depending on R1 dice and buy, maybe USSR has a load of units on West Russia that can crush any G1 press into Karelia. Even any G2 press could be favorably attacked; USSR might not want to stick around (it will lose most of its ground attack power to the German counter) but an attack into retreat is certainly possible.

But though a lucky R1 open and proper followup could leave even G2 into Karelia questionable, sometimes it’s a bit ambiguous. Suppose Germany builds 7 infantry 2 artillery 2 tanks on G1. Then Germany’s G2 press into attempted hold of Karelia adds two tanks. (Any G1 infantry/artillery simply won’t reach). Yes, Germany will always be down two units somewhere; 2 tanks have an opportunity cost of 4 infantry. But if Germany holds Karelia on R3, at least Karelia can put out 2 more units, contrast to if Karelia is not secured on R3 then Karelia can’t put out two units. So there’s certainly compensation, though I don’t know that I would say Germany going low on unit count into USSR that’s high on unit count would be best.

So it seems I’m saying maybe Germany doesn’t go 11 inf 2 art on G1 after all, just looking at raw unit count near Karelia after a lucky R1 open. But that’s not all there is to it.

We expect Germany to push out 12+ units a turn for a while, only going below if Germany feels it can afford the luxury of buying expensive stuff (i.e. Germany’s position is stronger, not weaker). USSR we expect 7 or less units a turn. Germany also wants to defend against UK and US landings, but it takes a while for UK/US to build up, and, well, I won’t get into that much.

So maybe it seems Germany can expect to catch up against USSR. If a player doesn’t run the numbers, maybe they think, maybe Germany doesn’t need that much against UK/US, engages in wishful thinking.

But actually, it’s much worse for Germany.

UK and US can fly in fighters. Then there’s UK production at India. Germany can’t really cut off a UK stack from India from joining up with USSR if UK moves in time to beat Germany’s eastern Europe stack advance.

So actually, even if you’re not running the numbers in detail, if you just vaguely eyeball it - in the opening, if USSR gets lucky dice, USSR has a real chance contest even Germany’s entire ground defensive power at Karelia at least as late as R3. German fighters can’t land on a territory Germany just captured; you can get up to 2 Japanese fighters at Karelia on J2 (two fighters in the sea zone south of Persia on a carrier at end of J1 can make it to Karelia on J2) but Japan really wants those fighters against India when the UK stack gets pushed off (otherwise maybe the UK stack does NOT get pushed off) so that won’t last long. (Maybe long enough to allow German fighters to land though). If UK and US build fighters then they can stall out Germany in Europe in the short term. But if UK and US aren’t building fighters to fly to Europe, Allies are building transports and escorts to dump cost-effective ground in Europe. Meanwhile UK is pumping out units at India, probably UK has to abandon India to Japan, but that means that UK India stack moves up through Persia into Russia. So if Germany can’t break into USSR on G1 or G2 as USSR just stalls it out, if later turns run into UK/US air reinforcement of USSR’s position as well as a UK stack moving in from India, can we really expect Germany to break USSR with raw brute force power?

No. We can’t.

We can see there’s a window of opportunity; while UK and US are racing to produce naval escorts and transports UK/US won’t have much fighters to spare for Europe and UK/US won’t be able to get much if any ground to Europe (not being able to protect transports). But though there’s a window, it’s not necessarily a window big enough to do anything with. If USSR’s defense holds up in Europe while UK/US get set up in Atlantic, then the Allies can try to put the squeeze on Karelia.

Yes, there’s plenty of Axis counterplay. I’m just saying there’s no guarantee Axis can slam raw attack from Karelia into West Russia and expect a good outcome. It could happen, but it also might not happen.

But if you remember that Germany’s advance doesn’t necessarily need to break USSR with raw power, instead Germany can just march up to Ukraine and make USSR pick between defending West Russia and Caucasus, then you see how Germany doesn’t need to rely on just brute power. Yes, there’s still problems going to Ukraine; if Germany simply leaves UK and US free to march into Karelia, Germany loses Karelia’s production on the front lines (it really makes a big difference), then can march cost-efficient ground into Russia. So actually it’s a little involved. But you can see where if the Axis simply can’t break USSR’s stack defense with raw power, how the Axis still have an option to push USSR’s combined stack backwards. And though even that still might not happen, you can see how if Germany works towards making it happen, the Axis don’t need nearly as much force to pressure USSR/Allied combined stack to retreat, as it does to break the USSR/Allied combined stack with raw power.

So, returning to raw unit counts and shortcuts. If you use raw unit counts, remember - it’s not just about one power trying to brute-force another power, using the map and positions properly changes how the numbers apply. If you’re calculating a German brute-force attack from Karelia into West Russia, that ignores Germany moving up to Ukraine and making USSR choose between defending West Russia and Caucasus (then later Caucasus and Russia). Germany might not be able to get a good attack against a multinational defense, but Germany and Japan together will probably be able to defend against a single power’s (probably USSR) attack. Remember also nations can work together; UK and US can fly fighters to West Russia (provided it held past G1) to reinforce, Japan can fly fighters to German-occupied Karelia to reinforce. You can’t just say “I want to think about Europe, only Europe, so I’m going to ignore India”, because UK’s India stack might (and probably should) march into Europe. If you’re totting up raw numbers and ignored fourteen UK units in your projection, well, you can see how that projection just isn’t going to work.

So when you use raw unit counts as a shortcut, or any shortcut really, remember. It’s not just about mathematics in a vacuum. Maybe your raw unit count based projection at the end of R1 predicts R2 can set up to hit Karelia with 30 units, where it’s anticipated Germany can only defend with 24 units. Maybe you even thought so far to eyeball skew, with a projection having ten USSR 3’s against nine German 3’s. But if that projection’s based off a prediction of G1 11 inf 2 art, is that really what Germany is going to do? What if Germany builds two G1 tanks and J2 flies in two fighters? Then Axis defends Karelia with 28 units, including eleven German 3s and two Japanese 4s. If Germany has an AA gun at Karelia, how does that affect USSR’s risk evaluation; even attempting the attack could see a USSR fighter lost to AA gun fire. Etc.

About contingencies:

I mentioned contingencies a few times in passing. If Germany can’t break USSR from Karelia into West Russia with raw power, Germany can go in through Ukraine to push USSR / Allies combined stack back. If Allies can’t break Axis defense at Karelia with one power, it can do followup attacks with another.

Or when contingencies are absent; if Allies commit to France but can’t do much off the position, if Axis pressure Russia then the Allies may not have any outs. If Allies are committed to France, a partial pullout means Dunkirk except Germany doesn’t hold back, and anything sent to try to help Russia may not arrive in time anyways. If Germany tries a stack defense of Karelia and it fails, well, probably all Axis air is dead, most German tanks are dead and Germany can’t recover.

So you’re looking at this and maybe thinking “well, if Axis are in danger at Karelia why don’t they just pull back? isn’t aardvark always saying not to assume players are brain-dead?”

Right. But that gets to what I want to lead off with when talking about contingencies.

Some other players say things like “there are always things you can do”, or “if you’re smart you can always figure a way out.”

Usually, yes. Always, no.

If players want to play accurately, they need to think about things mathematically. Not romantically, not movie hero defying the odds, but coldly, mathematically, objectively.

So the problem with going right into how to use “contingencies” is when players build up a little confidence in their abilities they think maybe they can fudge things, get a little lucky, maybe small things won’t make a difference. Then it’s all about the romance and movie hero escapades, except now there’s a Scientist (fancy) that says Dramatic Things and is a Genius that Figures A Way Out. There’s always a Contingency Plan.

But really? What if your opponent is just better at running the numbers? And/or what if your opponent just got lucky?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PFRCTeQtNdU

So the first thing to remember about contingencies is you won’t always have them.

The second to remember about contingencies is sometimes you SHOULD NOT have them.

Wait, what? How can NOT having a backup plan be a good idea?

“Put all your eggs in one basket, and then watch that basket” - Andrew Carnegie

If the Axis stack Karelia, what does that really mean? The strength is, UK/US ground reinforcements are cut off at Finland (there’s some Allied outs but they’re not great), Japan and Germany both have air that “locks down” UK and US fleets. (If UK and US fleets are together, maybe Axis don’t want to take the combined defense down. But the moment UK moves off, Japan can hit UK and/or US before US can move to reinforce UK. If US moves off first, Germany can hit UK and/or US before UK can move to reinforce. Even if Germany doesn’t have a huge air force, if Germany kept just five fighters that can be pretty nice if there’s a big transport payoff.)

Say the plan is Germany tries to force an Axis-favored battle against the USSR/Allied combined stack near Russia, while Japan pressures trades and grabs Africa income.

Suppose Japan tries to have a “backup plan” of pushing mass units through Asia to challenge Russia.

Then what happens? Probably Japan still doesn’t have the unit count to challenge USSR head-on. It’s still absolutely necessary that Germany get an Axis-favored battle against the USSR / Allied combined stack.

But how will Germany do that, when Japan has less units at Karelia, so Germany needs to commit more units there to defend? Japan also has less air near Atlantic, so UK/US don’t need as much naval escorts and can just keep building then dumping ground which in turn pressures Germany.

That doesn’t mean Japan building mass units is categorically wrong. Maybe dice and player action make it clear it’s unlikely Germany will ever be able to get any sort of decent battle against the USSR/Allied combined stack near Russia. Then the Axis need to try something else, if the current plan is unlikely to have any success.

But for this example the point is building a backup plan can cut the chances on the primary plan.

Watch out for whenever a “backup plan” requires significantly different buys and/or moves to a “primary plan”. When that happens, only switch plans if the primary plan has already succeeded or if the primary plan is unlikely to succeed. (If the primary plan already succeeded, mission accomplished and time to set new objectives and means of accomplishing those objectives. If the primary plan will probably fail, better not throw good money after bad and adapt a new plan.)

Do contingencies exist, are they of practical use? Sure. If Germany wants to choke off USSR income at Ukraine, if USSR has a bit too much at West Russia and Caucasus (which could hit any German push to Ukraine), USSR can deny income to USSR at Belorussia instead. The USSR infantry/artillery at Caucasus can’t reach, probably anything Germany could have pushed to Ukraine can reach Belorussia instead.

Yes, if Germany can’t capture and hold Ukraine that won’t push USSR into having to decide between defending West Russia and Caucasus. But Germany can still try to force a major stack battle favoring Axis at West Russia, perhaps by building air. In turn that could mean Germany’s defense of France collapses, but if the Axis can still get a tolerable position out of it, that may be what has to be done. (Though there’s no guarantee even allowing France’s defense to collapse would give the Axis a decent position, depending on the position.)

Third thing to remember about contingencies is you can’t do them if you don’t have what you need. When you leave a resource where it can be destroyed, whether it’s an expensive bomber or an inexpensive infantry, that means you won’t have it later.

Consider if the Allies try to pressure Japan. If Japan tries to pressure Asia and Africa (which I’d say usually it should despite the oncoming USA navy), US can advance in the Pacific, threaten any new builds in Japan sea zones, and push Japan’s navy away. Then US can start grabbing high value islands and set up industrial complexes and the Axis game can get pretty awkward.

But there’s a difference between “awkward” and “deadly”. If Japan loses control of the entire Pacific coast, if US is taking high value islands and setting up ICs, that’s tough for Axis. But if simultaneously Germany is about to crush Russia and UK has nothing happening in Europe, then Japan can wait for Germany.

But then what happens? Suppose Germany has a small fleet, moves it into position, then Japan uses its fleet to reinforce. The further US pushes into Pacific / Indian Oceans, the harder it is for US to protect its lines of reinforcement. So it’s possible that even if US had good odds against a Japanese fleet, just a few German naval units could tip the scales. And it’s very easy for Germany to, say, produce two carriers and a destroyer at Italy, then move through the Suez if Axis have control. Then Germany can land four fighters on, and that’s pretty hefty defense, especially if Japan still has a good-sized fleet.

But if Japan has no fleet left to reinforce, if Japan tried some (unnecessary) losing-odds battle for nonessential territory that it couldn’t hope to hole for long anyways, then Germany has no backup. And if Japan took a bad-odds battle then US won’t even have been severely weakened.

That doesn’t mean Japan shouldn’t try to fight in the Pacific even without German reinforcements, it doesn’t even mean Japan shouldn’t try some bad-odds desperation moves. It depends on the position. But if Japan loses a chunk of navy and air force for no good reason, that navy and air force won’t be around later to make a difference.

So to recap, for this section on contingencies. Rather than trying to have some complicated clever plan with a lot of parts moving in different conflicting directions, stick to the basics. Consider the numbers, consider your strategy, know when something’s not working as well as it needs to so you know to switch to something else. If you must spend units don’t hold back, but think about whether you really need to spend resources. You may, but you may not. Also remember even if your opponent plays completely correctly mathematically (they may not, I don’t), there is still dice variance so there may be an opening.