@Clyde85:
Case in point Lazarus you aren’t being objective, you’re being extremely pro-Monty, or an Anglophile or something.
The way Lazarus has acted in this discussion is, unfortunately, fairly typical for him.
[Lazarus has] made numerous claims about Monty that don’t hold up to scrutiny
That’s certainly true! Lazarus described Montgomery as
the man who brought about the complete collapse of the German Army in France in 1944
That statement conveniently ignores Patton’s contribution to bringing about that collapse. If one were to give Montgomery credit for Patton’s accomplishments–as Lazarus seems intent on doing here–then Lazarus will succeed in his goal of making Montgomery look at least as good as Patton.
From the Wikipedia article about Patton:
The Third Army simultaneously attacked west (into Brittany), south, east towards the Seine, and north, assisting in trapping several hundred thousand German soldiers in the Chambois pocket, between Falaise and Argentan, Orne. . . . Patton’s forces were part of the Allied forces that freed northern France, bypassing Paris. . . . .
General Patton’s offensive, however, came to a screeching halt on August 31, 1944, as the Third Army literally ran out of fuel near the Moselle River, just outside of Metz, France. . . .
Patton expected that the Theater Commander would keep fuel and supplies flowing to support successful advances. However, Eisenhower . . . gave Montgomery and his 21st Army Group a strong priority for supplies for Operation Market Garden.[68] . . .
Patton’s rapid drive through the Lorraine demonstrated his keen appreciation for the technological advantages of the U.S. Army. . . . However, probably the key to Patton’s success compared to all of the other U.S. and British forces, which had similar advantages, was his intensive use of close air support; the Third Army had by far more G-2 officers at headquarters specifically designated to coordinate air strikes than any other army.[71] . . .
On December 21 Patton met with General Bradley to go over the impending advance: “Brad, this time the Kraut’s stuck his head in the meatgrinder, and I’ve got hold of the handle.”[79] Patton then argued that his Third Army should attack towards Koblenz, cutting off the Bulge at the base and trapping the entirety of the German armies involved in the offensive.[78] After briefly considering this, Bradley vetoed this proposal, as he was less concerned about killing large numbers of Germans than he was in arranging for the relief of Bastogne before it was overrun.[78][82] . . .
By February, the Germans were in full retreat and Patton had pushed units into the Saarland. Once again, however, Patton found other commands given priority on gasoline and supplies. Field Marshal Montgomery suggested deprecatingly that Patton’s forces be limited to holding a defensive line at the Rhine River. However, Patton had no intention of being left behind, and promptly began initiating several “reconnaissances in force”. The 5th Mechanized Infantry Division of the Third Army crossed the Rhine at Oppenheim on the night of March 22, 1945, thirty-six hours ahead of Montgomery’s Rhine crossing, Operation Varsity. To obtain gasoline and supplies, Third Army Ordnance units passed themselves off as First Army personnel, in one incident securing thousands of gallons of gasoline from a First Army gasoline dump.[86][87] Within a day, Patton’s forces had established a six-mile (10 km) deep bridgehead, after capturing 19,000 demoralized German troops. . . .
From 1943 on, it was clear that a consensus existed in the German Army officer corps that of all Allied ground force commanders, the enemy general they feared the most was Patton. Adolf Hitler himself was impressed by Patton, reportedly calling him “that crazy cowboy general”, and “the most dangerous man [the Allies] have.”[136] Erwin Rommel credited Patton with executing “the most astonishing achievement in mobile warfare.” [137] Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, chief of staff of the German Army, stated that Patton “was the American Guderian. He was very bold and preferred large movements. He took big risks and won big successes. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring noted that Patton had developed tank warfare into an art, and understood how to handle tanks brilliantly in the field. I feel compelled, therefore, to compare him with Generalfeldmarschall Rommel, who likewise had mastered the art of tank warfare. Both of them had a kind of second sight in regard to this type of warfare.” Referring to the escape of the Afrika Korps Panzerarmee after the battle of El Alamein, General Fritz Bayerlein opined that “I do not think that General Patton would let us get away so easily.”[138] Oberstleutnant Horst Freiherr von Wangenheim, operations officer of the 277th Volksgrenadier Division, stated that “General Patton is the most feared general on all fronts. [His] tactics are daring and unpredictable…He is the most modern general and the best commander of [combined] armored and infantry forces.”[139] After the war, General der Infanterie Guenther Blumentritt revealed that “We regarded Patton extremely highly, as the most aggressive Panzer-General of the Allies. A man of incredible initiative and lightning-like action.”[140] General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel, who had fought both Soviet and Anglo-American tank commanders, agreed: “Patton! No doubt about this. He was a brilliant panzer army commander.”[141]
In an interview conducted for Stars and Stripes just after his capture, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt summed up the predominant German view of the American general: “Patton,” Rundstedt concluded simply, “he is your best.”[4]
In a lot of ways Montgomery’s fighting style bares a striking resemblance to the contemporary French
theory of battle methodic, slow, ponderous, and defensive in nature, in other words not bold.
I can’t argue with this. His attack from Egypt was launched only after he’d achieved overwhelming force. It’s much like the kind of attack General McClellan, of the U.S. Civil War, might have launched. If you happen to have overwhelming force anyway, there’s no shame in using it to attack. But these kinds of attacks are not typically interpreted as proof of good generalship. McClellan himself was later relieved of command by Lincoln.
After the conquest of North Africa had been complete, the Allies moved on to Italy. The Allied (and Montgomery’s) advance there was slow and plodding. Germany’s force in Italy was much smaller than its Allied counterpart. That small force was successful in trading land for time. Lots of time.
As you pointed out, Montgomery’s performance during the attempted Allied breakout from Normandy was uninspiring. He would later follow that up with the Operation Market Garden fiasco. On the other hand, he was calm and rational during the Battle of the Bulge; and provided good generalship there. My sense is that he was better-suited, by nature and temperament, to defensive battles, or slow, plodding offensives, than to rapid advances. From the Wikipedia article about him:
Eisenhower had then wanted Montgomery to go on the offensive on 1 January to meet Patton’s army that had started advancing from the south on 19 December and in doing so, trap the Germans. However, Montgomery refused to commit infantry he considered underprepared into a snowstorm and for a strategically unimportant piece of land.[citation needed] He did not launch the attack until 3 January, by which point the German forces had been able to escape. A large part of American military opinion thought that he should not have held back, though it was characteristic of him to use drawn-out preparations for his attack.
