The Meditteranean gambit is a red herring for the Germans. The 8 possible IPCs of Middle Eastern territory are not worth the dedication of 36 IPCs worth of warships. The Italian battleship and destroyer have more pressing business keeping the Allies at bay in the Atlantic. Having a battleship and destroyer bottled up in the Med is a serious mistep. Taking Gibraltar in T1 denies the British a base for their fighters (rendering the Italian fleet unassailable). A T2 link-up with the surviving German u-boats is critical in undermining the Allied bid for the Atlantic. Without capital ships, it is impossible to keep a competent Allied player from owning the Atlantic within 2 or 3 turns. However, through prudent management and reinforcement of the unified Med/Atlantic fleets, it is possible to delay an Allied invasion for several more turns.

Truly a first-rate reply, S_U_D! Excellent risk analysis and assault force breakdowns. Pearl lite is quite obviously a very viable gambit for J1.

Well, fellas, I’m inclined to agree. The fact that the ANZAC IPCs are largely permanent is a strong case, indeed. . .

re: Pearl lite. . .

S_U_D, assuming you don’t use the ‘2 hit’ BB rule, what kind of force do you send into Hawaii when you execute ‘Pearl lite’? Surely whatever units survive the initial assualt get knocked into oblivion by the US counter, no?

S_U_D, I have to disagree with you about the necessity of destroying the Hawaiian fleet. A savvy American player will wreak havoc in the Pacific if he is allowed to unite and enhance his two original Pacific fleets (i.e. the West Coast BB/Tr and the Hawaiian AC/sub). This combined US fleet will be unassailable after the first turn, and will become an increasingly large thorn in the side of the Japanese for the remainder of the game. I reckon that the only way to give the Japs the unchecked economic growth they need to win is to eliminate a strong US presence in the Pacific. The only way to eliminate the US presence thoroughly is to kick the bollocks off the Hawaiians.

I think it’s critical to capture the Hawaiian Islands in the first round of play. Occupying Hawaii is important because it reduces by 1 fighter any US counterattack (the Eastern US fighter will have nowhere to land). This may sound trivial, but it’s actually a great deterrent because it practically guarantees that the Americans will lose EVERYTHING after just one pass, should they counterattack. Compare the odds: Japan 4 d 4s (2 BS, 2 Fig), 1 d 3 (AC), and 1 d 1 (Trn) vs US 2 d 4 (BS, Bomber), 1 d 3 (Fig), and 1 Trn fodder. In the average game, the Japanese will suffer 2 losses while America will be eliminated from the Pacific entirely. In this scenario America has little choice but to cut and run with its paltry West Coast fleet.

Hey, fellows! I’ve a question for the more experienced players on this forum concerning Japan’s second turn naval strategy. This question takes it as granted that the Japs must both: A.) destroy the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, and, B.) invade and occupy the Hawaiian Islands during the first round of play. In an average game, the Japanese forces in the South Pacific after turn 1 should be as follows: 2 battlehips, 1 carrier, 1 transport in the Hawaiian SZ, 2 fighters on the carrier, 1 infantry occupying Hawaii, 1 infantry on the Soloman Islands, and 1 bomber on the Soloman Islands (flown there after the battle).

Now, my questions is: Should the Japanese concentrate on capturing Australia and New Zealand, or should they instead redeploy their fleet back to the East and focus upon the campaign against Allied forces in India and, eventually, Africa?

I am constantly weighing the longterm value of the 3 IPCs gained from the ANZAC territories versus the benefits of having the Japanese fleet in a position to immediately bombard Allied coastal forces in India and the Middle East (2 battleship broadsides per amphibious assault is tasty). Taking Oz and NZ takes the fleet away from the main theatre of operations for three turns. Are 3 IPCs per turn enough to make up for the delay in firepower/projection of force to India and the Middle East?