Most over-rated WWII Leader

I assure you that I do not confuse Epsom (26 June) with Goodwood (18 July) and German losses from 10th July can not possibly include Epsom losses.
I could ask you how you managed to get 2000 German losses for Goodwood. I have never seen a credible source that manages to isolate Goodwood casualties and wonder where you got it.

If you want more senior comments on Monty try this:

The Other Side Of The Hill
page 355

_In a reference to the Allied commanders, Rundstedt said:
“Montgomery and Patton were the two best that I met. FieldMarshal
Montgomery was very systematic.” He added: “That
is all right if you have sufficient forces, and sufficient time.”
Blumentritt made a similar comment. After paying tribute to
the speed of Patton drive, he added: “Field-Marshal Montgomery
was the one general who never suffered a reverse. He
moved like this”-Blumentritt took a series of very deliberate
and short steps, putting his foot down heavily each time.
Giving his impression of the different qualities of the British
and American troops, Blumentritt said: "The Americans attacked
with zest, and had a keen sense of mobile action, but when
they came under heavy artillery fire they usualJy fell back-even
after they had made a successful penetration. By contrast, once
the British had got their teeth in, and had been in a position
for twenty-four hours, it proved almost impossible to shift them.
To counter-attack the British always cost us very heavy losses.

I had many opportunities to observe this interesting difference
in the autumn of 1944, when the right half of my corps faced
the British, and the left half the American."……

Blumentritt considered that the Allied offensive had been too
widely and evenly spread. He was particularly critical of the
attack towards Metz,[MY EDIT: check who attacked Metz] pointing out that the forces available to
defend this sector along the Moselle were better relatively than
elsewhere. "A direct attack on Metz was unnecessary. The
Metz fortress area could have been masked. In contrast, a
swerve northward in the direction of Luxembourg and Bitburg
would have met with great success and caused the collapse of
the right flank of our 7th Army. By such a flank move to the
north the entire 7th Army could have been cut off before it
could retreat behind the Rhine. Thus the bulk of the defeated
German Army would have been wiped out west of the Rhine.

._

Have you seen the comments on Von Luck in  the Daglish  book ‘Over The Battlefield:  Operation Goodwood’? His views were echoed by Dunphie. In short they opine that Luck greatly overestimates his effect on Goodwood and despite intensive research Daglish  has been unable to locate the oft mentioned ‘88’ gun position he says he  took over and thus stopped the British advance. Daglish had the recce photos taken of the area von Luck says the guns were sited and found no trace of them. The opinion on Luck is that he has(over the years) used information gathered long after the events to ‘refresh’ his memory of the days events .

“Re: Most over-rated WWII Leader”

Stalin wins.  Cult of personality much?
Like, you’re talking about over-rated.  Until Kruschev pissed all over the parade, Stalin was supposed to fart flowers and s**t rainbows.

Apart from that, Churchhill got lucky.  If you discount Stalin because he’s not over-rated any more on account of crash of personality cult, then gotta be him.

For military, uhm.  IMO most that have decent reps that are actual reputations, decent.  If I had to choose, probably General MacArthur or Yamamoto.  The criteria isn’t “who was a schmoe”, it’s “who is most over-rated”.

@Herr:

Where have you read this? Was that opinion offered by an authoritative source? Were those situations in which it would indeed have been a better course to attack without that overwhelming numeric superiority?

Are comparative statistics about the number of casualties and the measure of success in operations of roughly comparable scope conducted by these respective generals, available?

Yours are reasonable questions. It’s unfortunate that no one in this discussion has offered answers to the kinds of questions you’re asking. The closest has been Clyde, whose posts and information about Operation Goodwood have been very informative. I also think the quote you provided from Ryan’s book was helpful to the discussion.

While I don’t have time right now to dig up the answers you seem to want, I’d like to contribute something else to the discussion instead. It’s a quote from Target: Patton by Robert Wilcox. Take it for what it’s worth.

[Patton] had done things militarily thought impossible. Just a year before, he had quickly turned the huge and unwieldy Third Army 90 degrees north from its easterly drive through France in snow and bitter cold to help save outnumbered and besieged U.S. paratroopers at Bastogne, Belgium. When he had proposed the rescue, his contemporaries said it could not be done. But he had been preparing it for days. His drive across France and Germany was itself one of the most brilliant feats of the European War, and it broke the back of the Nazis’ last major offensive–the Battle of the Bulge in Ardennes Forest. . . .

The press . . . often criticized him, especially towards the end of the war. Largely unrecognized by most of the news writers was the fact that he used his trademark swift, relentless, and crushing attacks–what they generally deemed as brutal and uncaring–to save lives by enabling victory to be more quickly attained. Hesitation, he preached, was a soldier’s worst enemy. A commander had to act swiftly and decisively to take advantage of fleeting, critical opportunities in battle. But his enemies, many of whom had never served and probably thanked God for it, thought him devoid of compassion–ad if that were a requisite for fighting–and a warmonger. He did love war but, as most warriors do, he loved it as a crucible, a test of his prowess and courage and, in his own peculiar religious way, a fulfillment of his destiny. But he was fully mindful of war’s horrors and pointed them out often.

His rivalry with British Field Marshall Bernhard Montgomery, who outranked him but whom he regarded as timid and indecisive, was a volatile story that had gotten him public attention, good and bad. . . .

He had raged at his superiors’ decisions to repeatedly halt his advances, most notably at Falaise where he could have killed thousands of Germans who escaped through a narrow pocket and returned to fight at the Battle of the Bulge; at the German border, where he could have crossed early and, he believed, shortened the war and saved American lives; and at the conclusion of the European conflict, just months before, when his pleas to go deeper into Eastern Europe and beat the Russians to crucial objectives, especially Berlin, had been sternly rejected. Fearing he might advance in spite of their orders not to, Eisenhower and General Omar Bradley, Patton’s immediate superior, several times cut off his gas supply. . . .

[Patton] was not insubordinate as he was unfairly characterized. Commanders were usually given discretion in the field and most of his unauthorized actions had resulted in success–the ultimate measure of a commander’s worth. Nevertheless, the same commanders–Eisenhower and Bradley–whose faulty orders he ignored had no shame in reaping the credit. For the most part, Patton was unfailingly loyal and professional and obeyed orders even when he bitterly disagreed. A former jeep driver for him, Francis J. Sanza, remembers Patton’s eyes tearing up because he was so angry when he was denied permission to go to Berlin. But he obeyed, however reluctantly. . . .

While Eisenhower and Bradley had been rapidly promoted, riding the victories [Patton] had mostly provided, [Patton’s] promotion was slow in coming.

pp. 2 - 6

This would be the same Patton who had the brilliant plan of attacking Metz  frontaly and ‘on the run’ and who suffered huge casualties when it went wrong. Lorraine  proved that when he faced German troops in prepared positions  he had no great military skill and no plan other than try and kick in the front door.
The same Patton who sacraficed the lives of his men to try and rescue a relative from a POW Camp?
The reason he was ‘stopped’ from  trying to close the Falaise gap was because his own commanders recognised that if he was foolish enough to dash across the neck of the pocket he would  have been  trampled to death by the retreating Germans. He was stopped to save him from  a humiliating defeat. Bradley said he prefered a  solid shoulder at Argentan to a broken neck at Falaise.
That is how much confidence his superiors had in his ability!

Patton could not have done the job the Eisenhower did as Supreme Allied commander, but he knew how to make use of his mobile advantage, close air support, and logistics in the aftermath of the Contentin Peninsula breakout and later his rapid shift in axis of advance helped save the battle of the bulge. The 101st’s heroic stand would have been wasted had they been relying on someone like Montgomery to save them. He had his deficiencies, but he was the type of aggressive cowboy that the American army needed in it’s arsenal.

IMO, the two biggest overrated leaders would be Gen Montgomery and Gen MacArthur. Montgomery was decent on defense, but he sucked wholeheartedly when trying to mount an attack. God forbid his troops advance without tea time when their paratroop brethren were getting shellacked. He was mostly the product of the English need for a national hero with all the setbacks they faced early in the war. MacArthur was a pompous windbag who invented his own intelligence to suit his version of what was going on, got us involved with China during the Korean war despite repeated warnings to stay away from the Yalu river from both the Chinese and his own higher ups, cost us a large portion of our pre-war ‘modern’ aircraft on the ground, forsook prewar planning by stockpiling needed supplies near the beaches and then decided too late that wasn’t a good move and didn’t get them transported back to his lines in time, and generally devoted most of his energies into self-serving PR.

@Lazarus:

This would be the same Patton who had the brilliant plan of attacking Metz frontaly and ‘on the run’ and who suffered huge casualties when it went wrong. Lorraine proved that when he faced German troops in prepared positions he had no great military skill and no plan other than try and kick in the front door.
The same Patton who sacraficed the lives of his men to try and rescue a relative from a POW Camp?
The reason he was ‘stopped’ from trying to close the Falaise gap was because his own commanders recognised that if he was foolish enough to dash across the neck of the pocket he would have been trampled to death by the retreating Germans. He was stopped to save him from a humiliating defeat. Bradley said he prefered a solid shoulder at Argentan to a broken neck at Falaise.
That is how much confidence his superiors had in his ability!

The Metz attack was Patton’s only real major failure in what had otherwise been a string of major successes.

You have presented several opinions as though they were facts. You do not know if Patton’s motive in liberating the POW camp was to save his son-and-law only, or if he also wanted to free the other Americans and Allied personnel present. Further, you stated as fact that, had Patton attacked the Falaise gap, “he would have been trampled to death by the retreating Germans.” We know that Bradley and Eisenhower expressed the view that this would have happened. But I have seen nothing to suggest that Bradley or Eisenhower were Patton’s equals as generals. When there is a difference of opinion, we should not (as you have done) assume that Bradley and Eisenhower were right, and Patton wrong.

To take a somewhat similar example: as Guderian’s panzers were advancing across France in an effort to cut off the Allied force in Northwestern France and the low countries, the German generals became nervous about a possible counterattack, and ordered a halt. They were even, for a time, able to talk Hitler into agreeing to this more cautious approach. Guderian managed to talk someone senior to him into giving him permission for a “reconnaissance in force.” A reconnaissance which Guderian then proceeded to execute–with the emphasis here being on force. Guderian’s willingness to defy or creatively interpret his orders directly led to the conquest of France. Nothing I’ve read suggests that Eisenhower or Bradley were any more competent than the German generals who had ordered Guderian to halt. I have seen the opposite view expressed: that the German generals tended to be superior to their Allied counterparts.

On page 5, Wilcox mentioned one instance in which Patton had ignored Eisenhower’s orders.

But as he was often at odds with his superiors’ plans, he sometimes conveniently found ways to disregard their orders. For instance, on May 1, 1945, he went ahead and captured Trier, Germany, even though Eisenhower, thinking Patton did not have enough divisions to do so, had told him to stay put. Upon being called on the action, he signaled Ike, “What do you want me to do? Give it back?”

I have to say Lazarus but I don’t think you’re being very objective in your application of historical evidence. Rather then create an image of a commander based on the evidence, your twisting evidence to fit the image you want. I think both of these men, Monty and Patton, were very over-rated and the evidence on had tends to support this. Neither was perfect, bot were human and both made mistakes when dealing with the fog of war. Patton for his hubris, arrogance, and just bullheadedness. Monty was no saint either and a claim could be made that while he was rather efficient, he was also overly cautious and most of his battle plans lacked any strategic boldness. He was so tied to his own concept of “war by timetable” that if his timetable was thrown off he couldn’t adapt. The only reason British forces even executed operation Goodwood was because Monty’s pre-Normandy plans were disrupted by poor weather preventing his planned landing of additional forces and supplies. I think that really shows how over-rated of a commander Monty was by highlighting his lack of adaptability.

Also, you can’t claim that Monty never suffered a battlefield set back with out mentioning Operation Market Garden, one of the few, if not only, time Monty put forward a bold offensive. It failed miserably and got the the British 1st Airborne Division destroyed.

@Clyde85:

I have to say Lazarus but I don’t think you’re being very objective in your application of historical evidence.

Is it  always the case that people  pointing out your errors  are ‘not very objective’ but your figures for German losses during Goodwood (that you plucked ouit of thin air) are the height of impariality?

@Clyde85:

Rather then create an image of a commander based on the evidence, your twisting evidence to fit the image you want

Strange as it seems I think you have a grossly misinformed and very partial view of Montgomery.

@Clyde85:

Monty was no saint either and a claim could be made that while he was rather efficient, he was also overly cautious and most of his battle plans lacked any strategic boldness.

Yes. The overall ground Commander for Normandy, the man who planned it and the man who brought about the complete collapse of the German Army in France in 1944 lacked any strategic boldness !!!

@Clyde85:

The only reason British forces even executed operation Goodwood was because Monty’s pre-Normandy plans were disrupted by poor weather preventing his planned landing of additional forces and supplies. I think that really shows how over-rated of a commander Monty was by highlighting his lack of adaptability

Another example of faulty sources.
Montgomery committed to print his ‘overall plan’ long before the first soldier hit the beach. The plan was always to pin the Germans in the east whilst Bradley pivoted and struck into the soft German rear. Countless documents confirm this and yet you still get ill informed complaints that Monty only said this after his ‘master plan’ was disrupted.
His master plan was to be on the Seine in 90 days.
He got there in 80 days.
Goodwood was meant to be a 2  handed assault but Bradley was not prepared enough  to carry out his half and thus Monty was hamstrung from day one.

@Clyde85:

Also, you can’t claim that Monty never suffered a battlefield set back with out mentioning Operation Market Garden,

Another common mistake.
Any attempt to counter the gross distortion of Montgomery and his performance in Normandy is immediatly turned into claims that you are defending his every act. I often wonder what drives otherwise sensible people to invent such an argument. I presume the lack of any real evidence to show Monty’s ‘failure’ compels them to use this straw man to save their blushes.

I liken it to Kurts argument. Anything you say that counters his claims is ‘opinion’ and every thing he claims is 100% cast iron fact and beyond and criticism!

What are we really debating here?

Whether Monty was good?  Or slow?  Or whether Pattons was more feard than Montgomery?

@Gargantua:

What are we really debating here?
Whether Monty was good?  Or slow?  Or whether Pattons was more feard than Montgomery?

I don’t know any more, I hate it when people get like this.

Case in point Lazarus you aren’t being objective, you’re being extremely pro-Monty, or an Anglophile or something. No one here is saying Monty is bad, just that his reputation in the post war era is inflated far beyond the ability and skill shown during the war, hence the over-rated title. You have made numerous claims about Monty that don’t hold up to scrutiny and any time someone brings this up you either accuse them of making things up or discredit their sources. I don’t know why Col. Von Luck wasn’t good enough, outside of you discrediting him for…… being German? Here’s a resource I know you’ll discredit too http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Goodwood but there are some numbers “pulled out of the air” for you.

While their are a number of point I could pick at there is really only one that bugs me, your assertion that Monty was bold. Montgomery was Not bold, save for one disastrous time. Look at his debut in North Africa against Rommel at the battle of Alam Halfa. Montgomery successfully repulsed Rommel’s attacks but rather then take advantage of the situation, he sat on his hands and waited on his timetable and for his precise specifications to be met before going on the offensive. A bold commander would have seized the opportunity to launch a counter-offensive before Rommel got the chance to reorganize his forces. To be fair, a previous British offensive, operation battle axe, was launched prematurely with disastrous results and no one can blame Monty for being cautious, but that’s what he was being cautious not bold. In Italy Monty continued to lead the 8th army moving up the eastern side of the peninsula. Though the British forces landed largely unopposed Monty continued a slow and methodical advance up the spine of Italy. Now a Bold commander would maybe have tried to keep the Germans from retreating in good order to the Gustav line, but that’s not what Monty did. In alot of ways Montgomery’s fighting style bares a striking resemblance to the contemporary French theory of battle methodic, slow, ponderous, and defensive in nature, in other words not bold.

I have already explained his failing in Normandy and i’m sorry but Operation Cobra was conceived by General Bardley and approved by Montgomery, not, as you suggested, created by Montgomery. I have presented my source as Col. Hans Von Luck for my information on Operation Goodwood and your explanation of why this source isn’t credible is insufficient. Operation Goodwood was a distraction operation to keep the Germans in place while the US executed operation Cobra, which was a costly British sacrifice. Monty’s failure to adapt to changing situations on the ground and break away from his beloved timetables caused him to fail to exploit the initial success of the British landings in Normandy and seize Caen right away, instead waiting and following his time table, which is why operation Cobra became necessary in the first place.

Then there is the whole Market Garden business where Montgomery ignored ULTRA reports and launched an airborne attack directly onto German armoured positions.

@Clyde85:

Case in point Lazarus you aren’t being objective, you’re being extremely pro-Monty, or an Anglophile or something.

I have made no claims that Monty was  better /made no mistakes etc. All I am doing is  putting the other side of the argument when you give specific examples of any ‘failures’… What is significant is that you inflate this into a ‘pro’ view. Have you a problem with those who do not share your views?

@Clyde85:

his reputation in the post war era is inflated far beyond the ability and skill shown during the war

Perhaps you can referesh my memory and give  examples of where post war era  inflated claims are made.
3 will do to start with

@Clyde85:

You have made numerous claims about Monty that don’t hold up to scrutiny and any time someone brings this up you either accuse them of making things up or discredit their sources.

You gave a German casualty total for Goodwood.
I say that  number is totaly unsourced and has no standing.
You have yet to source the numbers although I have asked you to do so.
I gave you the official German 10 day casualty total up to 20 July.
Tell me again who is making claims and who is posting facts?

@Clyde85:

I don’t know why Col. Von Luck wasn’t good enough, outside of you discrediting him for…… being German?

No for having a rather selective recollection.
I posted details of a man who had access to recce photos taken of the area where Luck says he took over some Flak  of 88 guns.
There are no guns to be seen.
Draw your own conclusions.

@Clyde85:

Here’s a resource I know you’ll discredit too http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Goodwood but there are some numbers “pulled out of the air” for you

If you read carefully you can see the following under the German Casualty Total

Unknown total
Further under the estimates you see:

KIA

2000 +
and under captured:
2500+

So those  figures are a base line with clear indications that the final total was greater.
However you posted them as the final totals

@Clyde85:

the Germans suffered only 2,000 (though by the end of the operation 2,500 Germans had also be captured,

You deliberately missed  out the ‘+’ at the end of the 2 totals.
So yes I still say your numbers are plucked out of thin air.

@Clyde85:

While their are a number of point I could pick at there is really only one that bugs me, your assertion that Monty was bold. Montgomery was Not bold, save for one disastrous time. Look at his debut in North Africa against Rommel at the battle of Alam Halfa. Montgomery successfully repulsed Rommel’s attacks but rather then take advantage

This is clear proof of your irrational downer on Montgomery. You are reduced to picking clear victories and then trying to claim they in some way were not as good as could have been achieved. A very churlish way of looking at things.
It is like saying Patton performed badly in the Bulge because he failed to trap all the Germans in the pocket.

@Clyde85:

Monty’s failure to adapt to changing situations on the ground and break away from his beloved timetables caused him to fail to exploit the initial success of the British landings in Normandy and seize Caen right away, instead waiting and following his time table, which is why operation Cobra became necessary in the first place.

I think you will find every D-Day objective was missed-including the US ones.I can only repeat the words of the British historian Robin Neillands:

For example, why is it that when Bradley’s First Army took a month to cover the last five miles to St. Lô this is attributed (correctly) to the bocage and the enemy but when the British Second Army took as long to cover the six miles into Caen that is attributed to Monty’s “timidity,” “caution,” and “slowness”? The presence of seven German panzer divisions in front of Caen is usually left out of this equation

Now instead of ignoring the valid points in the above please launch yourself into an attack on the US Forces who failed to adapt to changing situations on the ground and break away from  timetables
or if you are biased ignore it and  plough on with your myopic view of  Montgomery.

Sorry, but you are wrong. It’s really that simple you are just wrong.

You take my words out of context, its rather convenient where you ended this quote
@Clyde85:

the Germans suffered only 2,000 (though by the end of the operation 2,500 Germans had also be captured,

and yet leave out the other part of the statement which says
@Clyde85:

so that could be considered more of an even exchange I guess).

which is a clear indication that I wasn’t leaving out the “+” sign, as 4,000 is greater then 2,000, until you add in the 2,500 prisoners, which would make it closer to an even exchange. You chose to ignore this or didn’t bother to read it at all. That’s fine.

This is also a rather interesting statement
@Lazarus:

I have made no claims that Monty was  better /made no mistakes etc. All I am doing is  putting the other side of the argument when you give specific examples of any ‘failures’… What is significant is that you inflate this into a ‘pro’ view. Have you a problem with those who do not share your views?

If you’re not trying to be a Monty fanboy, then why are you so doggedly defending him? This thread is discussing over rater commanders of WW2 and yet you have offered no criticism of any commander, nor have you offered to defend any of the others discussed her accept Montgomery. You must be pro-Montgomery otherwise why would you be wasting so much time and energy? Your past posts in defense of Monty, and only Monty, belie any pretense of not favoring Montgomery. You are simply presenting the other side of an argument, but to what end? You seem more then happy to allow judgement to be past on all the others mentioned in this thread, BUT Montgomery. What other logical conclusion is there? All the evidence points to you being pro-Monty. That being the case, what am I inflating?

I don’t have a problem with people who don’t share my views, what I have a problem with is ignorance. Here is a nice example of that

You gave a German casualty total for Goodwood.
I say that  number is totaly unsourced and has no standing.
You have yet to source the numbers although I have asked you to do so.

@Clyde85:

Here’s a resource I know you’ll discredit too http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Goodwood but there are some numbers “pulled out of the air” for you

This seems like a clear contraction to me, you accuse me of not citing any sources for the figures on Goodwood and then show the link for the site I referenced the figures on Goodwood from? Wha…?? How dose that make any kind of sense?

@Lazarus:

Now instead of ignoring the valid points in the above please launch yourself into an attack on the US Forces who failed to adapt to changing situations on the ground and break away from  timetables

I already have, go back and read this thread from the beginning and you’ll see. That’s the difference here, I will readily state the men like Eisenhower, Patton, and especially MacArthur, were completely over-rated, and sacrificed the lives of their men to enhance their own personal glory, or that they had committed some other great Hubris. I think Montgomery was a good commander, competent if nothing else. However he is lauded as one of Britain’s best war time commanders and is certainly the most well known. I think this is an undeserved reputation and other British commanders from the war, like Lord Allenbrooke, or Bill Slim, deserve more recognition then Monty.

@Clyde85:

I wasn’t leaving out the “+” sign, as 4,000 is greater then 2,000, until you add in the 2,500 prisoners, which would make it closer to an even exchange. You chose to ignore this or didn’t bother to read it at all. That’s fine.

If you look closely at the Wiki page you will find it only gives one number. 2000 to 2500 prisoners. It makes no guess as to the dead.

@Clyde85:

If you’re not trying to be a Monty fanboy, then why are you so doggedly defending him?

Well that depends if putting right your errors about Montgomery and his actions is now taken to mean you are a fanboy.
I always assumed a fanboy would be more inclined to inflate his beloved hero-something I have never attempted.
I see  nothing other than the usual attempt to discredit  anyone who challenges  the Monty bashing.
@Clyde85:

What other logical conclusion is there?

That I am attempting to educate you in matters that so far  seem to have eluded you?
@Clyde85:

what I have a problem with is ignorance.

That depends on  several things. The definition of ignorance  and the fact  that you  probably consider yourself  free from this vice……

@Clyde85:

This seems like a clear contraction to me, you accuse me of not citing any sources for the figures on Goodwood and then show the link for the site I referenced the figures on Goodwood from? Wha…?? How dose that make any kind of sense?

I have  taken a closer look and the totals on Wiki are actualy just prisoner totals. It says 2000 to 2500 German prisoners. It gives no number for killed. It seems we both misread the information. I checked the source (number 13) and can confirm it  only gives POW totals and makes but  a single reference to 18 dead.

@Lazarus:

I see  nothing other than the usual attempt to discredit  anyone who challenges  the Monty bashing.

Monty bashing? This is a thread For bashing commanders, that’s like throwing a Woodstock concert to try to Stop hippies from smoking weed, it’s counter productive.

@Lazarus:

That I am attempting to educate you in matters that so far  seem to have eluded you?

How noble of you  :roll: I assure i’m not uneducated on the subject matter I’m just employing a more objective view on it. Monty was good, but not great and he could have done better as I pointed out. We’re not trying to view the subject from the perspective of someone in the moment but rather looking back at it with the advantage of historical hindsight.

@Clyde85:

Case in point Lazarus you aren’t being objective, you’re being extremely pro-Monty, or an Anglophile or something.

The way Lazarus has acted in this discussion is, unfortunately, fairly typical for him.

[Lazarus has] made numerous claims about Monty that don’t hold up to scrutiny

That’s certainly true! Lazarus described Montgomery as

the man who brought about the complete collapse of the German Army in France in 1944

That statement conveniently ignores Patton’s contribution to bringing about that collapse. If one were to give Montgomery credit for Patton’s accomplishments–as Lazarus seems intent on doing here–then Lazarus will succeed in his goal of making Montgomery look at least as good as Patton.

From the Wikipedia article about Patton:

The Third Army simultaneously attacked west (into Brittany), south, east towards the Seine, and north, assisting in trapping several hundred thousand German soldiers in the Chambois pocket, between Falaise and Argentan, Orne. . . . Patton’s forces were part of the Allied forces that freed northern France, bypassing Paris. . . . .

General Patton’s offensive, however, came to a screeching halt on August 31, 1944, as the Third Army literally ran out of fuel near the Moselle River, just outside of Metz, France. . . .

Patton expected that the Theater Commander would keep fuel and supplies flowing to support successful advances. However, Eisenhower . . .  gave Montgomery and his 21st Army Group a strong priority for supplies for Operation Market Garden.[68] . . .

Patton’s rapid drive through the Lorraine demonstrated his keen appreciation for the technological advantages of the U.S. Army. . . . However, probably the key to Patton’s success compared to all of the other U.S. and British forces, which had similar advantages, was his intensive use of close air support; the Third Army had by far more G-2 officers at headquarters specifically designated to coordinate air strikes than any other army.[71] . . .

On December 21 Patton met with General Bradley to go over the impending advance: “Brad, this time the Kraut’s stuck his head in the meatgrinder, and I’ve got hold of the handle.”[79] Patton then argued that his Third Army should attack towards Koblenz, cutting off the Bulge at the base and trapping the entirety of the German armies involved in the offensive.[78] After briefly considering this, Bradley vetoed this proposal, as he was less concerned about killing large numbers of Germans than he was in arranging for the relief of Bastogne before it was overrun.[78][82] . . .

By February, the Germans were in full retreat and Patton had pushed units into the Saarland. Once again, however, Patton found other commands given priority on gasoline and supplies. Field Marshal Montgomery suggested deprecatingly that Patton’s forces be limited to holding a defensive line at the Rhine River. However, Patton had no intention of being left behind, and promptly began initiating several “reconnaissances in force”. The 5th Mechanized Infantry Division of the Third Army crossed the Rhine at Oppenheim on the night of March 22, 1945, thirty-six hours ahead of Montgomery’s Rhine crossing, Operation Varsity. To obtain gasoline and supplies, Third Army Ordnance units passed themselves off as First Army personnel, in one incident securing thousands of gallons of gasoline from a First Army gasoline dump.[86][87] Within a day, Patton’s forces had established a six-mile (10 km) deep bridgehead, after capturing 19,000 demoralized German troops. . . .

From 1943 on, it was clear that a consensus existed in the German Army officer corps that of all Allied ground force commanders, the enemy general they feared the most was Patton. Adolf Hitler himself was impressed by Patton, reportedly calling him “that crazy cowboy general”, and “the most dangerous man [the Allies] have.”[136] Erwin Rommel credited Patton with executing “the most astonishing achievement in mobile warfare.” [137] Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, chief of staff of the German Army, stated that Patton “was the American Guderian. He was very bold and preferred large movements. He took big risks and won big successes. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring noted that Patton had developed tank warfare into an art, and understood how to handle tanks brilliantly in the field. I feel compelled, therefore, to compare him with Generalfeldmarschall Rommel, who likewise had mastered the art of tank warfare. Both of them had a kind of second sight in regard to this type of warfare.” Referring to the escape of the Afrika Korps Panzerarmee after the battle of El Alamein, General Fritz Bayerlein opined that “I do not think that General Patton would let us get away so easily.”[138] Oberstleutnant Horst Freiherr von Wangenheim, operations officer of the 277th Volksgrenadier Division, stated that “General Patton is the most feared general on all fronts. [His] tactics are daring and unpredictable…He is the most modern general and the best commander of [combined] armored and infantry forces.”[139] After the war, General der Infanterie Guenther Blumentritt revealed that “We regarded Patton extremely highly, as the most aggressive Panzer-General of the Allies. A man of incredible initiative and lightning-like action.”[140] General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel, who had fought both Soviet and Anglo-American tank commanders, agreed: “Patton! No doubt about this. He was a brilliant panzer army commander.”[141]

In an interview conducted for Stars and Stripes just after his capture, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt summed up the predominant German view of the American general: “Patton,” Rundstedt concluded simply, “he is your best.”[4]

In a lot of ways Montgomery’s fighting style bares a striking resemblance to the contemporary French
theory of battle methodic, slow, ponderous, and defensive in nature, in other words not bold.

I can’t argue with this. His attack from Egypt was launched only after he’d achieved overwhelming force. It’s much like the kind of attack General McClellan, of the U.S. Civil War, might have launched. If you happen to have overwhelming force anyway, there’s no shame in using it to attack. But these kinds of attacks are not typically interpreted as proof of good generalship. McClellan himself was later relieved of command by Lincoln.

After the conquest of North Africa had been complete, the Allies moved on to Italy. The Allied (and Montgomery’s) advance there was slow and plodding. Germany’s force in Italy was much smaller than its Allied counterpart. That small force was successful in trading land for time. Lots of time.

As you pointed out, Montgomery’s performance during the attempted Allied breakout from Normandy was uninspiring. He would later follow that up with the Operation Market Garden fiasco. On the other hand, he was calm and rational during the Battle of the Bulge; and provided good generalship there. My sense is that he was better-suited, by nature and temperament, to defensive battles, or slow, plodding offensives, than to rapid advances. From the Wikipedia article about him:

Eisenhower had then wanted Montgomery to go on the offensive on 1 January to meet Patton’s army that had started advancing from the south on 19 December and in doing so, trap the Germans. However, Montgomery refused to commit infantry he considered underprepared into a snowstorm and for a strategically unimportant piece of land.[citation needed] He did not launch the attack until 3 January, by which point the German forces had been able to escape. A large part of American military opinion thought that he should not have held back, though it was characteristic of him to use drawn-out preparations for his attack.

@KurtGodel7:

The way Lazarus has acted in this discussion is, unfortunately, fairly typical for him.

Kurt. The man who has complet faith in Wiki and loves it so much he keeps  reposting  most of it here verbatim.

Take the following example:
Clyde posts this (taken from the Wiki page)about Goodwood;
@Clyde85:

British infantry supporting the operation suffered 4,000 casualties where as the Germans suffered only 2,000

And Kurt is so impressed he chips in:
@KurtGodel7:

It’s unfortunate that no one in this discussion has offered answers to the kinds of questions you’re asking. The closest has been Clyde, whose posts and information about Operation Goodwood have been very informative.

Unfortunately the information is completely wrong. It is not correct. There is no  information about German dead and Cylde’s estimate is a simple misreading of the information on the Wiki page. Kurt believes anything that chimes  with his uber-panzer mentality!
Anyway I wonder why Kurt reposts the same information that was so comprehensively demolished earlier.
See here for a detailed refutation of all the points in his latest post
http://www.axisandallies.org/forums/index.php?topic=18537.msg794489#msg794489

If you prefer the short version then briefly:
The Wiki article is referenced to third hand accounts that all are corruptions of the original quote that I gave here
http://www.axisandallies.org/forums/index.php?topic=16779.msg633151#msg633151
All mention of  Montgomery had been removed and the quotes from the German Generals made to sound as if they were talking about Patton alone.

Time for a reality check .

See the numbers and draw your own conclusions.

German armour confronting Allies by sector

Who had the better chance of making a breakthrough.
An Army facing 25% of the german tank force or the one facing 75%?

If you were a German commander  and you concentrated 75% of your tanks on the  right of your line and 25% on the left does that give any indication of where you see the main threat against your army?

_“21st Army Group hurled itself against some of the densest concentrations of high quality opposition in the entire war. The importance of Caen as the fulcrum of events in Normandy was apparent to the German staff, and within days of the Allied landings, 21st Army Group was confronting 21st Panzers, 12th SS and Panzer Lehr around that disputed city. By the time of Epsom on 26 June, Dempsey’s 2nd Army was facing the deepest and most hostile opposition across the theatre, and arguably anywhere in Europe.”  _

and:

" why is it that when Bradley’s First Army took a month to cover the last five miles to St. Lô this is attributed (correctly) to the bocage and the enemy but when the British Second Army took as long to cover the six miles into Caen that is attributed to Monty’s “timidity,” “caution,” and “slowness”? The presence of seven German panzer divisions in front of Caen is usually left out of this equation "

@Lazarus:

" why is it that when Bradley’s First Army took a month to cover the last five miles to St. Lô this is attributed (correctly) to the bocage and the enemy but when the British Second Army took as long to cover the six miles into Caen that is attributed to Monty’s “timidity,” “caution,” and “slowness”? The presence of seven German panzer divisions in front of Caen is usually left out of this equation "

Because Monty was an over-rated commander hence his inclusion on this list. He was only pulled from Italy for Normandy for political and propaganda reasons. Britain’s hero, victor of the El Alamein, Returns to the continent to lead the allied armies in the liberation of Europe. Sounds good and I bet it sold a lot of newspapers, but he was only in command to please British public opinion and boost moral on the home-front, which after nearly six years at war, was becoming a little weary. Only during the initial landings on June 6th were there an even number of US and British forces(5 and 5) and as the battles progressed US forces outnumbered their British counter-parts more then 4 to 1 by the end. This is why Monty was dropped as overall commander 3 months after the landing, which proves his appointment was for purely political reasons.

@Clyde85:

This is why Monty was dropped as overall commander 3 months after the landing, which proves his appointment was for purely political reasons.� Â

Nope.
It was always the case that Eisenhower was to take over command. The time was not fixed and the option was not exercised until September 1st-after Montgomery beat the Germans.

@Clyde85:

Only during the initial landings on June 6th were there an even number of US and British forces(5 and 5) and as the battles progressed US forces outnumbered their British counter-parts more then 4 to 1 by the end.

June US Tank strength  1710
June UK Tank strength  2666

July US    3407
July UK    3828

Aug US      4379
Aug UK      4297

Have another try.