US in World War 2

Military aircraft production represents a (somewhat) reasonable proxy for overall military production. In 1940, military aircraft production was as follows:

UK: 15,000
Germany: 11,000
USSR: 11,000
US: 6,000
Japan: 5,000

A large portion of the American aircraft production was being sent to Britain, through lend-lease and other means. Moreover, British and American leaders had made plans to expand American military aircraft production to the staggering total of 72,000 planes per year, with half of that production going to Britain. Those plans placed significant intermediate-term pressure on Germany; and created a strong incentive for it to increase its access to manpower, raw materials, and industrial capacity to counter the Anglo-American threat to German cities and the German population. Hitler hoped to conquer the Soviet Union before the Anglo-American air threat had really kicked in. At that point, he’d use the resources gained from that conquest to even the odds in the air war.

In 1941, the US increased its aircraft production to 19,000 planes, even though it was still technically at peace until December of that year. By 1943, it had increased military aircraft production to 86,000 per year; surpassing the goal American and British leaders had set back in 1940. If that American military aircraft production could have been kept neutral (as opposed to being sent to the British and Soviets under Lend-Lease), it would have radically altered the strategic equation.

In 1942, military aircraft production was as follows:

US: 48,000
USSR: 25,000
UK: 24,000
Germany: 15,000
Japan: 9,000

Those numbers would seem to spell doom for the Axis, even if American military aircraft production could have somehow been removed from the equation. However, if American industrial capacity had remained neutral (as opposed to being sent to the Allies), Hitler would have had the option of waiting to invade the Soviet Union. That would have allowed Germany to consolidate its position in Central and Eastern Europe, while building up its industrial capacity. By 1944, increases in military productive capacity had led to the following aircraft production:

US: 96,000
Germany: 40,000
USSR: 40,000
UK: 26,000
Japan: 17,000

It’s also worth noting that in 1942, Germany produced 4,000 tanks (excluding light tanks) to the Soviets’ 15,000 tanks (excluding light tanks). That difference was exacerbated by the fact that over 12,000 of those Soviet tanks were T-34s; which were significantly better than any widely produced German model of that year. In 1944, however, Germany produced 17,000 tanks (excluding light tanks), to the Soviets’ 21,000 (excluding light tanks). 5,000 German tanks were Panthers or Tigers; which were qualitatively superior to most Soviet tanks.

For the Axis to have had a realistic chance of victory, the following would have needed to occur:

• The U.S. would have needed to stay neutral.

• American military production would have needed to remain neutral (no Lend-Lease)

• Hitler would have needed to wait until 1944 to invade the Soviet Union.

• Germany would have had to obtained a 1944 military production level at or near historical levels without prior access to Soviet POW manpower or resources obtained from conquests of Soviet territory

• The German military would have needed 12 million people (historic 1944 level) rather than 8 million people (historic 1941 level).

I think this was a very key consideration for the UK, Germany, Russia and Japan:

@KurtGodel7:

However, one reason for Hitler’s impatience in invading the Soviet Union was the British food blockade of Germany; and the resulting starvation in German-held lands. Delaying the invasion of the Soviet Union by two years would have meant two extra years of famine conditions; especially in occupied territories and population groups assigned low or mid-level priorities for scarce, precious food calories.

Only the US and some parts of the British empire had abundant food.  The UK, Germany, (and later Japan) were squeezed by naval (or submarine) blockades.  Russia was squeezed by the vast territories taken by the Germans.  Of course I’ll grant that in the early part of the war, Germany did quite well by taking the food and supplies found in France, Belgium, Ukraine, etc.

Grizzly, you make a good point.  The Germans were never going to be able to invade the UK; but they did try to starve them.  An excess of wheat in Australia and Canada does no good for the UK if it cannot be delivered.  I guess we disagree on whether or not British hunger, lack of heating oil, etc. would have been sufficient to make them either sue for peace with Germany…If the British were hungry enough (and I think without the US merchant marine), I could see them saying screw the French, lets have a ceasefire and let the USSR and Germany fight it out.

Regarding the USSR, I once read an estimate that 7/8 of the entire Germany war effort was fought on the eastern front.  This estimate includes the forces in Norway, the battles in Africa and the Balkans, Crete, the U-boat effort, the battles in Italy, the defense of France after D-day, the V-1 and V2 and other technological weapons, etc.  The defense of France required minimal forces in the early part of the war, especially early in the war when it was obvious the UK was in no position to invade.  I don’t think this small difference would have been enough to turn the tide in the East despite the small margin of victory by the USSR during 1941 and 1942.  I even doubt Hitler would have reduced the forces occupying France at this time had the UK capitulated.