Most over-rated WWII Leader

@Herr:

It is not specifically mentioned that (von) Rundstedt was among the generals who said that, but it seems likely: Liddell Hart did indeed meet Rundstedt

He did say it and it is in the book. It is a authentic sourced quote.

@Herr:

But the possibility exists that the quote was a consensus opinion offered by several German generals, Rundstedt being one of them.

There is no ‘possibility’ about it. It was said. The quote is sourced along with other comments by Blummerit.

"What did the Germans think of their Western opponents? They were diffident in expressing an opinion on this matter, but I gathered a few impressions in the course of our talks. In reference to the Allied comanders, Rundstedt said: “Montgomery and Patton were the two best that I met. Field Marshall Montgomery was very systematic. He aded: “That is alright if you have sufficient forces, and sufficent time.” Blumentritt made a similar comment. After paying tribute to the speed of Patton’s drive, he added: “Field Marshall Montgomery was the one one general who never suffered a reverse. He moved like this” – Blumentritt took a series of very deliberate and short steps, putting his foot down heavily each time.” --“The German General Talk”, pp.257-58, by B.H. Liddell Hart

One has to wonder why doubt is being cast on this ranking of Montgomery with Patton. It would appear there are those who simply can not accept reality and prefer legend.

I have nothing against Montgomery. I also have no personal opinion on whether Montgomery or Patton was the greater general, or how good they were at all. To form such an opinion would require quite a bit of additional reading and analysis on my part, which is something I don’t intend to spend my time on.

Thank you for the quote. Like I said, I don’t have Liddell Hart’s book at hand, and based my statement on a report in Der Spiegel which mentions “The German generals”, quite possibly referring to both Rundstedt and Blumentritt, and maybe others.

But I don’t think that the quote from Ryan’s book can be written off as “legend”. Ryan refers to Blumentritt as well. I also don’t necessarily see a contradiction between these two statements, and I’m not sure whether in Rundstedt’s view, “more dangerous”, also meant “better overall” - that’s a suggestion created by Ryan’s wording.

We also need to consider that translation and re-quoting may have disrupted certain subtleties in the wording that we can’t reconstruct right now. Liddell Hart needed an interpreter to speak with the German generals at all.

I would consider Blumentritt’s book “Von Rundstedt, the Soldier and the Man” the authoritative source on this matter, but I don’t have the text of that book either.

The point is the original claim that The Germans considered Patton the ‘best’ Allied General. I gave a quote where this is contradicted and no quote confirming the ‘Patton is best’ claim can be found.
I have yet to see any quote showing a named General showing the claimed German ‘fear’ of Patton.

@Lazarus:

The point is the original claim that The Germans considered Patton the ‘best’ Allied General.

That “original claim” is too vague anyway. We would have to define who “the Germans” were, and how “best” should be interpreted. If we consider that “the Germans” would, in this context, probably refer to “a representative cross-section of senior German military commanders during World War II” (a formula which introduces new definition problems in itself, but I guess it will have to do), then I very much doubt that they have ever been systematically polled on ranking the qualities of their Allied opponents, from “best” to “worst”.

@Lazarus:

I gave a quote where this is contradicted and no quote confirming the ‘Patton is best’ claim can be found.

Hardly. It’s a quote of Rundstedt stating that Montgomery and Patton were the best. So that’s no more than one of “the Germans”, albeit a very distinguished one. It would have contradicted the original statement if Rundstedt had ranked Montgomery, or anybody else, over Patton, but he didn’t. And even if he had, any claim one way or the other about the opinion of “the Germans” would need to involve more than one of them.
Furthermore, this is no doubt not the only thought or opinion Rundstedt ever had on Montgomery, Patton, or other Allied military leaders. So if we do hold Rundstedt’s opinion for representative, and we want to decide whether in the end, he considered either Montgomery or Patton the better general, we need to look into what else he said about these men. And those sources are not easily found. I quoted Ryan’s book, who bases his statement on Blumentritt, and concludes that Rundstedt considered Patton more dangerous.
Again, we need Blumentritt’s book to better understand Rundstedt’s assessment.

@Lazarus:

I have yet to see any quote showing a named General showing the claimed German ‘fear’ of Patton.

I agree with you there. I don’t believe that “fear of Patton” was a major psychological concern with the German populace or military leadership during World War II.

Anyway, the whole topic mainly provoked my interest once actual quotes and sources were presented. Like you, I’m not much in favor of arbitrary claims.

@Cromwell_Dude:

Feel absolutely free to disagree, but I say Eisenhower.

To me it really depends on how you view Eisenhower, if you view him as a tactician and as a field commander then yes he is over rated. However Eisenhower’s strength was in his ability to make war while keeping the peace amongst those under his command and his allies. It was Eisenhower who it fell to, to defuse the explosive rivalry between Patton and Montgomery.

Eisenhower seemed to leave it to his generals to make the day to day decisions of the war while Eisenhower was more of a war room type figure. Never the less under Eisenhowers command the allies succesfully invaded France and went on to win the war on the Western front.

I think purely by his World War 2 reputation McArthur was a bit overrated, not the most but definetly at least a little. He made good on his rep in Korea when UN forces amphibiously attacked Inchon arguably saving the remaining UN forces in Korea from a crushing defeat.

Charles De Gaulle was also an overrated figure in my opinion, but I suppose that had its purpose to keep up the morale of the French under Nazi occupation and know that a Frenchman would be their liberator.

@Octospire:

To me it really depends on how you view Eisenhower, if you view him as a tactician and as a field commander then yes he is over rated. However Eisenhower’s strength was in his ability to make war while keeping the peace amongst those under his command and his allies. It was Eisenhower who it fell to, to defuse the explosive rivalry between Patton and Montgomery. Eisenhower seemed to leave it to his generals to make the day to day decisions of the war while Eisenhower was more of a war room type figure. Never the less under Eisenhowers command the allies succesfully invaded France and went on to win the war on the Western front.

Yes, this is correct.  Eisenhower wasn’t a “battlefield general” (something he himself recognized) but he did have exactly the right skill set needed for the critical job of Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force.  He was an excellent organizer and administrator – qualities he shared with his boss, George Marshall – and he knew how to make coalition warfare work, a task which required a great deal of political skill.  He made sure he had first-rate people on his staff and he gave careful consideration to their advice.  He respected front-line soldiers, understood the importance of their morale, and made a point of keeping in touch with them by (for example) visiting units and talking with the men.  The G.I.s in turn respected and trusted him; when he visited some paratrooper units just before D-Day, for example, one of the men told him, “Don’t worry, General, we’ll take care of this for you.”

MacArthur was by far the most overrated commander on the allied side. He was a man more interested with getting his name in the papers and with political maneuvering then the lives of the men under his command. I think the Philippines campaign is the best example of this. The campaign cost the US around 62,000 casualties that were totally avoidable, but we had to fight there as MacArthur had promised that “He would return” or some such nonsense. MacArthur pitched a fit when Nimitz put forward the idea of by-passing the islands as part of the overall island hopping campaign, and move to capture Taiwan instead. Given that part of this campaign saw the battle of Leyte gulf, which was so close to a Japanese victory, and would have had disastrous consequences of the continued American offensive in the Pacific, one wonders if it was really worth the risk. B-29’s could reach the Japanese mainland from Saipan, and capturing Taiwan would have allowed the allies to strangle all Japanese south of that position including those on the Philippines. It was all done to appease MacArthur’s pride.

On a side note, about Patton, I think it should be noted that all accounts from the Germans say he was “the best” or “most feared” but then say for an allied General. To me that smacks more then a little of a condescending refrain. It’s almost like the Germans are saying, "out of all the wheelchair bound retards with sticks we have to fight, the one with the slightly pointyer stick, ie Patton, is more worrisome to fight then the rest, if for no other reason then he might try to stand up and fall over poking himself in the eye in the process.

@Clyde85:

On a side note, about Patton, I think it should be noted that all accounts from the Germans say he was “the best” or “most feared” but then say for an allied General.

Would you mind sharing the source of that information? As you can see in older posts on this topic, there’s been quite a bit of discussion a few years ago about how the Germans rated Allied generals, notably Patton and Montgomery. In the end, nobody came up with a reliable original source.

I’ve based my comments on those I have read in the memoirs of Lt. Colonel Hans Van Luck in “Panzer Commander” and from Maj Gen. F.W. Von Mellenthins’ “Panzer Battles”. Both made comments to the effect of Patton being one of the best allied generals with regard to his application of armored formations in combat. Von Mellenthin having fought against Patton in Alsace-Lorraine region of France remarked that He, his immediate superior, General Balck, and the army group Commander von Rundstedt were very wary of the movements of Patton and his 3rd army as they knew he had true understanding of armoured warfare. Though von Mellenthin goes on to say that Patton’s 3rd army’s habit of including “leg” infantry was a poor choice and hampered him from greater operational success, and the GI’s were rather poor soliders, but Patton still managed to make the most out of it.

In the other instance Von Luck faced off against Montgomery in operation “Goodwood” during the break out from Normandy and made mention of a number of rather obvious and simple mistakes Monty made during the operation. For instance he commented that British tanks would move with out any infantry support, or infantry moving without armoured support, would make it very easy for the Germans to deploy effective counter-measures and inflict great casualties on Monty’s forces.

They are, I feel, the best contemporary (of that time) sources for the feeling of German officers about two of the key allied commanders. If you want I can go back into both books and cite specifics passages.

Without being able to quote a source, and just going off my own knowledge and opinions of the subject, I think that the Germans didn’t necessarily think Patton was the “best” general because of his military accomplishments.
The Germans saw him as the most like their generals - aggressive, quick-thinking, no nonsense - and the Nazis tended to think of themselves as superior to everyone, including militarily. 
Since they were the best, and Patton was the most like them, therefore Patton must be the best Allied general.

BTW, my money is on Dugout Douglas MacArthur being the most overrated. It was all about MacArthur.
Saying, “I shall return,” instead of we or us, strong-arming Roosevelt into attacking the Philippines and costing thousands of lives not only there but on islands like Peleliu because they had to be taken to cover his flank.
And even though the Philippines would have been lost anyway, he made very few good moves in defending it.
Even when he returned it was more about him returning than about the fighting.

He took a giant gamble at Inchon, and though it paid off, it led him to thinking he was the only one who knew better.

@Clyde85:

I’ve based my comments on those I have read in the memoirs of Lt. Colonel Hans Van Luck in “Panzer Commander” and from Maj Gen. F.W. Von Mellenthins’ “Panzer Battles”. Both made comments to the effect of Patton being one of the best allied generals with regard to his application of armored formations in combat. Von Mellenthin having fought against Patton in Alsace-Lorraine region of France remarked that He, his immediate superior, General Balck, and the army group Commander von Rundstedt were very wary of the movements of Patton and his 3rd army as they knew he had true understanding of armoured warfare. Though von Mellenthin goes on to say that Patton’s 3rd army’s habit of including “leg” infantry was a poor choice and hampered him from greater operational success, and the GI’s were rather poor soliders, but Patton still managed to make the most out of it.

In the other instance Von Luck faced off against Montgomery in operation “Goodwood” during the break out from Normandy and made mention of a number of rather obvious and simple mistakes Monty made during the operation. For instance he commented that British tanks would move with out any infantry support, or infantry moving without armoured support, would make it very easy for the Germans to deploy effective counter-measures and inflict great casualties on Monty’s forces.

They are, I feel, the best contemporary (of that time) sources for the feeling of German officers about two of the key allied commanders. If you want I can go back into both books and cite specifics passages.

Thank you. I don’t have any of those books, so when the issue came up earlier, we only had information that was available from various internet resources.

@Clyde85:

I’ve based my comments on those I have read in the memoirs of Lt. Colonel Hans Van Luck in “Panzer Commander” and from Maj Gen. F.W. Von Mellenthins’ “Panzer Battles”. Both made comments to the effect of Patton being one of the best allied generals with regard to his application of armored formations in combat. Von Mellenthin having fought against Patton in Alsace-Lorraine region of France remarked that He, his immediate superior, General Balck, and the army group Commander von Rundstedt were very wary of the movements of Patton and his 3rd army as they knew he had true understanding of armoured warfare. Though von Mellenthin goes on to say that Patton’s 3rd army’s habit of including “leg” infantry was a poor choice and hampered him from greater operational success, and the GI’s were rather poor soliders, but Patton still managed to make the most out of it.

In the other instance Von Luck faced off against Montgomery in operation “Goodwood” during the break out from Normandy and made mention of a number of rather obvious and simple mistakes Monty made during the operation. For instance he commented that British tanks would move with out any infantry support, or infantry moving without armoured support, would make it very easy for the Germans to deploy effective counter-measures and inflict great casualties on Monty’s forces.

They are, I feel, the best contemporary (of that time) sources for the feeling of German officers about two of the key allied commanders. If you want I can go back into both books and cite specifics passages.

Good post! :) Elsewhere, I’ve read that Montgomery would attack only when he had overwhelming numeric superiority. Superior generalship can be used to compensate for numerical parity, or even numerical inferiority. To my knowledge, Montgomery never displayed superior generalship in that way.

Admittedly, the Allies typically had overwhelming numerical superiority, especially after 1941. This meant Allied generals had relatively few opportunities to show what they could do in an even fight. But my sense is that Montgomery’s advances tended to be slow, plodding, unimaginative, and therefore more expensive in terms of Allied soldiers’ lives lost. Fast advances, such as Germany’s blitzkrieg or Patton’s attacks, tend to allow any given military objective to be achieved for a much smaller cost to one’s own soldiers.

You’ve pointed out that Montgomery made basic mistakes during Operation Goodwood. This reinforces my impression that Montgomery was a less capable, less imaginative, and less insightful general than Patton. A lack of deep insight and caution can often go together. Someone who does not deeply understand a situation cannot understand its risks or how to avoid them; and therefore seeks to minimize all risk. On the other hand, someone with deep insight may realize that something which on the surface had seemed risky is actually relatively safe–if done correctly. It’s a difference between an 80 year old woman driving 10 MPH below the speed limit, and a race car driver traveling at a very high speed. Something which would be sheer suicide for a below-average quality driver is within the acceptable risk tolerance of the race car driver. His skill greatly reduces the risk associated with his high speed. By the same token, Guderian, von Mannstein, or Patton could undertake rapid advances more safely than could Montgomery.

@KurtGodel7:

Elsewhere, I’ve read that Montgomery would attack only when he had overwhelming numeric superiority.

Where have you read this? Was that opinion offered by an authoritative source? Were those situations in which it would indeed have been a better course to attack without that overwhelming numeric superiority?

@KurtGodel7:

But my sense is that Montgomery’s advances tended to be slow, plodding, unimaginative, and therefore more expensive in terms of Allied soldiers’ lives lost. Fast advances, such as Germany’s blitzkrieg or Patton’s attacks, tend to allow any given military objective to be achieved for a much smaller cost to one’s own soldiers.

@KurtGodel7:

By the same token, Guderian, von Mannstein, or Patton could undertake rapid advances more safely than could Montgomery.

Are comparative statistics about the number of casualties and the measure of success in operations of roughly comparable scope conducted by these respective generals, available?

The usual lies and distortion peddled by those who can never forgive the fact Monty saw off the golden boy Rommel (twice) and in 12 weeks  planned and executed the complete destruction of the German Army in France.
Anyone wishing to find the facts about the  claims the German’s 'feared ’ Patton should get Yeid’s new book.

http://www.amazon.com/Fighting-Patton-George-Through-Enemies/dp/0760341281/ref=cm_cr_pr_product_top

Review here

http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/106656

It  demolished the claim that Patton’s reputation  was responsible for keeping German  troops away fron the beachead.

The claim Monty suffered dispropotionate casualties when fighting the German is a pure invention.

Listen to the boss……

Never far from the front lines

Test

The usual lies and distortion peddled by those who can never forgive the fact Monty saw off the golden boy Rommel (twice) and in 12 weeks  planned and executed the complete destruction of the German Army in France.
Anyone wishing to find the facts about the  claims the German’s 'feared ’ Patton should get Yeid’s new book.

http://www.amazon.com/Fighting-Patton-George-Through-Enemies/dp/0760341281/ref=cm_cr_pr_product_top

Review here

http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/106656

It  demolished the claim that Patton’s reputation  was responsible for keeping German  troops away fron the beachead.

The claim Monty suffered dispropotionate casualties when fighting the German is a pure invention.

I didn’t say anything about the Germans fearing Patton, but that the Germans regarded him as the most competent Allied armoured warfare General, and that after the break out from Normandy several German Generals and members of the General staff tired to keep close track of his 3rd army’s movement.

Also, have you ever heard of Operation Goodwood? You should read up on it some time because the casualties were extremely disproportional. British amroured strength was between 1,100 ad 1,300 while the Germans only had about 375. British losses are estimated around 400 tanks knocked out or destroyed while the Germans only lost around 80-90 tanks, which seems disproportional to me. British infantry supporting the operation suffered 4,000 casualties where as the Germans suffered only 2,000 (though by the end of the operation 2,500 Germans had also be captutred, so that could be considered more of an even exchange I guess).

@Clyde85:

I didn’t say anything about the Germans fearing Patton, but that the Germans regarded him as the most competent Allied armoured warfare General, and that after the break out from Normandy several German Generals and members of the General staff tired to keep close track of his 3rd army’s movement.

If you read the linked review I gave you then you could see that this claim is not correct.
However if you would like to continue down this road do you have the names/quotes of the ‘several German Generals and members of the General staff’

@Clyde85:

British infantry supporting the operation suffered 4,000 casualties where as the Germans suffered only 2,000 (though by the end of the operation 2,500 Germans had also be captutred, so that could be considered more of an even exchange I guess).

   16th LW FD alone lost 3600 men in July, the bulk of which were suffered during Goodwood. Indeed the Division was effectively destroyed on July 18th. In addition intelligence reports note that over 2800 German POW’s were taken (not 2500) Your German figures seem to be a bit too low but  balanced reporting has never been a factor when Goodwood is discussed.
German figures for Goodwood are not listed seperately but we know that for 12-20 July they lost 6500 men. I leave it to others to try and chip away at the total to find a figure that best suits their preconceptions.

POW totals for the UK are 325 so the Germans surrendered at a rate 9 times greater. Though some use the tank loss figures to ‘prove’ the Germans ‘won’ they never want to compare the POW totals. I wonder why?

Actually the POW comparison proves Clyde’s position.

The German units, even the SS ones, weren’t exactly fully comprised of experienced men between 22 and 40.

Everyone knew Germany was losing, and thus, many of thier conscripts just wanted to surrender.  So number for number, you would actually have to reduce consideration of the equitable strength of the German Forces, which was probably a hodge podge of whatever they had left.

In all likely hood these troops surrendered freely, as opposed to being captured.  And lets not talk about supplies, weapons, food, or discipline comparisons.

Thus in reality, the British SHOULD have had much superior results.  Especially considering the mostly had supremacy of the air.

@Lazarus:

If you read the linked review I gave you then you could see that this claim is not correct.
However if you would like to continue down this road do you have the names/quotes of the ‘several German Generals and members of the General staff’

If you read my post from earlier you’ll see where I mentioned this but if you can’t then here you go

@Clyde85:

I’ve based my comments on those I have read in the memoirs of Lt. Colonel Hans Van Luck in “Panzer Commander” and from Maj Gen. F.W. Von Mellenthins’ “Panzer Battles”. Both made comments to the effect of Patton being one of the best allied generals with regard to his application of armored formations in combat. Von Mellenthin having fought against Patton in Alsace-Lorraine region of France remarked that He, his immediate superior, General Balck, and the army group Commander von Rundstedt were very wary of the movements of Patton and his 3rd army as they knew he had true understanding of armoured warfare. Though von Mellenthin goes on to say that Patton’s 3rd army’s habit of including “leg” infantry was a poor choice and hampered him from greater operational success, and the GI’s were rather poor soliders, but Patton still managed to make the most out of it.

In the other instance Von Luck faced off against Montgomery in operation “Goodwood” during the break out from Normandy and made mention of a number of rather obvious and simple mistakes Monty made during the operation. For instance he commented that British tanks would move with out any infantry support, or infantry moving without armoured support, would make it very easy for the Germans to deploy effective counter-measures and inflict great casualties on Monty’s forces.

They are, I feel, the best contemporary (of that time) sources for the feeling of German officers about two of the key allied commanders. If you want I can go back into both books and cite specifics passages.

Also, I think your figures are off for Goodwood, and I think you may be including other operation such as Epsom, Martlet, Chanrwood, and Windsor which were the precursors to operation Goodwood that were carried out in June and July.