Was the Sherman Under-rated?

@SuperbattleshipYamato hard to argue against any of this really. The IJN was so far gone by this point in the war that there’s not really much they could have done to salvage their situation one way or another. The bit about the allies not having many LSTs in general is something I never knew before though.

@SuperbattleshipYamato Yeah I get you 100%. Alternate History is a niche interest in the first place so finding other people willing to go down the rabbit hole is always tough.

I was reading this document (https://history.army.mil/html/books/104/104-20/CMH_Pub_104-20.pdf) which counted the Panzer 1 as a tankette. Do any of you think this is a better description for the vehicle than a light tank? It’s not much heavier than some Japanese tankettes and its armament and crew size is certainly similar.

This is the first time I’ve heard of classifying the vehicle as a tankette, which is why I find it noteworthy.

@Witt

Thank you so much! I appreciate your input.

If I was going into Tank on Tank combat I’m taking the M4 Sherman. Better sights, better visibility, an actual turret basket, better ergonomics, better mechanical reliability, and with the 76mm variant a very capable anti armor gun. As well as far more reliable armor due to high production quality standards. The M4 armor is reliable face hardened. The T34 could be correctly hardened, too hard so that it’s brittle or too soft.

If I was trying to drive a tank to get into a fight, the M4 is the obvious choice due to the much better reliability.

If I had to pick a tank to work on. M4 again due to its easy to repair design.

If I wanted to drive a comfortable tank well that’s no contest it’s the M4. Also it’s an easier to drive tank due to the vastly superior production quality.

So the M4 is a vastly superior weapons platform the only reason they seem comparable is on paper armor thickness and gun. Off of paper they aren’t close. Like pretty much all Russian military equipment they seem intimidating but ultimately are trash. Like how the T 72 got smashed by the M2 bradely and infantry fighting vehicle not even a tank.

@General:

29 July 1942 the SS Seatrain Texas set sail from New York with a cargo of 250-300 Sherman tanks. Arrived Cape Town 18 days later and arrived Port Taufiq southern end of Suez Canal 2 Sept. 1942                          Â

Thank you.

@balungaloaf:

without US aid assistance via lend lease, without the allied strategic bombing campaign tying up much of the luftwaffe and anti air defenses, and without the threat of invasion keeping millions of german soldiers in europe, the soviets would have been smashed before they could ever set up a counter attack.  if moscow was taken, the people would give up on their communist overlords and capitulate.

You alluded to the pressure the U.S. and Britain put on Germany; and I fully agree that pressure was immense. Even in 1940–before the U.S. was technically at war–its industrial production created profound implications for the balance of power in Europe. With massive numbers of American aircraft being produced and sent to Britain, Germany had to either a) find a way to keep pace, industrially, with the U.S. and Britain combined, or b) watch its cities and people be destroyed by waves of British and American bombers. The invasion of the Soviet Union was largely precipitated by the desire to allow Germany to attain the raw materials and industrial capacity to achieve outcome A.

However, keeping pace with the production capacity of the U.S. and Britain also required Germany to invest heavily in its own production facilities. That investment diverted effort from what would have been immediately useful production against the Soviet Union. During 1942, the Soviets out-produced the Germans 3:1 or even 4:1 in all major land categories of production, and even out-produced the Germans 2:1 in planes.

Prior to launching Operation Barbarossa, the German military staff had incorrectly believed that the Soviet Army consisted of 200 divisions. Divisions which had fought very poorly in the Soviets’ 1940 invasion of Finland. In the spring of 1941, the German Army consisted of 150 divisions; 100 of which were used for the invasion of the Soviet Union. But in the months after the invasion, the Soviets were quickly able to expand the size of their army to about 600 divisions. Given the imbalance of sheer numbers, it is very unlikely Germany could have prevailed in a war against the Soviet Union even despite its military’s advantage on a man-for-man basis.