Contrary to the subject, I don’t want to weaken the total Russian economy. But from my experience and what I’ve read (particularly in the Huge Russian Stack of Infantry Problem thread) Germany really has trouble taking out Russia. Moscow is a minimum of four moves away from Germany’s starting eastern front, and Germany generally isn’t in a good position to attack for the first couple of turns anyway. This gives Russia generally at least 5 or 6 turns to build up its defenses. It can easily have several dozen infantry in Moscow by the time the Germans can attack it. Even if Russia follows a different strategy it is still hard for Germany to beat it quickly.
I know that if Russia does this, Germany can circle around and take the rest of Russia. But that doesn’t help them meet their victory city requirement, and for the Axis especially time is of the essence and fortifying Moscow makes it that much harder to take it before American intervention diverts German attention.
My suggestion, therefore, is that the Russian economy be weakened when not at war. They, like the US, start out neutral and don’t see a need to operate under full military capacity until later. The Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and Russia exemplifies this, and there’s evidence to suggest that Stalin wasn’t prepared for the German attack. So it makes some sense from a historical perspective.
I don’t really know how much money Russia should lose when not at war, because I’m not too great at balancing things. But I’d suggest something around 10-12 IPCs.
Perhaps to balance it out if that’s too much of a disadvantage, the USA could be allowed to transfer money to Russia when they’re both at war and the Allies have achieved some form of naval supremacy in the Atlantic (perhaps 5 IPCs a turn, with 5 more if there’s no Axis presence in the Atlantic). This would show the importance of the USA’s economic aid and the power of U-boat interdiction.