In order for us to determine if Germany and their allies could have produced a favorable outcome during the war, we have to examine two factors, one dependent on the other. First, what were the war aims of the Axis powers? In order to know how to define the conditions of victory, we have to establish German (for they are the guiding strategic force in the Axis) objectives. Once those are ascertained, we can define an outcome that the German High Command would see as “successfulâ€.
For the duration of this post, I will refer to the collective strategic decision makers of each country as a monolithic entity. For the purposes of this discussion we can ignore the political infighting that was embedded with most nations, as the overall war goals are fairly consistent, the French collaborators notwithstanding.
The Germans had a series of strategic objectives. First and foremost, the Germans wanted to regain the Danzig region and restore a continuous national border. To accomplish this met direct opposition with the Polish. Warsaw would not agree to relinquish this territory. This objective brings England and France into opposition with Germany, adding a second objective: Germany must maintain a secure nation, without suffering a major defeat similar to the so-called armistice of the previous war.
Given the German doctrines in place of a swift, decisive campaign, the German forces have to strike within a certain time window in order to avoid a prolonged conflict. The Polish territorial question came to a head in the summer of 1939. Had the Germans waited to initiate an attack against the Allied armies, rather than strike in the late spring/early summer of 1940, then the likelihood of increased Allied industrial production could negate the superior training and doctrines of the German army. As is stood, the German armor was outnumbered by the French armor. Whether the French would have corrected their policy of dispersed armor is impossible to surmise, but they could have produced more tanks had the Germans waited to attack later than 1940. Delaying the start of conflict with any of the belligerent parties would have seriously compromised the German capability to deliver a swift and decisive victory.
Once the Allied forces on the continent were defeated, the Germans were left with one battlefield: England. The German strategy of crippling the capacity of the Royal Air Force was a sound one. It is here that we find an opportunity for the Germans to change the outcome of their conflict. Had the Germans maintained a policy of destroying the logistical chain supporting the RAF, and their ability to house planes at air bases, the Germans could have fared better in crippling British industrial capacity.
Here we see the German’s first strategic flaw. They have eliminated the French as a decisive military force, but for how long? The continued existence of Britain leaves an unstable political situation in Western Europe. But, even if the Germans land on the coast of England, and as in Thomas Mackey’s Invasion! force a capitulation of mainland England, what prevents the Americans from entering the war and attempting to aid Canada, South Africa, and the rest of the Commonwealth from liberating England and eventually France? It is easy to say that Germany can avoid fighting America for a time after Pearl Harbor by not becoming Japan’s co-belligerent, but if the German position on the European continent becomes too strong, would the Americans have eventually intervened?
This conundrum doesn’t even take into account the great bear lurking to the east of Germany. Russia’s strategic importance and their affect on outcomes is a whole other topic, one that I will examine in a later posting, particularly after suppertime.