UNIT TYPE AND COUNT
At some point, a player’s intuition for any particular version of Axis and Allies may recognize how a position is likely to develop, based on the map (what territories connect to what, how “big” the board is), income, production (how many units can be produced where), combined with looking at what’s on the board at the moment.
I think that intuition is absent in the currently addressed proponent of the G1 Ukr hold / G1 6 + tank build, not because the line contains risks, but because the risks are not acknowledged, because important things are not addressed, much less small details that don’t make sense on first examination so should be explained especially to newer players but aren’t - perhaps because there is no real plan, only action and observation of consequences.
LET’S TAKE A MOMENT TO THINK ABOUT HOW TO BE WRONG
So I say “don’t be smug!” and of course, nobody thinks they are, not really. If they are maybe just a little bit, then it’s with good reason! They put a lot of time and work in, and people should recognize that!
When I say not to stop at empirical data, but to apply discipline and the scientific methods to build accurate predictive models that not only encompass empirical data but allow a player to develop entirely new lines of play, that’s a specific criticism where people start to perhaps take a step back and think.
But now I say - think on it really. If the scientific method is about cycles of hypothesis, testing, and observation, there is not necessarily an endpoint. As to intuition, of course it’s informed by experience, but a player won’t know what’s outside their experience, never having experienced it! So really, everything could be wrong. Everything I write. Isn’t that just massively reassuring?
To which I reply, yes, you will be wrong, I will be wrong, and none of that excuses failure to try to progress, none of that means the scientific method, flawed as it may be in practice, should not be applied. After all, what else have we got? Tanks + magic = win?
So much for theory, and warnings, and so on. Now to return to the whole G1 Ukr hold / G 6 tank + buy line.
WHAT HAS COME BEFORE (THIS BEING THE THIRD PART)
Well, it really doesn’t look good in general, what with a lot of suppositions by the opposition having been demonstrated to be flat wrong, or at least suspicious, and in Discord there’s an ongoing refusal to answer specific questions not just from myself but posters in general, so there may be some inclination by readers just to dismiss the whole thing.
But actually - not so much. No matter how disagreeable someone may be, or how bad they may appear, the legitimacy of their points should be considered separate from the person trying to argue those points.
We did see, at least, that R2 might have some reason not to hit G1 Ukr hold (mostly timidity and aversion to risk to R air to the AA gun), along with probably neglecting any G1 stack on Karelia. We saw G2 had a strong attack into WR that could not be taken lightly. Even with some Allied coordination, the Axis advance could not be taken too lightly. We saw that even a single AA changed win/loss outcomes by 14% at a key timing, how a couple more infantry lost impacted expected defense, which should give readers the idea that if the dice came out a little differently there would be a legitimately strong attack that would be difficult to deal with, and that if a player didn’t coordinate carefully the G move could indeed be overwhelming.
Of course, I set the bar of player competency pretty high, so I don’t feel a competent player should necessarily be losing it over the line, but that’s as it goes.
There are some key counterpressure timings I mentioned to disrupt the Axis timings. But there’s a lot left unsaid.
THINGS TO COME, OR NOT
I mentioned some "odd’ bits earlier, like G1 6 units to sz7. It’s not that I was concerned particularly at the time; I thought there were major basic issues that needed addressing. But properly, every action taken should be part of a plan. The tricky part is, a player that does an action may be wrong in performing that action because it’s not part of a plan; a player that does the same action may be right in performing that action because it’s part of a plan.
So how can you tell the difference? Naturally, you ask. I asked on Discord, and got some replies like “it doesn’t matter”, “you know everything anyways”, I explained people reading a board wouldn’t necessarily assess the board state the same as the active player, but all the same. No reply. And you know, that’s okay. There’s a lot going on. Imagine, top player, lots of respect from others, been working on something for two years in collaboration with another player, people listening intently, then suddenly a horrible disrespectful aardvark appears and starts asking awkward questions. (I don’t think of myself as disrespectful, but I feel sometimes others treat me that way, so I infer.) Well, we shall move on bravely in any event.
So, who really knows, vaguely defined line, repeatedly no specifics, and at some point I can’t even address the line, because I don’t know what it really is, I don’t know what it’s supposed to be about, both despite my inquiries into the matter and superficial replies - and I’m not interested in building out a supposed line as I can’t be bothered. Yet, I suppose I’m doing enough writing on the matter and providing enough specifics that perhaps - quite horribly to me - my name shall forever be linked with the line of play, if I go much further. Ugh, fame.
I won’t try to address everything, no. Just not convenient. But a few things, perhaps.
WHEN THINGS GO WRONG
I wrote essentially R can postpone a major stack battle until R3, though I don’t say it’s right to do so. If players find that doesn’t work out, again, I’ll say look at R2 vs Ukr. Think about it. The numbers indicate that’s one of the weakest points in the Axis line - at least, as far as I make it out to be.
If things are going terribly, then probably - not for sure, but probably - there was a point earlier in the game where a wrong decision was made.
It’s said chess goes to the player that made the second to last mistake. So too with Axis and Allies, perhaps.
But also, sometimes you legitimately won’t have done anything wrong. Or sometimes you’re consistently losing but you can’t figure out why. For those times, analysis, and trying to get insight from other players, may help.
So moving forward - why only address the losing scenarios? Because if you’re not losing you’re winning and you can figure it out from there, I’d say. Even if you were losing you would have to figure it out from there, come to think on it.
G1 UKR HOLD WITH G1 6 TANK + BUY - THE FUTURE
Okay so let’s say the Allies did a bunch of fun things but the Axis managed to push on.
The problem is, this is where the proponent of the line totally craps out. They have literally nothing on key end game states, transitions between current and later states, or generally anything except “Tanks + magic = win!” which seems rather derisive, but is, in application, really pretty much the case when it comes to actionable information. They won’t put anything in an analytic framework so have no basis for comparison to recognize where something might be overkill, or where something else might be underkill, and so have no idea of how to reallocate resources to deal with burgeoning threats.
That doesn’t mean they play badly. It does mean they’re terrible at explaining, when it comes to identifying reasoning, when it comes to giving actionable information, and so on. Which is not to be uncharitable, it’s just to recognize the fact so progress can be made.
My intuition tells me one way or another, things aren’t over. (Unless they’re over.) But let’s assume the Allies didn’t quite get the dice they wanted.
FOUR PROBLEM SCENARIOS
Before getting into it - I’ve been here before. I don’t need to hear anyone boasting “that’s what I meant in the first place”. Typically someone has vague low-effort authoritarian appeals in place of anything approaching a reasoned argument, they wrote nothing of the kind, it’s I that am writing out the details. That’s just the reality. When someone doesn’t even allude to anything until after someone else says it, they’re not the originator, they’re the copier. Weak arguments are weak, don’t try to dress it up any other way because I will call people on it.
As I said, I let that sort of thing go for years and only saw things get worse. What I do now is what I think of as minimally corrective action. No, things aren’t going to get better on their own, they haven’t done to this point and I see no reason to think that will change. What I do see is some people that don’t want to be bothered making up excuses so they don’t have to think about much less deal with any issues. Of course, squashing the person making noise about what’s happening seems like a solution, but that just ends up with them being inundated and accepting bad reasoning, bad arguments, and things in general devolving.
Which will probably make a lot more sense to people in about four years if it doesn’t already, and even more sense ten or twenty years after that. Eh.
I’m not saying I’m original. I always say I’m copying, more or less, methodology used in Revised days, and some applications found in various other disciplines. If I have some original points, well whatever, I’m not here to build a cult of personality. If anything, I find fame a bother.
Anyways back to Axis and Allies; there’s more than four problem scenarios, but whatever. Figure it out, heh.
- If G2 captures the Caucasus and J2 reinforces then they get wiped, but R gets badly depleted.
- If G2 captures the Caucasus and J2 does not reinforce then G gets wiped and R depleted.
- If G2 does not capture the Caucasus, instead continuing to build pressure at Ukr
- The Allies fail some significant action
There’s some variations, like G tries to smash the combined Allied stack on WR, but the lines transpose. It’s not simply about who controls what and where, precisely. It’s more that map characteristics and logistics push players naturally into certain repetitive lines, so a position develops of those mechanics. That was supposed to be what was illustrated in my game as Allies against TTG, but sadly the audio commentary didn’t reflect that at all, but eh.
So what’s actually going on in actionable terms is, the UK1 player should be looking at the board and thinking at least about those three possibilities, and what action they should take. Depending on what the Axis do, any or none of the above may happen.
Why are there four categories listed above? Why may there be more? (There are). Why did I make that comment about transposition?
It’s to get players thinking about lines, not in terms of rote moves to follow, which is dangerous, but transitional states characterized by force compositions - unit counts and types. It’s a bit of an oversimplification, but a useful one for now.
In the first line, G loses a large chunk of infantry and its starting tanks, and J loses its starting fighters. That will not change, and those units are not “replaceable” in the sense buying more tanks or fighters comes at opportunity cost of infantry. Probably R is quite depleted, though perhaps not.
In the second line again G loses a lot of tanks, J does not lose fighters, R is less depleted.
In the third line nobody’s depleted.
The fourth line is really just there to increase awareness that there are, in fact, practically irrecoverable game states. It’s not that a player can think their way out of every situation. In practice, actually players should try for the “best chance”, similarly to previously described, understanding what future danger points may exist, and taking moderate or possibly even extreme chances so even worse scenarios with worse probabilities may be avoided. It is important to understand this is not simply refusal to capitulate, it is a matter of training against adverse conditions, so a player gets used to operating while playing a “losing” game. It’s also a matter of playing through a game to gain firsthand experience with scenarios that might not otherwise be easily explored.
Regardless, under all lines, the characteristics of the game will take on aspects reflective of the forces available to each power.
ADVANCED LOGISTICS, AND LIMITS - WHY THERE ARE NOT, IN FACT, INFINITELY MANY STATES
When I see what I call an uninspiring game where players are on round 38 pushing massive blocks of infantry around, I wonder just how and where the community failed those players that they would play in such an uninspired joyless manner.
Germany starts with a certain number of tanks. Buying any more comes at the expense of infantry, but Germany starts with those tanks.
Each power only has a certain amount of income, and can only mobilize that income at particular locations in limited numbers. Sometimes the numbers are quite high as on Berlin, sometimes quite low as on Karelia, but there is a limit.
Players need to understand effective play considers these starting units, their usage, stack sizes, stack compositions, stack movement, production, development, as part of one big gestalt.
Let’s say for example that Japan wants to pressure India. How does it do that?
Japan can build up to four transports and use them to move units from Tokyo to Yunnan each turn, from where units can move to Burma then India, or be transported via transport directly to India.
Tokyo’s production limit of 8 means no more than 4 transports can be used, and to fill transports to capacity, 4 of those units must be infantry. That’s just how the game rules, map, and starting setup interact.
But Japan may build up to six or even eight transports to pull units off isolated islands, or Philippines o East Indies and so forth. So Japan can use more than just 4 transports against India. Again, that’s just the board and starting setup, it’s just thinking outside the limits of production on Tokyo alone.
But if Japan buys transports that’s less spent on actual units to ferry to India. That’s economics. If Japan moves transports east/southeast to pick up units from isolated islands, those transports are moving away from India, and will have to return. That’s timing, opportunity cost, and logistics.
Sometimes you see players complain or boast that there are supposedly any number of possibilities that are impossible to analyze. Clearly that is not true. Even those players don’t really believe it, none of them buys USSR1 battleships (at least not that I know of). It’s not true when it comes to development of board states either.
Japan cannot just throw whatever at India. Whether Japan builds bombers, tanks, transports, or industrial complexes, there is a cost paid, and an opportunity cost as well. Whatever action Japan takes, Japan will be better at something but worse at others, depending on what that action was.
MY INTUITION, WHAT “THEY” SAID, AND WHAT FOLLOWS
My intuition is a lot of what little was said by the proponent of the line lacked any distinguishing characteristics, probably because they don’t have a plan that they can really enunciate. I think a lot of small things aren’t talked about, even now, and that as rounds pass, this lack of detail will become more obvious and important, as important things are wholly undefined.
I don’t think the Axis should push to Caucasus on G2, or stack Ukraine on G1, but I don’t have absolute mathematical proof, even if what I did look at leans that way. The proponent of the line did not answer a specific question from another poster about the disposition of the J air force, but did support G2 Caucasus. For the sake of limiting discussion, then, I will assume that J did land its air force, for the sake of simplicity.
https://discord.com/channels/606254910438375434/1300603351636906106/1333148559218049024
“You can write the main ideas now and more detail later. I promise not to criticize your level of detail or something else on how you describe it.”
(In response, eventually, to my statement detail was absolutely necessary yet not provided).
ASSUMPTION OF COMPETENCE
Sometimes it’s very easy to be dismissive of someone because they say or do things that one doesn’t think makes sense, or perhaps there are personal disagreements. In the history of recent Discord discussion around this topic, there was a lot of back and forth, and I’m sure assumptions were made all around.
I will say again, it’s about clarity, communication, and reproducible results. Things are not really “strategies” if players end up feeling lost, if they lack actionable information. I say again, I think key details were left vague, and assertions made that were not supported. I say again, I think there was poor communication and bad intention.
However, all that very naughty behavior does not answer the question - what validity is there in the line? What happens as the line is played out?
Yes, I disagree with the nominal proponent of the G1 Ukr hold with G1 6 tank 1 inf buy. But even if I disagree, do I in fact find zero credibility in the line, do I say its success is all due to bad meta play?
It’s easy to say “yes”. It’s easy to say “no”. But actually, the answer is I identified some specific points of counterpressure, which though in simple application seem to counter some arguments, in practical terms have not been fully analyzed. I left the story at demonstrating Allied counterpressure points do really exist against G3 Moscow, which is nice for a short fairy tale, but in real life, real characters have to deal with real problems that aren’t wrapped up nicely at the end of a forty-five minute episode.
It’s not that I assume the nominal proponent of the line is competent. But for the sake of discussion, instead of picking apart bad choices and bad communication, one must assume that there is, indeed, some competence. We must assume, for the sake of discussion, that even if the nominal proponent is really just terrible at writing about what happens, that there is, in fact, some real strategy that works, perhaps that would even work if the meta were not weak. Personally I’d say really look at that R2 Ukraine but eh. We proceed.
I say G2 should not push the Caucasus, that J2 should not reinforce with air. The nominal proponent of the line advocated G2 Caucasus and remained silent on J2 air.
I think actually the nominal proponent advocates G2 Caucasus to push their point about G3 Moscow. Like, they don’t want to back down. Especially since early talk by other posters in the thread discussed G3 Caucasus and were not addressed. Though come to think on it a lack of specific response was characteristic to the discussion at that point. So who knows. Eh.
So here we have an assertion by nominal proponent that G2 pushes to Caucasus. It should be understood, being on the losing end of a major stack battle means losing dozens of IPCs or more relative to an opponent. It’s true that positions should not be assessed merely by value of units or units destroyed. But tanks have very high value for Germany, they certainly aren’t easily replaced, the losses are real in a real sense. So how to rationalize that decision?
Well, it’s not even very hard. One only need look at the proposed UK2 attack on G2 Caucasus. It’s not an IPC-positive battle, it’s only performed as part of the overall strategic Allied counterplay. Similarly, G losing a major stack battle could be put in that light.
If there is a strategic end served, it is in weakening USSR’s central stack. It makes sense that if that is the simple goal, that J’s fighters may be served up as well. In practical terms, maybe J could do more with the fighters but we just won’t worry about that.
WHY RESTRICT SCOPE - KEEP IT SIMPLE
As it is, there’s a lot of context and theoretical methods and models to get into, then there’s also a practical matter of time. If I say “if this happens” then write a dozen pages, then “but if this happened instead” then wrote another dozen pages, then “but in this scenario neither of those happens and these three scenarios happen instead”, well, people just won’t follow. So, keeping it simple. Again, I requested information, it was not forthcoming, I don’t care to get into boundless speculation, and I don’t particularly regard this entire venture as a great use of my time, except that possibly commentary on how to build and use an analytic construct may make the meta discussion community less boring. Ah well.
INDIA
Where Moscow is central to the conversation, so is India. Japan will go after India as a gateway to Africa IPC and to help address Japan’s horrible logistics and production limits - or Japan won’t do that and will go after Moscow.
For purposes of this discussion, I will say Japan presses Moscow. It’s consistent with a very simple plan, and though it has the issue that UK retains Africa IPC and bleeds the Axis through Persia, we shall say the Axis are working on a self-imposed timer; they are determined to take Moscow in short order and regard all else as a distraction. An assumption, but one consistent with an Axis decision to commit to a bad-odds major stack defense.
ATLANTIC
Earlier I mentioned something like UK1 purchase 2 fighters London 3 inf India, which goes into UK2 fighters to WR, then possibly UK3 India defense. But also I mentioned UK1 extant London fighters to WR, meaning they could not hit G’s sz7 survivors, which I thought ought to raise a stink, but nobody made a peep. Well, it’s a problem.
If UK1 does not have a destroyer that can hit the Baltic sea zone, then G2 can build submarines unopposed. This, together with air, can deter Allied landings, especially as submarines are quite expensive, and transports, destroyers, and such, rather more expensive.
This problem is compounded if the sz7 survivors are not wiped out. The problem is simplified as the line, at least as I understand it, leaves the G Baltic transport where it may easily be picked off, but I digress.
I don’t think I read one word about G sub counterpressure on Discord. Ah well. There’s also G subs at Italy counterpressure, which needs thinking about. After all, it should make sense. If G1 is near-pure tank build then Axis is soft on unit count; one way for Allies to challenge Axis low on unit count early is to push to Africa.
At any rate, that’s the problem in broad theory. Now some practical comments.
ALLIED NAVAL DEVELOPMENT IN ATLANTIC
At end of G1, G threatens any landings at Morocco with 4 fighters and any sz7 survivors, preserving Axis income assuming US will not land there - not an entirely safe assumption as the Allies have two destroyers and a cruiser entirely unaccounted for, but especially if G has survivors of sz7, then G won’t risk its precious air. We say UK1 builds London fighters and India infantry, leaving G comfortably in control of the north Atlantic. UK and US may dump to French West Africa, or possibly move to sz10 East Canada; the former sets up for control of Africa and possibly setting up to bleed the Med, the latter sets up for a dump to sz3 Norway/Finland, G has a lot of ways to respond, including Baltic sub(s) even if no sz7 survivors, but sz10 can move to sz13 on round 2.
It’s not that an Allied move to sz10 is a “fake” and it doesn’t “force” anything either. (Meta discussion is filled with grandiose inaccurate terms). G has a choice, it can invest in subs for a low-cost counter in case Allies follow up with pressure to Norway/Finland, G can stick to air or build more air, G will have to think about where its fighters are landing considering G NW Europe fighters can’t hit Moscow or Caucasus, and the Allies threaten to land on NW Europe as well - remember, under the proponent’s line, 1 AA moved to Ukraine, 1 AA moved to Baltic States, it’s not that Axis have a load of AA to throw around on defense, and infantry are in short supply as well, remember the proponent’s line places an infantry on Italy?
Pepperidge Farms remembers.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gXUxLqqmhNs
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r2QVjp4KEjU"
So why wouldn’t Allies move to sz10? Control of Africa. If the Allies dump to Africa immediately, Allied forces are in place about the time Axis start nosing about.
So you see where I’m going, perhaps. I say moves should be done responding to board state. Instead of simply asserting that Axis will ignore India and push Moscow, I would say if Allies dumped to Africa then Axis push Moscow while Allies ground is bumbling about useless in Africa. If Allies went to East Canada, then the Axis push India/Africa, as the Allies will be late with any counterpressure there.
Doesn’t that just make sense?
So what do the Allies do? The answer is, the Allies move to sz10. It is not a matter of a pre-emptive counter. UK and US and the USSR sub, if surviving, all act after G1; they see the G1 move and purchase. They know the Allies may not have time to be slogging through Africa while the Axis beeline for Moscow.
G2 in turn knows the Allies do this, as those moves are completed before G2. So G can responsively purchase submarines at Baltic.
AFRICA
It’s important for income, and Italy for production. Normally I would not ignore Africa, but here we are.
ITALY
The Allies want to bleed the Axis out in the Mediterranean. There really is an issue where possibly G has no sz7 naval survivors, then Allies just dump a transport to Morocco to start the bleed. If G commits fighters to the counter that’s less pressure on R. If G reactively buys units to counter, that’s less pressure on R. It’s a real problem that should be addressed, as should the transposition where sz10 pushes to Morocco on round 2 to start the bleed.
Earlier I mentioned J’s air may or may not be present. You can see where it makes a difference. If Axis have almost no air then the Allies can simultaneously bleed Axis out in northern and southern Europe, needing relatively few escorts and taking advantage of early existing Allied units (e.g. fighters) to bolster defensive stacks. Which is not to say we assume the Axis messed up by sacrificing Japan’s entire air force. There are tradeoffs to every move, and that Axis decision is perhaps not the worst.
KARELIA
The Allies dump to Finland/Norway then push through to Karelia towards Moscow, trying to establish a logistics reinforcement line that moves cheap UK and US ground units to join a unified Allied stack on Moscow. From Karelia, the Allies can also trade G territories.
It’s not as simple as G simply stacking Karelia. G is very soft on unit count after G1 6 tank 1 inf buy. If the Allies set up a bleed against Med, G must deal with that bleed else G is denied income and the Allies just keep pushing pressure there.
